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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Antti Moisio 
 
   
  
 
In international comparisons and political debate the Nordic countries are often 
described as a region that successfully combines equality and economic success. 
As a result, the expressions “Nordic model” and “Nordic welfare state” have 
become common terms to describe political and social systems that aspire to high 
levels of fairness. Less well known is that all Nordic countries rely heavily on 
local governments for their public service provision, and that they are among the 
most decentralised countries in the world. The local governments in Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and Norway have a crucial role in providing and delivering the 
health, education and social services. Also the tax raising powers of the Nordic 
local governments are high when compared internationally. But despite the many 
similarities between the Nordic countries, a closer examination reveals some 
important differences in local government structure, financing and tasks. Each 
country has chosen its own way to practice the welfare state and the way that the 
sub-national level of government is involved in welfare service provision.  
The fact that the basic fiscal framework is similar but that the practical 
implementation differs, gives an interesting opportunity to compare these four 
countries and to analyse the effects of the different policies at the local 
government level. It also seems that all Nordic countries face similar future 
challenges, especially in the light of population ageing, public finance 
sustainability and globalisation. Learning from other countries’ experience 
should be easy in a situation where the basic structures of local government are 
so similar. In the Finnish case, the comparisons with the other Nordic countries 
are especially interesting. This is because Finland is at the outset of structural 
reforms that have already been implemented in Sweden and Denmark and to a 
degree in Norway.  
This book consists of six essays of which four discuss and analyse the situation 
of the local governments in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. In addition, 
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two essays provide a more general view of fiscal federalism. Each author was 
also asked to briefly comment on the Finnish situation. In order to be able to do 
this, the authors were sent a recent report that describes Finnish local government 
(Moisio, Loikkanen, Oulasvirta 2010). These comments are collected together in 
the last chapter of the book.  
The rest of this introduction provides a short summary of each essay trying to 
identify the key points for busy readers. Chapter two addresses the key policy 
issues associated with managing fiscal relations across levels of government. 
Chapter three consists of three sub-chapters, each describing local government in 
one Nordic country. Chapter four describes the Finnish local government. 
Chapter five discusses the ways to reform the local government to prepare it for 
future challenges. Finally, chapter six presents expert comments and suggestions 
for Finnish local government. 
1.1 Fiscal federalism in the aftermath of the global fiscal crisis  
The first paper of the book, by Camila Vammalle and Claire Charbit, starts with 
a thorough presentation of the traditional principles of fiscal federalism, and how 
these principles have evolved during the last decades in the OECD countries. 
They note that there is a wide array of multi-level government systems in the 
OECD, and that these systems involve a more complex assignment of tasks than 
the classic assignment of expenditure and revenue functions of Musgrave and 
Oates. In addition, they find that the present global fiscal crisis has affected 
adversely the implementation of fiscal federalism in OECD countries. As a 
result, they argue, the importance of policy coordination and partnership between 
central and local levels has greatly increased. Also, the traditional principles of 
fiscal federalism that are based on issues such as separation of central and local 
government, minimum interactions between different levels of government and 
competition between sub-central governments, may no longer apply. 
Interestingly, Vammalle and Charbit show that the countries that had existing 
institutions for inter-governmental coordination, were in the best position to 
respond to the recent global fiscal crisis. They emphasise that the future 
challenge among the OECD countries is to reform the central-local relationships 
to get them to work better together. This is not an easy task, however, as the 
tensions between central and local level may actually be increasing in the 
aftermath of the crisis, as someone will need to bear the cost of the consolidation. 
While the available policy tools (fiscal rules, taxes and grants) are the same as 
before, something totally new may be needed to avoid a “war of attrition” 
between levels of government. Although the financial crisis may have 
highlighted the need for reform, it may also make structural reforms more 
difficult, as there is less money to compensate losers.  
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1.2 The Nordic experience 
Denmark 
The article by Jens Blom-Hansen provides an in-depth discussion and analysis of 
the Danish local government. According to Blom-Hansen, the Danish state-local 
relationship is characterised by the strong position of central government. A good 
example of this was the big reform in 2007, when the number of municipalities 
was reduced from 271 to 98 and the 15 counties were replaced by five regions.  
The major tasks of the Danish municipalities consist of social services, primary 
schools and employment services. The regions concentrate solely on health care 
services. Municipal financing is based mainly on a local income tax. 
Municipalities are free to set their income tax rate, although municipal taxation is 
constrained by the yearly agreements by the central government and the 
municipal sector. Municipalities also levy taxes on property and receive a share 
of corporate income taxes, but these taxes generate far less revenue. The second 
most important revenue source is grants from the central government that are 
mainly in the form of block grants or general grants. Municipalities also get 
revenues from user fees.  
The regions are financed solely by municipalities and central government grants. 
Most of the funding for the regions is provided by central government block 
grants that take account of both a region’s needs and performance. The grants 
from municipalities to regions are of less importance. The main purpose of the 
municipal grants to the regions is to make the municipalities jointly responsible 
with the regions for health expenditure. The aim is that this will provide an 
incentive for the municipalities to establish effective health promotion and 
disease prevention measures within their health care areas.  
The Danish system of annual negotiations between the central government and 
the association of local authorities results in an agreement of the overall spending 
and revenue levels in the local governments. This system has been in place for 
decades and in the past, the system was able to keep the municipal expenditures 
within the agreed limits. But since 2007 the negotiation system has been less 
successful, as in 2008 the municipal expenditures grew much faster than agreed. 
To constrain the municipal expenditure growth, the central government has 
tightened the economic control by sanctioning the municipalities that have failed 
to follow the agreement.  
According to Blom-Hansen, the Danish system has been successful especially if 
judged by macroeconomic control of the local government. However, Blom-
Hansen also points out three areas of concern. First, the coordination between the 
municipal and regional level operation has proved to be a challenging task. 
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Although the Danish regions are now in practice single-purpose entities, the 
regional tasks still partly overlap with the municipal tasks. Second, the future of 
the regions seems uncertain. As the 2007 reform stripped off most of the powers 
from the intermediate level, political participation in the intermediate level has 
become less interesting. The debate about the proper organisation of the regional 
level is not over in Denmark, and there is speculation about abolishing the 
regions and establishing hospitals as independent organisations controlled by 
user boards. The third big challenge arises from the need to control municipal 
and regional expenditure. As mentioned above, the central government has been 
forced to use strong measures: if the municipalities raise taxes above the agreed 
guidelines, the general block grant is reduced by the same amount. These 
measures have guaranteed a perfect obedience from the municipal side, but in 
return no municipality dares to lower their tax rates. As some municipalities face 
rising costs, for instance due to local demographic developments, they can react 
by either pressurising the central government for more grants or by cutting local 
welfare. Blom-Hansen doubts that this state of affairs is sustainable in the longer 
run. 
Norway 
The third article of the book, written by Lars-Erik Borge, describes and analyses 
Norwegian local government. In Norway, local government consists of 19 
counties and 430 municipalities. The number of municipalities and counties has 
been quite stable during the past decades, and some of the municipalities have 
very small populations. Instead of big mergers, the most important recent reform 
in Norway concerning local government has been the health care reform in 2002, 
that transferred the responsibility of hospitals from the counties to central 
government.  
In Norway, the most important tasks for municipalities are social services and 
primary and lower secondary schooling. The counties concentrate on upper 
secondary education (general and vocational) but they also provide transportation 
services and are in charge of regional planning. In terms of revenues, the 
municipal level is more than 5 times as large as the county level.  
Income tax is by far the most important revenue source for both the 
municipalities and counties. Central government grants and user fees are the 
second and third most important revenue sources for both government levels. 
The counties are more dependent on central government grants, while user 
charges are more important for the municipalities. Municipalities also have the 
right to use property taxes and they get a fixed share of the wealth tax revenue 
and of the natural resource tax revenue. The most prosperous municipalities are 
the small rural communities with waterfalls, where property tax and natural 
resource tax from power companies make up substantial amounts per capita. 
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Norwegian local governments do not have much tax autonomy. Although 
municipalities have the right to set tax rates within limits set by central 
government, these powers are not used by the municipalities. Instead, the 
municipalities have used the maximum tax rates in income and wealth taxation 
during the last 30 years. Hence, this tax discretion applies only to the municipal 
property tax. The county governments have even less tax discretion since they do 
not have property tax. Borge argues that local tax autonomy should be increased, 
because greater tax discretion would result in more efficient and equal provision 
of local public services. Borge also sees that local tax discretion would improve 
local democracy by increased voter participation in local elections.  
A major challenge for Norwegian local government is that, despite the 
substantial equalisation system, the differences in fiscal capacity are large. The 
regional policy grants and natural resource tax revenues result in large 
differences in service provision and cost efficiency between municipalities. 
According to Borge, the Norwegian regional policy should be re-designed with 
less emphasis on grants to local governments.  
The situation of the counties poses another challenge for the Norwegian decision-
makers. According to Borge, there are two alternatives: first, to enlarge the 
counties and their responsibilities or, second, to abolish the intermediate 
government level completely. The latter option may not be feasible because most 
of the municipalities are too small to take responsibility for all of the county level 
tasks. Borge concludes that in the short term, there is still a need for the middle 
tier, but with a down-scaled administration and political system (possibly with 
council members appointed by the municipalities). 
Despite many efforts to reduce the number of municipalities by merger reforms, 
municipal mergers have not been common in Norway. According to Borge, the 
slow process of increasing the population size of the municipalities is a challenge 
for the efficiency and quality of service provision, as the welfare services are 
getting more complicated and require more skills. Small municipalities have 
problems in recruiting competent personnel to satisfy national regulations and to 
meet demands from citizens. If the present policy of voluntary mergers 
continues, it seems likely that in the longer term the central government will take 
on more responsibilities for provision of welfare services. As for municipal 
cooperation, Borge does not see that this could be a serious alternative to merger 
reform in Norway. The preferred outcome is a national reform of the municipal 
structure to establish robust municipalities that can provide welfare services 
efficiently and also take on new tasks.  
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Sweden 
The last article of section three is by Matz Dahlberg, who analyses the Swedish 
local government. In Sweden, there are presently 290 municipalities and 21 
counties that together form the local government sector. Of the two local 
government levels, the municipalities are responsible for more tasks and handle a 
much larger budget. The main municipal tasks are the schooling, elderly care, 
child care and social care services. The counties are mainly responsible for 
healthcare services. 
In Sweden, the local income tax is the only tax revenue available to 
municipalities and counties, and it generates the biggest share of the municipal 
and county revenues. Inter-governmental grants and user fees form the second 
and third biggest source of funding. Both the municipalities and the counties can 
set their income tax rates. They can also decide on spending levels and are 
allowed to borrow freely on both domestic and international credit markets. The 
grant system for the municipalities and counties is mainly based on revenue 
equalisation but also on the service needs and cost differentials as well as 
structural differences which are taken into account.  
In his article, Dahlberg discusses carefully the most important Swedish reforms 
concerning local government. For the amalgamation reforms (these were mostly 
done between 1952 and 1974) Dahlberg takes up the common pool problem. The 
common pool problem exists when a municipality has an incentive to raise its per 
capita debt before the amalgamation. The empirical evidence from the Swedish 
amalgamation reforms supports the common pool problem. Therefore the policy 
recommendation is that the reforms decided by the central government should 
follow strict protocols to prevent this malpractice. The common pool problem 
may also prevent otherwise reasonable voluntary amalgamations, if no 
previously agreed debt policy exists.  
As an example of reforms of municipal tasks, Dahlberg discusses the 
decentralisation of primary education in the 1990s. Before 1991, the primary 
schooling system comprised central government regulations, centrally employed 
teachers and earmarked grants for specific categories of school spending. After 
the reforms, the municipalities were funded with a general grant that allowed the 
municipalities to allocate freely their money across different tasks. In addition, 
wage settlement for teachers was devolved to school level. Since the 
implementation of the education reforms, Sweden has experienced an overall 
decline in education expenditures relative to GDP and a decrease in the number 
of teachers in compulsory schools. Moreover, school resources have decreased 
most amongst those schools with students that were already provided with low 
resources. As a result, student performance has clearly lowered in Sweden. Based 
on this evidence, Dahlberg concludes that decentralisation might lead to an 
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undesirably large variation in school resources. Hence, from an equity 
perspective, a decentralised school system might not be desirable, and some 
centralisation of resources for schooling might be necessary. 
As for the municipal revenues, Dahlberg thinks that due to business cycle 
swings, the Swedish local tax revenues are far too volatile. This poses a threat to 
the provision of important welfare services such as education, child care and 
elderly care. The situation could be improved by tying grants to the general 
macro economy swings or by centralising some of the municipal services. 
Alternatively, the requirement for municipalities to have balanced budgets could  
be relaxed so that municipalities could build up funds in good times to be used in 
bad times. Dahlberg also suggests that the Swedish tradition of using 
discretionary grants to fund municipalities should be abolished in order to avoid 
the soft budget constraint problems. 
1.3 The Finnish local government 
In the fourth section of the book, Finnish local government is described and 
discussed by Antti Moisio, Heikki A. Loikkanen and Lasse Oulasvirta. In 
Finland, unlike in the other Nordic countries described in this book, there is only 
a single tier of local government. In 2010 there are 326 municipalities and 226 
joint authorities formed by municipalities that are in charge of all education, 
health and social services. In addition, municipalities provide local infrastructure, 
housing and planning services. In practice, municipal cooperation has replaced 
the intermediate government tier and has made it possible for the small 
municipalities to exist.  
The Finnish municipal finances consist of tax revenues, grants, user fees and 
sales revenues. The main source of municipal revenue is the municipal income 
tax. There is also a municipal property tax, but its importance is small. In 
addition, municipalities receive a share of state corporate tax revenue. 
Municipalities are free to set their income tax rates without limits and they can 
set their property tax rates within the limits set by central government. 
Municipalities do not have rights to affect the tax bases (tax reliefs or 
deductions).  Municipalities decide autonomously on spending levels and they 
are allowed to borrow freely.  There is a single block grant that is based mainly 
on cost equalisation formulae. The system also takes account of revenue 
equalisation. Like other Nordic countries, the grant system results in a high 
degree of equalisation between municipalities.  
The most important reform in the Finnish municipal sector to date was the grant 
reform in 1993. This reform, that was refined in 1997, caused a fundamental shift 
from a pure matching grants system to a block grants system. The grant reform 
and the accompanying Local Government Act reform in 1995 gave 
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municipalities more freedom to decide upon their own matters. As a result, the 
productivity of municipal services improved considerably at the end of the 
1990s, although the deep economic recession and the central government tight 
fiscal policy in the beginning of the decade had an effect too.   
At present, the major municipal reform is the ongoing PARAS reform that aims 
to achieve economies of scale and sufficient capacity in the municipalities to 
provide services. In practice, the PARAS reform encourages municipalities to 
merge or to increase co-operation. The resulting larger catchment areas are 
expected to help the municipalities to cope with the increasing costs of local 
public service provision due to population ageing and internal migration. So far, 
the PARAS reform has been successful in creating larger catchment areas, but 
the effect on the actual municipal services is still to be seen. In fact, the 
reforming of the service structure after reaching the required minimum 
population bases – by merger or cooperation – has been left to the municipalities 
themselves. But past mergers do not have a convincing record in cost savings or 
efficiency improvements. Therefore, it is unlikely that the present mergers will 
have immediate beneficial effects on either service improvements or cost 
savings. The OECD has criticized the PARAS reform for a lack of strategic 
vision and complexity that can seriously jeopardize success in the ultimate goal 
of reforming the service structures.  
Another interesting effort to reform the local public sector in Finland is the 
administrative experiment in Kainuu region. An experimental regional level 
authority for cooperation and decision-making was launched in the Kainuu 
region in 2005 and the experiment is to last until 2012. This regional level 
authority is in charge of 60 percent of all municipal tasks in Kainuu region, 
including health care, social services (except daycare), secondary schooling and 
planning. Kainuu regional authority is governed by an elected council. The 
financing of the Kainuu regional authority comes from the nine member 
municipalities so that each municipality pays 60.1 per cent of their revenue (tax 
revenue and grants) to the regional authority. The Kainuu regional authority 
differs from the traditional Finnish joint authorities mainly with its elected 
council, with its extensive list of tasks and its fixed budget financing. The latest 
evaluation reports claim that the Kainuu experiment has been successful in 
cutting costs and improving efficiency. On the other hand the Finnish National 
Audit Office has offered a much more critical view of the achievements of the 
Kainuu experiment. In sum, there is clearly a need for more empirical evidence 
on the effects of the experiment, before any conclusions about the suitability of 
the model for wider use can be made. 
In the conclusion of their paper, Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta discuss the 
present challenges to the Finnish municipal sector. First, the benefits of the 
intermediate level should be further explored for example by extending the 
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Kainuu experiment or by setting up an intermediate level of governments in the 
surroundings of the main urban centres to take care of tasks like land use and 
transportation. Another alternative could be to intensify the PARAS reform by 
amalgamations of the weakest municipalities into neighbouring towns or cities – 
voluntarily or by force – to create stronger independent municipalities. With 
more equal partners for cooperation, the inter-municipal cooperation could then 
concentrate on services that truly need a larger scale of operation. That said, it 
may well be that the traditional methods or thinking may no longer apply in 
solving the future problems of local government. It is equally possible that the 
answers can be found from better utilisation of market mechanisms in the 
municipal sector. Indeed, this development has already started as a growing 
number of municipalities are presently outsourcing their services and utilising 
vouchers in the service provision. 
1.4 Reflections on the Reform of Local Governance for the Next 
Decade 
The essay written by Anwar Shah begins with discussion of the change that has 
taken place during the last decades: the globalisation, the market liberation and 
the information revolution. Shah argues that despite these positive developments, 
the global financial crisis has recently forced us to reconsider the role and 
responsibilities of local governments. In his essay, Shah discusses the future of 
local government from several perspectives: traditional fiscal federalism, new 
public management, public choice, new institutional economics, and network 
forms of local governance. As a synthesis, Shah argues that top-down 
hierarchical controls are ineffective, as they tend to disregard client orientation, 
bottom-up accountability and lowering of transaction costs for citizens. 
According to Shah, local governments can have a major role in the new public 
governance provided that the central control over them is diminished. In the 
future, local government should operate actively as purchaser of local services 
and as a facilitator of networks of government providers and entities beyond 
government. According to Shah, the funding of local government should be 
based on output based grants rather than on complicated formula based block 
grants.  
1.5 The Finnish model – which way forward? 
Camila Vammalle and Claire Charbit base their comments on several recent 
OECD reports on public governance, regional policy and policy reforms. First, 
they emphasise the need for reform in Finland due to the socio-economic forces 
(population ageing, internal migration) and the recent global fiscal crisis that 
together seriously challenge the viability of the present organisation of the local 
government. They note that other Nordic countries and many EU countries have 
recently gone through structural reforms to increase the municipal size and to 
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reinforce the regional government. They also note that in some cases, like in 
Sweden, the regional structure has not been based on a single “one size fits all” 
model. This process of “asymmetric decentralisation” enables the learning-by-
doing and tailoring different solutions for regions with different needs and 
capacities. But with this development there is also a risk of creating a complex 
and heterogeneous system in which accountability mechanisms are unclear and 
the credibility of the regional level is limited. But based on the recent OECD 
reports on Finland, Vammalle and Charbit argue that in practice Finland has 
already allowed a rather asymmetrical decentralisation. Another point they make 
is that while the PARAS reform has already been able to increase the municipal 
size, it seems that the municipalities do not yet have strong enough incentives to 
seek structural changes. This situation could be improved by altering the 
equalisation mechanisms so that the small municipalities have a clear incentive to 
improve their cost efficiency by merging or joining a cooperation area. The 
PARAS reform would also benefit from setting clear targets for the mergers and 
clear guidelines for the cooperation areas. In addition, there is clearly a lack of 
good quality information on the effects of different experiments and of the 
PARAS reform. Based on the OECD experience of the successful reforms in the 
member countries, Vammalle and Charbit recommend bundling several reforms 
together. This could push public administration reforms through, as stakeholders 
may lose from some elements of the reform while benefiting from others, 
therefore being either indifferent or even supportive of the reform as a whole. 
Jens Blom-Hansen comments on the Finnish system using the Danish experience 
on municipal amalgamations, equalisation schemes, macroeconomic control and 
intermediate government level. Based on the experience of a massive scale 
amalgamation reform performed in Denmark in 2007, Blom-Hansen sees the 
biggest challenge as controlling municipal expenditure. Municipal expenditure 
may easily increase because of common pool problems, pressures to improve the 
municipal service quality or because of failure to utilise economies of scale. To 
fight the common pool problems, Blom-Hansen emphasises the importance of 
clear rules in advance of the amalgamations. This could mean, for example, 
restrictions on local investments, current spending levels and tax rates. Also, 
compulsory saving schemes in advance of the mergers could help to avoid the 
“spend before closing time” behaviour.  
To constrain the municipal expenditure growth after the merger can be difficult 
too, because of political pressure to show positive effects of the mergers and 
because prior to the mergers, local citizens are usually told that amalgamations 
will result in local service improvements. In addition, the latest research results 
from Denmark show that it is very difficult to gain economies of scale effects 
from the amalgamations. This is not to say that amalgamations do not have any 
positive effects. Mergers force the municipalities to reconsider their organisation, 
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service standards, administrative routines and number and size of their services 
units. But the lesson from the Danish experience is that in economic terms 
municipal amalgamations carry considerable risks and no easy gains. 
As for the equalisation systems, Blom-Hansen shows that the problems discussed 
in Finland are topical issues also in Denmark. The block grant systems that are 
based on measures of need and cost factors usually suffer from the difficulty of 
finding a balance between fairness and transparency. In addition, grant system 
reforms are often difficult to manage because they need to be implemented as 
zero-sum games between municipalities, and this causes political problems. It is 
then likely that the status quo of grant policies will be constantly challenged. 
In Denmark the local governments are subjected to tight macroeconomic control. 
This situation is based on the system of annual economic negotiations between 
the central government and the association of local and regional authorities. As a 
result of these negotiations, an agreement that defines the overall expenditure and 
revenue of the local government sector is signed. Although individual 
municipalities may deviate from the agreement, in practice the system is rigid 
because municipalities cannot adjust their own revenues due to fear of central 
government sanctions. According to Blom-Hansen, the Danish structural reform 
has contributed to increased local government expenditure and to keep the 
expenditure of the local governments within limits, the central government has 
implemented tight control measures, which in turn have decreased the autonomy 
of the local government. A reform that will create considerably bigger 
municipalities will perhaps need an accompanying reform of fiscal rules to 
control the growth of public expenditure.  
Lastly, Blom-Hansen shows that in Denmark the status of the regional level of 
government has traditionally been weak because of lack of support from the 
citizens. Therefore, in Denmark, the argument for regional government service 
provision is not local democracy but instead the administrative efficiency. All in 
all, the Danish model seems to be based on strong municipalities and not so 
much on regionalisation. Blom-Hansen ends by stating that based on the Danish 
experience, he cannot recommend any large-scale regionalization efforts in 
Finland unless a strong regional allegiance by the local citizenry can be 
demonstrated. 
Matz Dahlberg comments on the Finnish system of joint authorities, the 
municipal amalgamations, the grant system and the tasks of municipalities. 
Dahlberg sees several potential problems with the joint authorities. For example, 
it might be difficult to secure adequate preference matching and transparency and 
accountability of decision-making, when the decision-makers of the joint 
authorities are not elected but instead nominated by municipalities. The joint 
authorities may also create common pool problems in cases where the cost of 
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joint authority membership to municipalities is fixed (as in fact is the case in the 
Kainuu regional authority experiment). According to Dahlberg, one solution to 
these problems is to impose an additional local government level which would be 
responsible for services that need a large population base and whose decision-
makers are elected in general elections. As for the specific question of the correct 
level of government to perform the planning of land use, Dahlberg emphasizes 
that without good information on the benefits and costs of larger jurisdictions, it 
is hard to say what the optimal jurisdictional size should be for land use planning.  
Dahlberg thinks that there is room for policy improvements concerning the 
municipal amalgamations in Finland. While the research results have not been 
able to show that amalgamations will result in significant economic 
improvements, it should be noted that the existing research can show that local 
democracy will suffer with larger municipalities. Moreover, the Finnish policy of 
voluntary mergers supported by extra grants to merging municipalities might 
reward inefficient, debt-financed, spending behaviour. Instead of the voluntary 
approach to amalgamations, the process could be improved by a central 
government led programme whereby the central government announces the 
amalgamations that should happen and follows the process through until the 
amalgamations have taken place.  
At present, in Finland a large share of the grants allocated to the municipalities is 
based on municipal characteristics. According to Dahlberg, this is problematic 
because the municipalities may be able to affect some of the variables through 
their policies, and thereby the allocation of grants. The weights used for the 
different municipal characteristics in the allocation rule seem also problematic.   
As for the large variety of municipal tasks in Finland, Dahlberg points to the 
research on decentralisation of schools and welfare assistance in Sweden, which 
indicates that decentralisation might lead to an undesirably large variation in 
school resources for students from the society’s point of view. Therefore, some 
centralisation of the municipal tasks should be considered.  
Lars-Erik Borge comments on the Finnish municipal structure, cooperation 
among municipalities, the discussion about middle tier of government and the 
equalisation system. The Finnish municipal structure much resembles the 
Norwegian one, with a high proportion of small municipalities and a voluntary 
programme of amalgamations to reform the municipal structure. But the Finnish 
PARAS reform seems to have been successful in reducing the number of 
municipalities whereas in Norway amalgamations have been rare. Therefore, 
although Borge supports the idea of a national solution to create a new municipal 
structure in Norway, the situation in Finland seems to make him wonder. In 
Finland, those municipalities who decide not to merge, choose to cooperate. In 
Norway, this is not the case. So it seems that the Finnish case with extensive 
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cooperation is special and may need another kind of solution. Nevertheless, the 
Finnish system of joint authorities seems to be somewhat problematic as it can 
result in unclear responsibilities and little accountability.  
As for the middle tier of government, the present Norwegian and Finnish 
discussion are concentrated on the same issue, but from opposite points of view: 
in Norway the abolition of the intermediate tier is on the agenda. According to 
Borge, the Norwegian experience is that it is difficult to build up sufficient 
political legitimacy for a new middle tier. Since its establishment in Norway in 
1976, the middle tier has never been able to fulfil its expectations. The citizens 
are far more attached to municipal and national politicians than to county 
politicians. Therefore, Borge does not recommend that Finland to establishes an 
intermediate government tier with its own taxation rights and an elected council 
for small purpose services like regional planning, transportation, and other minor 
issues. If such an intermediate level were to be established, the responsibility for 
something very important like the hospitals should be a pre-condition.  
As for the equalisation system, Borge has three proposals. First, the separate 
block grants formulas for education, health and social services should be 
combined into a single block grant. This would make the system less confusing. 
In addition, the cost equalisation could be made self-financing by letting 
contributions from municipalities with below average calculatory costs finance 
the transfers to municipalities with above average calculatory costs. The central 
government funded amount of money in the present cost equalisation grants 
could be transferred into a flat per capita grant. Lastly, the system could be 
improved by altering the revenue equalisation so that the municipalities below 
the 92 per cent threshold would receive less than 100 per cent compensation. 
This would improve the incentives to develop the local tax base. 
Anwar Shah comments on the Finnish case mostly from the governance point of 
view. When compared to many other industrialised countries Finland seems a 
success story rather than a problematic case. Shah thinks that the Finnish solution 
with wide municipal tasks actually recognises the role of municipalities as 
primary agents of people and is therefore a positive thing from the local 
democratic point of view. The local government structure in Finland without an 
intermediate level and with extensive municipal cooperation is also a positive 
element that should not be reformed. For financing of local governments, Shah 
recommends the use of output-based fiscal transfers for merit goods that set 
national minimum standards in education, health, social welfare and 
infrastructure. The mistake of basing the equalisation systems on complicated 
formulae as done in Australia, Netherlands and several other countries should be 
avoided. The Finnish municipalities should aim to achieve performance 
budgeting by linking their budgeting with planning, evaluation and human 
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resource management. Overall, Shah thinks that the Finnish model can be 
improved with fine tuning rather than comprehensive reforms. 
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Chapter 2 
Fiscal Federalism.  
Recent Developments and Future Trends1 
Camila Vammalle – Claire Charbit2 
 
  
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
By highlighting mutual dependency and the need for coordination between levels 
of government, the global financial crisis has shaken the traditional principles of 
fiscal federalism. Indeed, traditionally, fiscal federalism rests on the principles of 
“separation” (strict separation of competencies defined by the Constitution or the 
law), “non-interference” (minimisation of interactions between different levels of 
government) and “competition” (both between sub-central governments, but also 
vertical competition between levels of government). But these last decades have 
seen a general trend in OECD countries towards greater delegation of spending 
responsibilities to sub-national levels of government, while at the same time, 
macroeconomic pressure on central governments (CGs) has increased. Sub-
central governments (SCGs) thus face increased responsibilities in terms of 
public service delivery, but do not always have the discretion about the level of 
their resources, nor about how to spend these. This leads to a situation of mutual 
dependency between levels of government, where CGs need the cooperation of 
SCGs in order to achieve their nationwide macroeconomic objectives, while 
SCGs need to negotiate the allocation of resources, spending responsibilities and 
expected results with CGs. In particular, to tackle the global financial crisis and 
                                              
 
1 This article is based on work carried out for the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of 
Government. The authors would like to thank Lee Mizell, Hansjörg Blöchliger and Timothy Goodspeed 
for their contribution to this network. For more information on this network, please visit: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism 
2 Camila Vammalle and Claire Charbit are, respectively, Economist/Policy Analyst, and Head of 
Unit/Senior Policy Analyst in the Multi-Level Governance Unit, Regional Development Policy Division 
at the Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, OECD. 
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implement timely and effective stimulus programs, CGs soon realised that SCGs 
were unavoidable partners, for at least two reasons: 
1. SCGs were also facing financial difficulties due to the crisis (declining 
revenues and raising expenditures, especially for those SCGs with large 
responsibilities in terms of social protection). They could therefore be 
tempted – or obliged – to cut expenditure (in particular investment) and 
raise taxes, which would have contributed to worsening the real sector and 
social crisis; 
2. On average, SCGs are responsible for two thirds of public investment in 
OECD countries, and have the information about the desirability and 
feasibility of investment projects which could be implemented very fast 
(“shovel ready” projects as they were called in Canada). They were 
therefore a necessary partner for implementing the stimulus packages, as 
these heavily relied on public investment. 
The global financial crisis thus clearly highlighted the mutual dependence 
between levels of government, and therefore, the need to coordinate their 
responses to the crisis. Indeed, CGs stimulus plans were deemed to fail if SCGs 
carried out pro-cyclical (“anti-stimulus”) policies, but SCGs would not have had 
a choice than cutting expenditure – thus investment – without CGs actions (either 
by providing direct financial support, by relaxing budget rules to allow SCGs to 
exceptionally increase budget deficits, by facilitating SCGs’ borrowing, etc.).3 
Besides, in the advent of a slow recovery and long lasting high unemployment, 
more and more people will move from unemployment benefits to social welfare 
programs. As in OECD countries, SCGs often have large responsibilities in terms 
of welfare, this could therefore cause a lagged and long-term impact of the global 
financial crisis on SCG finances. The need for coordination across levels of 
government is therefore both immediate, and potentially long lasting. 
Those countries who already had a tradition of coordination between levels of 
government and who counted with the appropriate institutions for this 
coordination saved time in implementing their recovery strategies (such as 
Australia with the COAG or Canada with the Regional Development Agencies). 
Other countries had to create these institutions (ex. Sweden extended the 
experimental project of the “Regional Coordinator”), or suffered from their 
absence (as the United States). Ironically, highly centralised countries (such as 
Korea) did not face such coordination problems, as all decisions could be taken 
                                              
 
3 For an analysis of the early reactions of central and sub-central governments to the crisis, please see 
Blöchliger, Charbit, Pinero-Campos, Vammalle (2010), Sub-Central Governments and the Economic 
Crisis: Impact and Policy Responses, Economics Department Working Papers No. 752, OECD, Paris. 
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by the CG (but if this allowed them to act fast, it may not have led them to 
choose the potentially most relevant investment for long term development).  
The design of intergovernmental fiscal relations bears multiple – possibly 
conflicting – objectives: macroeconomic stability, efficiency of spending and 
redistribution concerns. The main instruments to achieve these goals are fiscal 
rules, taxes and grants. This paper addresses some of the key policy issues 
associated with managing fiscal relations across levels of government. The next 
section presents the key issues associated with managing fiscal relations across 
levels of government. Sections three to six analyze how the key instruments such 
as expenditure assignment, revenue assignment rules and performance indicators 
are used in order to achieve the efficiency, equity and stability objectives. Section 
six gives some preliminary findings of a study carried out by the OECD Network 
on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government on the political economy of 
fiscal decentralization reforms, and presents a preliminary summary of recent and 
planned reforms in a sample of OECD unitary countries. The final section 
concludes. 
2.2 Objectives of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
There is a clear trend in the last decade towards a greater devolution of spending 
and revenue raising capacities to SCGs, following the idea that decentralisation 
of spending responsibilities can improve efficiency in the allocation of resources 
and welfare. Indeed, local governments should have better information about 
local needs and preferences, and could therefore provide a composition, quantity 
and quality of public goods closer to the preferences of their beneficiaries4. But 
decentralisation has also its drawbacks, aggravating regional differences and 
undermining distributional equity. As stated above, the global financial crisis has 
shown that decentralisation makes macroeconomic management more delicate, 
as SCGs actions can go against central government’s macroeconomic objectives5 
and coordination between levels of government becomes necessary.  
To achieve its three objectives (efficiency, equity and stability), the design of 
fiscal relations across levels of government has three main policy tools: the share, 
composition and autonomy of SCGs expenditures, the share, composition and 
autonomy of SCGs revenues, and fiscal rules. 
 Allocation efficiency concerns are mainly addressed in the assignment of 
spending responsibilities. The general rule is that to increase efficiency in the 
                                              
 
4 See for instance Tiebout (1961), Musgrave (1969), Oates (1972) or Ter-Minassian (1997). 
5 See Prud’Homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996). 
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allocation of resources, the responsibility for each type of public expenditure 
should be assigned to the level of government that most closely represents the 
beneficiaries of these services. Therefore, in general terms, the more spending 
autonomy is given to SCGs, the greater the allocation efficiency. But the 
efficiency benefits from spending delegation must be balanced with possible 
negative impacts of spending decentralisation on other objectives, such as equity 
(as poorer regions will not be able to provide the same level of public goods than 
more developed regions) and macroeconomic stability (as the addition of all 
SCGs spending might lead to over-spending on a global level). Besides, as some 
locally provided public goods and services might have externalities which will 
not be taken into account by SCGs, the aggregate level of public goods provided 
might not be optimal. An example of such goods is education or basic health 
care, which affect the overall stock of human capital, and therefore the potential 
for growth at national level. 
Equity (income redistribution) concerns are one of the key elements in the 
allocation of revenues. The main sources of financing for SCGs are own taxes, 
and inter-governmental transfers (tax-sharing and grants). The larger the reliance 
of SCGs on own taxes, the larger the potential discrepancies between poorer and 
richer regions. Inter-governmental transfers are thus needed to increase 
distributional equalisation. These can take the form of tax-sharing, where the 
coefficients are calculated on redistribution criteria, such as population, regional 
income per capita, indicators of backwardness, etc., or they can take the form of 
grants. The drawback of equalisation is that if incentives are not designed 
properly, it might lead to moral hazard issues, where SCGs will not be 
encouraged to increase tax pressure, as their lower revenues are compensated by 
intergovernmental transfers. 
Finally, stability (macroeconomic management) issues are mainly addressed 
through fiscal rules such as golden rules, balanced budget rules or borrowing 
rules. These fiscal rules should allow SCGs to provide the most efficient level of 
public goods, while making sure that SCGs’ policies are consistent with national 
macroeconomic objectives.  
National fiscal arrangements between levels of government vary widely, as they 
necessarily incorporate local economic, but also political, social and cultural 
factors. In the remainder of this paper, we will give a picture of these choices in 
the OECD countries, based on the research conducted by the OECD Network on 
Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government.  
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2.3 Allocating expenditures between levels of government 
a) Assigning responsibilities for expenditure functions 
The theory of assignment of functions to levels of government often begins from 
Musgrave’s (1959) classification of government functions: redistribution, 
allocation, and stabilization. Oates (1972) suggests that the stabilization and 
redistribution functions should be assigned to the central level of government, 
while there is some role for SCGs in fulfilling the allocation function for certain 
types of public goods. The reasoning behind the above allocation of 
responsibilities is three-fold. First, macroeconomic stabilization depends on 
monetary and fiscal policies normally residing at the central level of government. 
Indeed, fiscal policy is thought to be more effective when used by national 
governments, and national spending and tax policies may also provide automatic 
stabilizers that cannot be implemented at the sub-national level (because of a 
higher cost of borrowing, or spillover effects of local spending on other sub 
national governments, which will deter local spending). Still, the global financial 
crisis has shown that SCGs’ must be implicated in the national stimulus plans, 
and that they can also carry out efficiently their own stimulus plans when 
needed.6  
Second, with respect to redistribution, it is very difficult for SCGs to redistribute 
in a world of mobile resources. Indeed, an attempt by a SCG to tax a mobile 
resource in order to redistribute to poorer mobile factors would result in the flight 
of the wealthy to avoid paying for the redistribution and an influx of the poor in 
order to benefit from it. This dynamic would tend to defeat the redistributive goal 
if pursued by SCGs. But as resources are less mobile internationally than within 
a country, central governments are in a better position to attain redistributive 
goals. 
Finally, with respect to allocation, pure national public goods with economies of 
scale will benefit the most from cost-sharing and hence are clear candidates for 
central government provision. This is the case for example for defence, foreign 
affairs, interstate transport and telecommunications infrastructure, etc. Public 
goods that are subject to congestion and whose benefits are limited 
geographically will not benefit from cost-sharing and are therefore best provided 
by SCGs in order to take advantage of the ability of SCGs to more closely match 
regional public service delivery with local preferences. But SCGs will not take 
into account the possible externalities of their decisions on other regions (for 
instance, contagious diseases might have an impact outside the boundaries of a 
given SCG, but only the impact on its own residents will be taken into account, 
                                              
 
6 See Blöchliger & Alii (2010). 
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therefore leading to a lower level of spending on prevention if decided at sub-
national level than the one that would be considered optimal on a nationwide 
scale).  
Although there is general agreement on the normative principles outlined here, 
actual expenditure assignment usually leads to some overlapping in the 
assignment of responsibilities. Some areas, such as defence, foreign affairs, 
foreign trade, etc., must clearly be assigned to central governments, while in 
others such as local police, fire prevention, sanitation, etc., SCGs have much 
more information about local needs and preferences, and are therefore best suited 
to provide the goods. But many other expenses do not have such clear cuts, often 
leading to overlapping and ambiguities about which level of government is 
responsible for their provision. As there is no unique answer, this leads to a great 
variety of situations across countries. This situation was predicted by Mancur 
Olson’s (1969) theory of “fiscal equivalence” in which he argues that it might be 
possible to define an “optimal” geographic size of government for each public 
service that corresponds to the boundaries that internalize all externalities. But as 
the boundaries of governments and the relative power of central government pre-
exist (they are given by historical factors that do not take these issues into 
account), it seems almost inevitable that there will be over-lapping assignments 
of responsibilities as countries deal with the most efficient way to structure 
government. 
b) Spending power of SCGs 
The relative share of SCGs spending in total government spending varies greatly 
across countries, ranging from 6% in Greece, to almost 70% in Canada, with an 
average of 33% (Figure 2.1). But assigning spending responsibilities to SCGs is 
not enough to assure effective allocation efficiency. Indeed, sub-national 
spending might be strongly influenced by upper levels of government, thereby 
reducing their discretion over their spending, thus reducing their ability to 
allocate resources where they are most efficient at the local level. The commonly 
used measure of the relative share of sub-national spending to total government 
spending does not take this factor into account. It would therefore be useful to 
have a set of indicators of sub-national spending power autonomy, in order to 
assess how decentralisation affects policy outcomes like public sector efficiency 
or the long-term fiscal stability. 
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Figure 2.1. Share of sub-central governments in general government 
revenues and expenditure* in OECD countries 
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Note: Decentralisation is measured by the changes in the share of SCGs in total public revenues and 
spending. 
 
1. Or latest year available: 2005 for Korea, New Zealand and Poland. 
2. Excluding transfers received from other levels of government. 
3. Excluding transfers paid to other levels of government. 
4. The share of subnational revenues is expressed in percent of total government mainland revenues. 
 
* General government revenues and expenditures are broken out between central government, sub-
national governments (local and, when available, intermediate) and Social Security. As the share 
attributed to Social Security varies widely between countries (from 45.3% of spending in France to 4.4% 
in Denmark), this has a sigificant impact on the remaining shares attributed to central and sub-national 
governments. 
 
Source: OECD National Accounts database; US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
There is no set of internationally comparable indicators of spending power 
(defined as the extent of control SCGs exert over their budget), except for very 
recent studies by the OECD. In particular, the OECD Network on Fiscal 
Relations across Levels of Government has recently done a pilot study on sub-
national spending power indicators, by sending questionnaires to a sample of 
countries in the summer 2007 and spring 2008, focusing on four specific policy 
areas: education, public transport, childcare and elderly care (Bach, Blöchliger, 
Wallau, 2008). 
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The term “spending power” was defined for this study as the “ability of SCGs to 
shape, determine and change their spending policy”, which means: to what extent 
do they set the rules and regulations that govern the services they provide? These 
rules and regulations were grouped into five categories: policy autonomy (are 
SCGs obliged to provide certain services?), budget autonomy (is expenditure 
autonomy limited by earmarked grants or expenditure limits?), input autonomy 
(staff management, salaries, right to tender or contract out services), output 
autonomy (standards setting for quality and quantity of goods provided) and 
monitoring and evaluation (to what extent do SCGs exert control over evaluation, 
monitoring and benchmarking?).  
Figure 2.2. Comparing SCG expenditure ratios and SCG spending power 
indicators 
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Note: Bars and the left hand scale represent SCG expenditure shares in percent, dots and the right hand 
scale represent spending power indicators. The spending power indicator for “public transportation” is 
compared to the expenditure ratio for “economic affairs”. The spending power indicator for (primary and 
secondary) “education” is compared to the expenditure ratio for “education”. The mean of the spending 
power indicators for “child- and elderly care” is compared to the expenditure ratio for “social protection”. 
Switzerland is not represented due to lack of COFOG I data. National Accounts data are unconsolidated.  
 
Source: OECD (Bach, Blöchliger, Wallau, 2008). 
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Figure 2.2 compares the spending power indicators with the expenditure shares 
in the corresponding policy areas. It supports the hypothesis that simple 
expenditure ratios often poorly reflect effective sub-national spending power: 
whereas expenditure ratios frequently exceed 50%, the corresponding spending 
power indicator is rarely above the value of 5 (on a scale of 10), indicating that 
sub-national spending power is more limited than expenditure share suggests. 
The conclusions of this preliminary study are the following: 
• Spending power indicators show relatively low SCG spending autonomy: 
much sub-national spending is regulated or otherwise influenced by 
central government, and simple expenditure shares tend to overestimate 
actual sub-central spending autonomy; 
• Spending power is particularly low in education, even though SCG 
spending share in this area is very large (above 50%); 
• Federal countries grant more power than unitary countries. 
2.4 Determining the size and type of revenues for SCGs 
Financing public service delivery is also a shared responsibility between levels of 
government. SCGs have two main sources of funds: own taxes and transfers (fees 
usually make up for a low fraction of their revenues). Each of these types of 
revenues has different implications on the efficiency, equity and stability 
objectives, and therefore, the sub-national revenue mix will affect the final 
outcomes. In this section, we analyse the theoretical views of which taxes should 
be attributed to SCGs and which should be collected by central governments, and 
finally, what is the optimal level of discretion of SCGs over these resources 
(control over the tax rates and the tax base). Each time, we will confront these 
general principles with the actual practice in OECD countries. 
a) Revenue structure of SCGs: taxes vs. grants 
The “Fiscal gap” (the difference between SCGs expenditures and revenues) can 
be quite large in some countries, and several OECD reports show that this 
vertical imbalance has widened during the last decade (Mizell, 2005). As this 
vertical imbalance is mostly covered by grants, the reliance of SCGs towards 
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grants has increased.7 What implications does this have on the efficiency, equity 
and stability objectives? 
The mainstream view is that SCGs spending should essentially be covered by 
own tax revenues. Indeed, own taxes improve resource allocation and 
management efficiency, as citizens will put more pressure on SCGs to be more 
efficiency oriented and more responsive to their tastes and preferences when they 
actually pay for the goods and services provided. For efficiency considerations, 
the last dollar of spending should be financed by own-tax, so that citizens only 
demand an extra service if they value it at more than the cost of providing it. 
Own taxes are also considered to promote democratic accountability, since those 
that benefit from public services decide on taxation levels and finally pay the bill. 
Finally, a high reliance on own-resource revenues provides SCGs with incentives 
to growth-oriented economic and fiscal policies, since they may fully reap their 
financial benefits.  
But Figure 2.3 below shows that on average, only about half of SCG revenue is 
covered by own taxes, the other half being covered by intergovernmental grants. 
Of course, this average hides a large variation, with own tax revenues 
representing up to 90% of SCGs revenues in Iceland, and as little as 13% in the 
Netherlands. In general terms, federal countries tend to allocate a slightly higher 
own tax share to their SCGs than unitary countries. 
                                              
 
7 See Blöchliger, H. and Vammalle, C. (2009), “Grants systems in OECD countries: trends and some 
policy issues”, Paper prepared for the KIPF Meeting in Copenhaguen, September. 
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Figure 2.3. Revenue composition of SCG, 2005 (in percentage of total SCG 
revenue) 
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Figure 2.4. Revenue composition of SCG, 2005 (in percentage of general 
government revenue) 
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Source: OECD (2008/5) 
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b) Which taxes for SCGs? 
It is generally agreed that SCGs should rely on taxes levied on relatively 
immobile assets (such as property), in order to avoid tax-induced migrations of 
factors of production, and on relatively stable assets, to avoid large SCG’s budget 
fluctuation. Therefore, central governments are usually assigned the taxes levied 
on the most mobile factors, taxes with the higher income elasticity, and taxes 
levied on tax bases that are distributed unevenly across countries (Ter-Minassian, 
1997). According to these criteria, income taxes on enterprises should be 
assigned to central government, while taxes on individuals and households (such 
as income taxes or property taxes) are more suited for SCGs, as these are seen as 
less mobile than enterprises. Taxes on natural resources and on foreign trade are 
usually assigned to central governments, as well as multi-stage sales taxes (such 
as VAT), as coordination problems between regions would make their 
management very difficult for SCGs. 
Table 2.1 below shows that indeed, income taxes on individuals represent the 
largest share of SCGs’ tax revenues, with more than 35% on average. The second 
largest taxes are taxes on property, with 27%, and third come taxes on goods and 
services, which represent 21% of total SCGs’ tax revenues. 
Table 2.1. Composition of SCGs’ own taxes 
 
Type of tax 
As % of  
total SNG taxes 
1000 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains   
      1100  Of individual              
      1200  Corporate              
      1300  Unallocable between 1100 and 1200 
41.7 
35.5 
5.9 
0.3 
2000  Social security contributions 0.3 
3000  Taxes on payroll and workforce 3.3 
4000  Taxes on property 27.3 
5000  Taxes on goods and services 21.4 
6000  Other taxes 5.9 
 
Note: Unweighted average. Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. 
 
Source: OECD (2006). 
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c) Tax autonomy 
For most countries, taxes represent the largest share of SCG revenues, but what is 
the actual discretion of SCGs over this source of revenues? What is SCGs’ right 
to introduce or abolish a new tax, to set tax rates, to define the tax base, or to 
grant tax allowances or reliefs to individuals and firms? The OECD Network on 
Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government has developed a series of 
indicators to measure the level of SCGs’ tax autonomy (Blöchliger, King, 2006; 
Blöchliger, Petzold, 2009).  
Taxing power indicators developed by the OECD measure the degree of own-
taxing power of SCGs by capturing the degree to which SCGs can set their own 
tax rates and bases. In a number of countries, taxes are not assigned to one 
specific government level, but shared between the central and SCGs. Such tax-
sharing agreements deny a single SCG any control on tax rates and bases, but 
collectively, SCGs may negotiate the sharing formula with central government. 
The OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government has 
developed a set of institutional indicators to estimate tax autonomy. The 
framework consists of five main categories of autonomy, ranked in decreasing 
order from highest to lowest taxing power (from left to right in Table 2.2). The 
category “a” represents full power over tax rates and bases, “b” represents power 
over tax rates, “c” power over the tax base, “d” tax-sharing agreements, and “e” 
no power on rates and bases at all. Each of these categories is again divided into 
sub-categories up to a total of 13 different categories. 
The average results are presented in Table 2.2, for the year 2005. They show that 
although tax autonomy varies widely across countries, most SCGs have 
considerable discretion over their own taxes: on average, the tax revenue share 
with full or partial discretion (categories a, b and c) amount to more than 50% for 
state and almost 70% for local governments.  
Table 2.2. Summary of taxing power of SCGs, 2005 
 
Source: OECD (2008/7) 
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The data of tax autonomy by tax type reveals that autonomy varies according to 
the tax type, in both levels of SCG (state and local). Property taxes are usually 
assigned more discretion than other taxes, with almost all tax revenue in category 
a and b. Around a quarter of income tax revenue is embedded in tax-sharing 
systems, which restrict a single SCG’s control over this tax. Taxes on goods and 
services are even more embedded in tax-sharing arrangements than income taxes, 
and so provide a relatively small part of the tax revenues under the full control of 
SCGs (Blöchliger, Petzold, 2009). 
Tax-sharing arrangements are something of a hybrid between decentralized and 
centralized revenue sources for SCGs and in practice, are difficult to distinguish 
from grants.8 Tax-sharing formulas are not simply a division of revenues, but can 
involve complex formulas that are similar to grant formulas. Equally, 
intergovernmental grants are sometimes little more than a share of national taxes. 
The National Accounts and Revenue Statistics provide some guidelines, but it is 
entirely possible that reported tax-sharing in one country would be reported 
grants in another. In terms of their economic effects, tax-sharing arrangements 
are almost indistinguishable from grants. Since SCGs do not set the rate or base, 
countries with tax-sharing arrangements cannot take full advantage of one of the 
main benefit of decentralisation, the offering different public service-tax 
packages to satisfy diverse tastes. But on the other hand, the pooling of taxes 
tackles potential drawbacks of local taxation, such as income volatility and 
mobility of the tax base. Fiscal equalisation elements, which are often built into 
tax-sharing arrangements, suffer from the same incentive difficulties as 
equalizing and formula-based grants, which are discussed below. 
d) Intergovernmental Grants 
Intergovernmental grants can be of different types (Box 2.1 describes the OECD 
typology of grants), and respond to three types of objectives:  
• Financing sub-national services and investments: In most countries, 
spending by SCGs is larger than their revenues. Grants are therefore used to 
fill the gap between SCGs’ revenues and spending responsibilities. 
• Equalisation: While taxes are preferable to grants in terms of efficiency and 
accountability, a high reliance on own tax revenues for SCGs might raise 
equity concerns. Indeed, tax raising capacity is usually unevenly distributed 
across sub national governments, which could lead to different levels of 
public service delivery across regions or to different levels of tax burdens on 
                                              
 
8 See Blöchliger, King (2006) and Blöchliger, Petzold (2009) for some attempts to draw a line between 
grants and tax-sharing agreements. 
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citizens. Equity concerns might then arise, and the central government might 
prefer SCGs to provide the same basic bundle of services with roughly the 
same tax effort. Intergovernmental “equalisation” grants are then used to 
redistribute wealth from richer to poorer regions.  
• Correcting externalities (subsidisation): Grants can also be used to correct 
potential fiscal externalities or “spillovers”. Such externalities arise when the 
fiscal policy of one sub national government affects outcomes in other sub 
national governments. Grants (mainly matching grants) are then used to 
change the price of providing public goods, in order to internalize the 
externality. 
Box 2.1 The OECD typology of grants 
 
 
Grants
Non-earmarked
Earmarked
Mandatory
Discretionary
Mandatory
Discretionary
General purpose grant
Discretionary
Matching grant
Non-matching grant
 
 
 
Earmarked and non-earmarked grants 
Grants can be either earmarked or non-earmarked. An earmarked grant is a 
grant that is given under the condition that it can only be used for a specific 
purpose. Non-earmarked grants can be spent as if they were receiving 
SCG’s own (non-earmarked) tax revenues. 
 
Mandatory and discretionary grants 
Both earmarked and non-earmarked grants can be either mandatory or 
discretionary. Mandatory grants (entitlements) are legal, rules-based 
obligations for the government that issues the grant. This requires that both 
the size of the grant and the conditions under which it is given be laid down 
in a statute or executive decree and that these conditions be both 
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necessary and sufficient. Typically, SCGs can also appeal to a court or 
administrative judicial authority in order to obtain the grant. Most grants that 
are given to SCGs on a regular basis are mandatory. The size of 
discretionary grants, and the conditions under which they are given, are on 
the other hand not determined by rules but decided on an ad hoc, 
discretionary basis. Discretionary grants are often temporary in nature and 
include, for example, grants for specific infrastructural projects of 
emergency aid to a disaster area. 
 
Matching and non-matching grants 
Earmarked mandatory grants can be either matching or non-matching. 
Matching grants complement sub-national contributions. Matching grants 
are dependent on normative or actual spending for services for which the 
grants are earmarked, or on local revenue collection related to these 
services. All mandatory earmarked grants that are not given complementary 
to sub-national contributions are non-matching. The decisive question to 
determine whether a grant is matching or non-matching is whether the 
decrease in sub-national spending would automatically lead to a decrease 
in the grant. 
 
General purpose and block grants 
Non-earmarked mandatory transfers can be general purpose or block 
grants. Both types are similar in that they increase the SCGs’ revenues 
without changing relative prices in the provision of services. The difference 
is that a block grant is given by the grantor for a specific purpose (or 
purposes). However, since the grant is not earmarked, the grantee’s actual 
use of the grant is not controlled. Instead, the output could be regulated 
through, for example, a set minimum standard that the SCG would have to 
provide. In this case, resources are transferred in the form of a grant to the 
SCG to cover all or part of the cost for certain sub-national services. The 
criteria used to calculate the level and distribution of the grant are usually 
connected to the normative cost of providing the goods or services for the 
sector as a whole, using variables that a specific SCG cannot directly 
control. The rationale for this type of grant is to improve efficiency in the use 
of resources at sub-national level, whereas the activity is financed, in part or 
fully, by the central government. If a sub-national unit is able to perform the 
activity at lower than normative costs, the grant will not be reduced for that 
unit as a consequence, thereby giving the SCG an incentive to fully explore 
the advantages of decentralised service provision. This kind of grant can be 
a means of moving away from earmarked grants. 
 
Source: Bergvall et al. (2006) 
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i. Financing sub-national services 
On average, earmarked transfers constitute about half of grants for both the state 
and the local level of government (Table 2.3). These average numbers hide a 
very large variation across countries, with earmarked grants representing as much 
as 94% in Australia, and as low as 17.6% in Spain (Blöchliger, Petzold, 2008). 
Table 2.3 also shows that most earmarked grants are matching, both at state and 
local government levels.  
Table 2.3. Average grant revenue by type of grant, 2006 (as a percentage of 
total grant revenue) 
 
Unweighted 
average 
Earmarked Non-earmarked 
Mandatory Discretionary Mandatory 
Discretionary 
Matching 
Non-
matching 
Matching 
Non-
matching 
General 
purpose 
Block 
grants 
State 18.8 13.7 8.5 9.3 48.2 0.2 1.1 
Local 27.7 5.6 3.0 16.3 39.3 3.0 3.0 
 
Source: Blöchliger, Petzold (2008) 
 
Functions financed by earmarked grants vary significantly between countries 
(Table 2.4). On average, the most important functions are education (21%), 
general public services (17.4%) and social protection (16.7%), but these averages 
hide a large variation between countries, with education representing only 7.5% 
of grants in Hungary for instance, and more than 60% in Mexico. 
Camila Vammalle – Claire Charbit 
 
 
 
32 
 T
ab
le
 2
.4
. 
G
ra
nt
s b
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t f
un
ct
io
n,
 2
00
6 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
 o
f t
ot
al
 e
ar
m
ar
ke
d 
gr
an
ts
) 
 
 
1)
 N
ot
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
he
ad
in
g 
“O
th
er
 g
ra
nt
s”
 th
at
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
in
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 a
bo
ve
 c
at
eg
or
ie
s. 
So
ur
ce
: B
lö
ch
lig
er
, P
et
zo
ld
 (2
00
9)
 
Fiscal Federalism. Recent Developments and Future Trends 
 
 
 
33 
ii. Fiscal equalization 
One of the most important roles of intergovernmental grants is to reduce 
differences in tax raising capacity and public service needs across sub national 
governments. Most countries have introduced explicit or implicit equalization 
systems using either vertical transfers to financially weak SCGs, or horizontal 
transfers from financially strong to financially weak SCGs (Bloechliger and 
Charbit, 2008). Fiscal equalization is defined as “a transfer of fiscal resources 
across sub national governments with the aim of offsetting differences in revenue 
raising capacity or public service cost. Its principal objective is to allow sub-
central governments to provide their citizens with similar sets of public services 
at a similar tax burden” (Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell, 2007). Box 2 below 
describes the main reasons for equalization. 
Box 2.2. Main reasons for equalisation 
 
Equity 
To equalise per capita tax revenue raising capacity and the per-beneficiary 
cost of providing public goods and services across regions. Tax raising 
capacity per capita and cost of providing public services can differ across 
regions for geographic or socio-economic reasons. The objective of 
equalisation is to provide every citizen with an average level of public 
services at comparable tax rates.  
 
To equalise the marginal benefit of public spending across regions. OECD 
countries that have central government programs for important public 
services (such as health and education) administered by sub-central 
governments, may use equalising transfers to equalise the marginal social 
benefit of public spending across regions.  
 
Externalities 
To avoid fiscal externalities resulting in a misallocation of labour and/or 
capital across regions. A decentralised fiscal system could distort the 
location decision of mobile factors. Unequal tax bases result in pecuniary 
incentives to locate in high tax base regions, thereby distorting location 
decisions of mobile factors of production. Grants that equalize tax bases 
across regions will eliminate this source of inefficiency.  
 
Insurance  
To provide insurance against asymmetric income or employment shocks. If 
the regions of a country are subject to asymmetric shocks, redistributive  
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grants may provide regions with insurance against the adverse effects of 
such shocks on income or employment. 
 
In all countries, the driving force for equalisation is equity, i.e. having similar 
tax raising capacity and equal access to public services across sub national 
governments. 
 
Source: Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell (2007) 
 
On average, equalisation represents 2.3% of GDP (Table 5), but ranges from 
0.5% in Australia and Norway, to 4% in Japan. It represents on average 4.8% of 
total government expenditures, and about 55% of intergovernmental grants. All 
grants do not have an equalisation objective. Are considered equalisation grant 
only those fiscal arrangements that provide greater transfers per resident to SCGs 
with below-average tax revenue-raising capacity, or greater transfers per resident 
to SCGs with above-average public service cost, even though this last distinction 
proved difficult for some countries (Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell, 2007). 
The coefficient of variation gives a picture of regional disparities. It measures the 
variability of GDP per capita per region in a given country. Table 2.5 shows that 
fiscal equalisation considerably reduces disparities, from an average of 30% to 
less than 10%. In some countries, such as Australia and Sweden, disparities are 
actually reduced to zero. After equalisation, fiscal disparities are clearly below 
economic disparities as measured by regional GDP, meaning that the potential to 
provide public services is more evenly distributed than economic wealth 
(Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell, 2007). 
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Table 2.5. A snapshot of fiscal equalisation. Equalising grants and their 
fiscal disparity-reducing effect 
 
 Size of the equalisation system  
(in percent) 
Effect on fiscal disparities  
(variation coefficient) 
 
Percent  
of GDP 
Percent of 
government 
expenditure 
Percent of  
intergovernmental 
grants 
Disparities 
before  
equalisation 
Disparities  
after  
equalisation Difference 
Federal/Regional  
Countries       
Australia 0.5 1.4 19 16.8 0.0 16.8 
Austria 3.8 7.6 69 - 4.2 - 
Canada 1.0 2.5 24 29.8 20.1 9.7 
Germany 2.0 4.2 45 13.0 2.7 10.3 
Italy 3.0 6.3 48 39.0 6.0 33.0 
Mexico 3.7 - 78 - - - 
Spain 3.0 7.6 67 26.5 10.1 16.4 
Switzerland 3.0 8.2 80 31.8 23.2 8.7 
Unitary 
Countries       
Denmark 2.8 5.1 23 16.0 6.0 10.0 
Finland 3.8 7.4 71 17.7 4.2 13.4 
Greece 1.2 2.4 75 - - - 
Japan 4.0 11.0 - 36.0 - - 
Norway 0.5 1.2 11 23.0 8.0 15.0 
Portugal 1.8 4.0 81 90.0 28.0 62.0 
Sweden 2.6 4.6 50 10.0 0.0 10.0 
Turkey 1.1 - 82 39.0 14.0 25.0 
Unweighted 
average 2.3 4.8 55 29.9 9.7 19.2 
 
Source: Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell (2007) 
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Equalisation thus seems to improve equity. Nevertheless, equalisation also has 
some drawbacks.  
• On the revenue equalisation side, equalisation can have negative incentives 
on a SCG’s tax efforts. Indeed, for richer SCGs, an increased tax effort will 
be equalised away, as a share of the extra revenues will be transferred to 
poorer sub national governments. The higher the equalisation tax rate9, the 
bigger the incentives for strategic tax rate setting (such as avoiding taxes that 
enter the equalisation formula, etc.). Besides, by guaranteeing a minimum 
fiscal capacity to all SCGs, equalisation might deter poorer regions from 
developing their economic and fiscal base. Possible solutions are to include 
only part of SCGs’ tax revenues in the equalisation formula, or to base 
equalisation on other criteria than fiscal revenues, such as the regional 
development programmes in Italy, where a part of investment support is 
linked to a region’s performance in selected policy areas (Blöchliger, Merk, 
Charbit, Mizell, 2007). 
• Cost equalisation tends to be rather complex and difficult to manage. Indeed, 
the cost of services varies across regions due to a number of different factors: 
geographic location, population size and concentration, demographic 
characteristics, etc. Objective criteria must be selected to explain cost 
differences, and cost equalisation schemes easily open the door to rent 
seeking and potential over estimation of expenditure needs, and therefore, of 
equalisation payments (see Boxes 2.3 and 2.4 for the Austrian and Japanese 
experiences). Indeed, if there can be objective reasons for production costs to 
be higher in certain regions than in others, these differences might also be due 
to inefficient structures and institutions. In the long run, a compensation for 
higher costs might therefore reduce service providers’ interest in developing 
cost-saving technologies. 
                                              
 
9 The concept of “marginal equalisation rate” (or “equalisation tax”, “tax back” or “compensation rate”) is 
defined as the amount of money a SCG loses (wins) if it increases (decreases) its own tax revenue by 100 
monetary units). 
Fiscal Federalism. Recent Developments and Future Trends 
 
 
 
37 
Box 2.3. Equalisation tax rates in Austria 
 
Some Austrian municipalities with weak fiscal capacity face equalisation tax 
rates exceeding 100 percent. The comprehensive and complex Austrian 
fiscal equalisation is embedded in a tax-sharing system that covers both 
the state and the municipal level. Shared taxes are distributed across the 
Länder according to population mainly and a factor representing tax shares 
of the past, and to the municipalities according to various criteria such as 
fiscal capacity, expenditure needs and a scale factor favouring larger 
municipalities. Altogether five distinct equalisation schemes govern the 
allocation of the equalisation grant to the individual municipality, each with 
different tax and expenditure bases. As the equalisation formulas interact, a 
municipality’s overall loss in equalisation grants may in some cases be 
greater than its gain in additional tax revenue resulting from development 
efforts. Since the disincentive is larger for poorer than for wealthier 
municipalities, and since policy makers at the Länder level tend to favour 
development in municipalities with a low equalisation tax rate (Schneider, 
2002), Austrian municipal equalisation may in the long run exacerbate. 
 
Source: Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell (2007) 
 
Box 2.4. Service capacity equalisation in Japan 
 
Sub-national authorities should not be able to influence the criteria for 
service cost equalisation. This requirement is not entirely met in Japan, 
where at least part of the borrowing by SCGs (and consequently the 
worsening of Japanese public finances) can be ascribed to the fact that 
road construction volumes and interest payments are important distribution 
criteria for the non-earmarked grant (the LAT, local allocation tax). Each of 
these criteria creates an incentive for Japanese prefectures to borrow and 
overspend on roads. Other OECD member countries where road 
construction volumes constitute an important distribution criterion for the 
equalisation grant are Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Denmark. In the 
latter country, the number of local road kilometres was a criterion for the 
need for road spending during the 1980s. Local authorities then began to 
turn small, private dirt roads into public roads. This led to much more 
equalisation compensation than the costs of maintaining the dirt roads 
(which only involved a truck and some gravel every second or third year). 
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The criterion was later abandoned. The reason for the wrong incentives is 
that the grants do not equalise service capacity (the need for roads or 
borrowing) but the actual level of road construction or borrowing. 
 
Source: Blöchliger, Merk, Charbit, Mizell (2007) 
 
iii. Correcting externalities 
Fiscal externalities arise when the fiscal policy of one SCG affects outcomes in 
other SCGs. In these cases, SCGs do not take into consideration the full social 
effect of their decisions, as they only consider the impact on their own 
constituents10. Externalities may arise on the spending side, for example, when 
one SCG finances public infrastructure that will also benefit the residents of 
neighboring SCGs. Or they can arise on the revenue side (tax externalities), when 
a SCG’s tax policy affects the residents of other regions, for example, by tax 
exporting (trying to have non-residents paying local and regional taxes) or by tax 
competition (lowering the tax rate to attract firms). Grants can be used to correct 
for these externalities. Matching grants are often used to compensate local 
authorities for the extent of benefit spillovers across administrative boundaries. 
By lowering the cost of the public good (as they complement SCGs spending, 
SCGs only face part of the cost of providing the good or service), they give 
incentives to the SCG to provide higher levels of public services to non-residents. 
Still, an OECD study (Blöchliger, Petzold, 2008) has shown that the real scope 
for externality correction is rather limited, and probably much smaller than the 
size of the matching grants created to correct them. Thus, it seems that the size 
and structure of grants, and particularly matching grants, depend more on 
political economy factors rather than purely fiscal considerations. 
 But regional spillovers are not necessarily handled through grants: other possible 
ways to solve regional spillover problems are to increase the size of SCGs, or to 
charge non-residents a differentiated rate for the use of services11. Some OECD 
countries have also used inter-municipal fiscal contracts. Voluntary contracts are 
preferable, but often difficult to put in place, because SCGs that benefit from 
positive spillover effects might be tempted to free-ride, and avoid paying the 
costs. Grants can then be designed to encourage cooperation between sub-
                                              
 
10 SCGs do not fully perceive the social marginal costs and benefits of their taxing and spending 
decisions. 
11 This of course requires excludability, i.e. that it be possible to prevent people from using the service if 
they do not pay for it (some public goods such as public lightning are not excludable: once they are 
provided, everybody can enjoy them). 
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national units of government, as the EU LEADER Programme (Liaison Entre 
Activités du Développement de l’Economie Rurale), which aims at bringing an 
integrative approach to rural development. It attempts to use subsidies to 
encourage public-private and intergovernmental cooperation through innovative 
multi-sector projects. France has also an interesting program of inter-municipal 
cooperation (Box 2.5). 
Box 2.5. French support for co-operation 
 
Intermunicipal co-operation has been and remains an important element of 
most national programmes. This is especially true in France where there 
are more than 36 000 municipalities and where mergers are resisted by 
local politicians and citizens and are not promoted by the central 
government. In order to increase the scale of local service provision, the 
French authorities have favoured the use of incentives to encourage co-
operation. These incentives were systematised in 1999 with central support 
for "structures à fiscalité propre" (intermunicipal structures with their own 
tax), even if other types of intermunicipal structures remain. The principle is 
the following: the intermunicipal bodies continue to be voluntary structures; 
the parent communes have 10 years to progressively converge towards the 
same business tax rate (the most important local tax) and the "losers" in 
this converging process receive compensatory payments; the tax rate is 
decided by the intermunicipal body which will also directly receive the tax 
revenue. In order to stimulate local authorities to participate in these 
structures, the French government pays a supplementary grant to the EPCI 
(établissements publics de coopération intercommunale) in addition to the 
general purpose grant to all sub-national levels, the DGF (dotation globale 
de fonctionnement). This supplement is called the "dotation 
d'intercommunalité" (intermunicipal grant), and its size depends upon the 
type of EPCI. Six years after the launch of this new programme, 84% of the 
French population lives in an area covered by an EPCI with its own tax 
revenue (88% of French municipalities are located in these areas). 
 
Source: Bergvall, Charbit, Kraan, Merk (2006) 
 
2.5 Managing macroeconomic stability: fiscal rules 
Decentralising expenditure capacity to lower levels of government can have 
positive effects on efficiency, as local governments are more aware of local 
needs and tastes than central governments. But this can also undermine global 
macroeconomic stability, as SCGs do not always take into account the effect of 
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their fiscal decisions on the rest of the country on the one hand, and might even 
have incentives to overspend on the other hand. Fiscal rules are therefore needed, 
in order to reduce this possible risk. Fiscal rules are defined as a set of 
institutional constraints on policymakers’ decision-making discretion. Such rules 
may be imposed on SCGs by a higher level of government, or SCGs may adopt 
them themselves, where constitutional arrangements grant them the autonomy to 
do so (Sutherland, Price, Joumard, 2006). 
We have shown that the increase in SCGs spending responsibilities has been 
larger than the increases in their tax autonomy. SCGs do not bear the whole costs 
of the public goods and services they are responsible for, thus creating incentives 
for overspending. If SCGs are allowed to borrow on capital markets, they might 
face interest rates that do not fully reflect their credit risk (as lenders perceive 
that their borrowing is implicitly guaranteed by central government), thus leading 
to possible over-borrowing. If investors anticipate a bailout in case of default by 
a SCG, fiscal decisions of one SCG will impact on the borrowing costs of the 
other SCGs and of the central government, reflecting a higher overall risk of 
default. Sound SCGs fiscal policies are therefore crucial for the macroeconomic 
stability of the whole country. Four types of rules can be used to support fiscal 
sustainability and short-term stability: balanced budget requirements, borrowing 
constraints, tax and expenditure limits (TEL) and process and implementation 
regulations. 
• Balanced budget requirements in OECD countries vary according to whether 
they are applied to the current budget and/or the capital account (balanced 
budget requirement applied only to the current budget, thus allowing 
borrowing to finance net investments is usually referred to as the “golden 
rule” of public finance); whether they are set annually or multi-annually; and 
whether they are imposed from above or self-imposed. Most commonly, 
balanced budget requirements are applied to current and capital budgets, are 
set annually, and are imposed from above. 
• Borrowing constraints are widely used in OECD countries, but with a 
substantial variation in terms of restrictiveness. They range from total 
prohibition (Denmark and Korea) to no restriction at all. In most cases, SCG 
borrowing requires prior approval by higher levels of government, and is 
often restricted to certain purposes (such as investment). Box 2.6 gives some 
examples of borrowing constraints in OECD countries. 
• Tax and expenditure limits. Overall limits on tax rates or reliefs are widely 
used in OECD countries, and usually take the form of an explicit limit on tax 
autonomy set by central government (see Table 2.2). Expenditure increase 
limits are usually linked to income, inflation of population growth. But 
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explicit, binding, expenditure limits are rather rare (they exist only in 
Germany, Korea, Portugal and Turkey). In some countries such as Japan, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Spain, expenditure limits are not imposed by central 
government, but self imposed. 
• Process rules that govern implementation will determine the degree of 
commitment of SCGs to the set of rules described above (indeed, without a 
proper commitment mechanism, SCGs could either ignore, or change the 
rules binding their autonomy). Process rules include the obligation to produce 
financial accounts (transparency), monitoring and reporting, and eventual 
sanctions in case of non compliance. But process rules should also allow for 
flexibility of response, as breaking the fiscal rules might be the appropriate 
response to an unanticipated shock such as large revenue shocks, downturns 
in the local economy, the impact of natural or other disaster, etc. This is why 
many countries incorporate escape clauses that allow SCGs to breach the rule 
in case of certain predetermined events.  
Box 2.6. Examples of borrowing constraints in OECD countries 
 
Borrowing constraints cover a range of restrictions on sub-central 
government recourse to debt financing. With the exceptions of Australia, 
Canada, Spain (states) and Switzerland, a higher level of government 
typically imposes these constraints.12 In the most restrictive cases, 
borrowing may not be allowed at all (as in Denmark, or in Korea and Spain 
for current expenditure). In Poland, no borrowing is allowed if general 
government debt levels exceed 60% of GDP. The requirement of prior 
approval from higher levels of government is also quite widespread, 
including permission to borrow in foreign currency as in Mexico and Turkey. 
The need for prior approval on a project-by-project basis is gradually being 
relaxed in OECD countries, such as Mexico which abandoned such a 
system in 2000. In Japan and Korea the formal requirement to obtain 
permission from a higher level of government is being relaxed. In Norway 
and Spain, prior authorisation can be imposed when sub-central 
governments breach agreed deficits or the proposed borrowing is 
substantial. In Belgium, in large part due to complicated inter-governmental 
relations, there are no explicit sanctions for breaching consensual targets 
                                              
 
12 In Germany, the Länders’ access to borrowing is almost totally unconstrained. Technically, there is a 
provision to limit borrowing to prevent major macroeconomic disturbances, but this has never been 
invoked. 
Camila Vammalle – Claire Charbit 
 
 
 
42 
set by the Conseil Supérieur des Finances (CSF) for each local 
government and local government as a whole. However, legislation permits 
the federal government to limit borrowing by non-compliant regions for two 
years.13 A few countries apply limits on borrowing for specific purposes. For 
example, in Spain, local authorities can borrow up to 30 per cent of current 
revenues to cover short-term liquidity needs, while long-term borrowing is 
restricted to capital investment. No constraints on access to borrowing are 
applied in the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, and Japan. In 
interpreting this information, it should be kept in mind that strict budget 
balance requirements (see Table 2.1) may also have the effect of outlawing 
in practice the need for borrowing constraints. 
 
Source: Sutherland, Price, Joumard (2006) 
 
 
The need for fiscal rules is influenced by three factors: expenditure assignments, 
revenue assignments and financial market oversight.  
• Expenditure assignment. Fiscal rules are particularly important when SCGs 
are responsible for large and politically sensitive areas such as health, 
education or social welfare, as it may then be difficult for central 
governments to resist bailing out deficit-prone SCGs. However, fiscal rules 
limiting SCGs’ spending autonomy must not reintroduce central direction, 
which would then undermine the benefits from decentralising spending 
decisions.  
• Revenue assignment (the extent and sources of SCGs’ income) also affect the 
need for fiscal rules: the more SCGs depend on transfers, the more fiscal rules 
(such as borrowing constraints) are needed to compensate for the lack of 
matching between the benefits from spending, and the weight from financing 
these expenditures. For those SCGs with higher tax autonomy, tax 
competition can be a positive factor in keeping deficits small without the need 
for fiscal rules.  
• Finally, financial market oversight might substitute for other monitoring 
mechanisms by imposing higher borrowing costs to profligate SCGs. 
However, this market discipline requires that central governments credibly 
                                              
 
13 Maintaining limits on deficits was important due to the vertical fiscal gap that opened during the 
process of decentralisation. More recently, as greater revenue sources have been assigned to sub-central 
governments, macroeconomic considerations would suggest they target minimum surpluses. 
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commit not to bailout defaulting SCGs. Besides, the adoption of fiscal rules 
limiting their deficit and debt levels may still be used by SCGs as signals of 
fiscal discipline in order to obtain lower interest rates. 
Depending on their expenditure assignment, revenue assignments, and the 
importance of financial market oversight, each country has developed its own set 
of fiscal rules. Box 2.7 below describes the particular case of Switzerland. 
Box 2.7. Fiscal rules in Switzerland 
 
Switzerland is a highly decentralised federal country, where the cantons are 
autonomous in all the spheres of competences where the confederation is 
not authorised by the constitution. This constrains the ability of central 
government to impose fiscal rules on sub-central governments (and as a 
result the confederation can face difficulties in conducting counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy). The confederation changed the constitution in 2001 to the 
effect that the budget is balanced over the cycle, but this “debt brake” does 
not apply to the cantons. 
 
There is considerable variety in the cantons’ own fiscal rules and the rules 
they impose on their communes. For example, 13 cantons have their own 
“debt brakes” of various degrees of restrictiveness and requirements to 
hold referenda on expenditure vary across the cantons. The cantons 
determine budget balance objectives and debt service limits for the 
communes. In some cases, the cantons are responsible for deficits 
experienced at the communal level. 
 
A number of studies have identified features that have helped restrain the 
growth in the size of government. These include most notably the institution 
of direct democracy (the requirement to hold referenda on expenditures 
that exceed certain thresholds). Tax competition between the cantons has 
helped maintain pressure on policymakers to keep rates low, particularly on 
the more mobile tax bases. As a result, the argument that sub-central 
government have a tendency, from political myopia, to tax inefficiently or 
excessively has not been an important motivation for fiscal rules in 
Switzerland. Other factors that lead to smaller government include the 
small size of the cabinet, bodies that oversee the finance commissions and, 
in some cantons, rules that debar bailouts of communes (Schaltegger and 
Feld, 2004; Schelker and Eichenberger, 2005; and Blankart and Klaiber, 
2005). And a recent federal court ruling that a canton (Valais) did not have 
the obligation to bail out a delinquent commune (Leukerbad) has further 
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strengthened the position of the cantons vis-à-vis the communes and 
enhanced the potential monitoring and sanctioning role financial markets 
can play. 
 
Notwithstanding these aspects of the fiscal policymaking landscape, during 
the 1990s, the growth of sub-central government as a share of GDP 
increased and liabilities almost doubled in real terms. This occurred despite 
most cantons having adopted recommendations contained in the 
Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Finance’s Handbook of Public 
Budgeting to balance their budgets over the business cycle and to reduce 
debt over a 10-year period. The growing debt levels provoked over a third 
of cantons to introduce new limitations on the accumulation of debt. These 
“debt brakes” have proven to be successful at preventing deficits (Feld and 
Kirchgässner, 2004, 2005). Another source of pressure has been exposure 
to guarantees given to canton owned banks. The recent experience of a 
few cantons having to bail out publicly owned banks has led to a 
reassessment of these types of guarantees. 
 
The problems of the 1990s emerged because the existing fiscal rules were 
ill adapted to cope either with cyclical variations in revenue or the secular 
upward pressures on spending (Bodmer, 2004). Direct democracy by 
voting on new spending is weak in addressing growing programme 
spending. Thus, as programme spending rose during the 1990s, both as a 
result of the economic downturn leading to larger social security spending 
and the consequences of population ageing, this has led to a severe 
squeeze on spending, which may be leading to allocative inefficiencies. 
Furthermore, the constraints of the rules have led some canton to shift 
expenditure off-budget and increasingly resort to non-tax revenue. This 
serves to reduce the transparency of budgetary reporting, which is already 
murky with respect to social security and health spending and only weakly 
constrained by a recommendation to use a common reporting standard. On 
the other hand, no investment insufficiency has arisen because debt brakes 
have usually differentiated between current expenses and investment. 
 
The experience of Switzerland highlights the fact that certain institutional 
features, such as direct democracy and tax competition can help constrain 
the size of the public sector and obviate the need for tax rules. It also 
shows that appropriate borrowing and debt rules can enhance fiscal policy 
even where there is financial market oversight: cantons with stronger debt 
brakes have experienced a slower growth of expenditure than those with 
weaker brakes. Nevertheless, such rules need to be flexible with respect to 
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cyclical shocks a significant minority of cantons now allow a correction with 
respect to the business cycle and forward looking if they are to deal 
effectively with spending pressures stemming from ageing and demand 
driven growth of entitlement spending. 
 
Source : Sutherland, Price, Joumard (2006) 
 
Fiscal rules can help central and SCGs address stability concerns, but they can 
also suffer from side-effects and trade-offs such as pro-cyclicality, inefficiency or 
fiscal gimmickry. The recent global financial crisis has clearly shown this, as US 
States for instance were constitutionally obliged to balance their budgets, which 
amplified the effects of the crisis as State governments were forced to reduce 
employment, raise taxes, and sometimes reduce public service delivery (Box 8). 
In other countries, such scenarios could be avoided as the fiscal rules could be 
temporarily suspended (Austria, Italy). Efficiency may also be impaired as SCGs 
lose the ability to smooth consumption over time, and may reduce their level of 
investment, as capital spending is easier to reduce than current expenditures in 
the short run. Golden rules have the opposite effect, by leaving capital 
expenditures outside the rules’ frame. SCGs may also appeal to fiscal gimmickry 
to try to circumvent the rules. Tax and expenditures limits seem to be frequently 
overcome by the creation of “special districts” that are not covered by the rule, 
and tax limitations might be circumvented by rising user charges and service 
fees. 
Box 2.8. American states, balanced budget rules and fiscal packages 
during the global financial crisis 
 
In the United States, 49 states have balanced budget rules enshrined in 
their constitutions. Any reduction in revenues must therefore be 
compensated by an equivalent reduction in spending. The crisis has 
considerably reduced states’ revenues, and state budget gaps (i.e. 
difference between desired spending and projected revenues) have 
reached unprecedented levels (Box Figure 2.5). As lawmakers prepared 
their 2009-2010 budgets in July 2009 (FY 2010 budgets), they faced a 
cumulated gap of over $142 billion. These gaps, though shrinking rapidly, 
are projected to last at least until FY 2012, as sub-central tax revenues 
usually take longer to recover in the United States than GDP growth. 
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Box Figure 2.5.   State budget gaps;  
  FY 2011–FY 2012 (projected, in bn $) 
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Source : NCSL.  
 
* 20 states reported budget gaps after the adoption of the budget (includes Puerto Rico),  
 
** 44 states reported budget gaps after the adoption of the budget (includes Puerto Rico). 
The ex-post budget gap was much larger than the budget gap estimated at the time of 
budget adoption,  
 
*** 46 states report budget gaps at the adoption of the budget (includes Puerto Rico). Ex-
post gaps are expected to be larger,  
 
^ 31 states and Puerto Rico forecast FY 2011 gaps, the amount for FY 2011 indicates the 
24 states that have provided estimations,  
 
^^ 15 states forecast FY 2012 gaps, the amount for FY 2012 indicates the 9 states that have 
provided estimations. 
 
The difference between the amounts before budget adoption and the 
amounts after budget adoption show that no matter how pessimistic 
revenue forecasts have been, actual collections came in even lower. In FY 
2010 to 2012, the fiscal gaps after budget adoption are also expected to be 
larger than those estimated in the budget. 
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Because of the balanced budget rules, sub-central governments had to 
take measures to balance their FY 2010 budgets. Given the weight of sub-
central governments in the American economy (they represent 20% of 
GDP, 38% of general government revenues, 45% of general government 
spending, and 88% of public investment), these measures ran the risk of 
amplifying the effects of the crisis. These measures include: spending cuts 
(across the board cuts, education, hiring and salary freezes, layoffs and 
early retirement, health care, etc.), raising taxes, increasing fees, etc. For a 
detailed state by state description of the measures taken to balance FY 
2010 budgets, see: http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=17255. 
 
In February 2009, the Federal administration voted the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). One of the several objectives of this plan 
was to stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize 
and avoid reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and 
local tax increases (www.recovery.org). Out of the $787 billion of the 
stimulus plan, $286 billion affected sub-central governments, either by 
substituting their expenses (as increased federal participation in Medicaid), 
or by directly providing stabilization funds. In the FY 2010, these funds 
have helped offset some of the planned spending reductions, and covered 
about 40% of the states’ budget gaps. It is too early to evaluate whether the 
stimulus plan reached all its objectives, but according to some experts, it 
did help preserving existing jobs (Hurley and Tubbesing, 2009). Yet, the 
situation of the states is still worrying, as the lagged effect of the crisis will 
cause further budget gaps in FY 2011 and 2012 (Figure 2.1), while they will 
no longer be able to count on the ARRA funds to bridge these gaps. 
 
 
These problems are dealt with in different ways, but dealing with different trade-
offs and side-effects usually implies the adoption of a multiple set of rules, with 
some rules created to reduce the side-effects of others. For instance, multi-annual 
budgets are sometimes used to smooth out cyclical effects, upper limits on tax 
rates are used to prevent a ratchet effect on spending from a borrowing 
constraint, and increased information requirement and monitoring may help 
reducing fiscal gimmickry. 
2.6 Promoting efficiency and effectiveness 
The growing spending power of SCGs increases the importance of the issue of 
efficiency and effectiveness for policy makers. Countries have adopted various 
approaches to generating the competitive pressures and the synergistic 
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opportunities that might enhance efficiency of local public spending. These 
include in particular, inter-municipal mergers and collaboration, the use of 
market mechanisms, and the implementation of performance indicators systems. 
a) Inter-municipal mergers and collaboration 
 In theory, inter-municipal mergers and collaboration are warranted under several 
circumstances including economies of scale, standardization of services, strategic 
alliances, and financial constraints. However, several empirical studies have 
shown that the scope for economies of scale from mergers is not so important, 
and these imply high transition costs (in particular, it is very difficult to actually 
reduce personnel after a merger). Cooperation might therefore be a more viable 
alternative, and is very widely developed. In Finland for example, cooperation 
has been used by municipalities for many years (OECD, 2006).  
Denmark has a large experience in cooperative arrangements, with the average 
municipality participating in approximately 30 such arrangements. Often, larger 
municipalities act as a supplier and smaller ones act as a purchaser of services. 
The Danish Commission on Structural Reform found that cooperation can help 
municipalities gain economies of scale and access a greater number of services, 
but they also found that cooperation can diminish the tailoring of services to local 
needs, reduce citizen influence, and make responsibility less clear. Interestingly, 
mergers rather than cooperative arrangements seem to be preferred by the central 
government in Denmark, who has recently imposed a merging policy, where 
each municipality was allowed to choose with whom to merge, as long as they 
reached a threshold size of 20,000 inhabitants. This reduced the number of 
municipalities from 271 to 98. At the same time, Denmark created 5 regions 
which are mainly responsible for health services.  
But this type of obligation to merge is very exceptional within OECD countries, 
where most of the countries do not have an explicit merger policy. Some 
countries, such as France or Austria even have some disincentive to merge 
(France encourages cooperation, and Austria just eliminated an equalisation 
benefit that used to benefit municipalities which reached a threshold of 5,000 
inhabitants). The majority of other countries have a voluntary policy and neither 
encourages nor discourages mergers.  
b) Market mechanisms 
 Market mechanisms constitute another strategy for sub-central governments to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. Market mechanisms refer to the set of rules 
and institutions of a market economy as applied to the public sector (Blöchliger, 
2008). These can be supply-side measures, such as outsourcing, private 
provision, and competition, or demand-side measures, such as “user choice”, 
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vouchers or other forms of performance related funding. The purpose of market 
mechanisms is to take advantage of the resource allocation efficiencies of the 
private market in providing public services. Indeed, market mechanisms can 
increase the efficiency of public service delivery in three ways: improving 
productive efficiency by lowering costs without compromising quality; 
increasing resource allocation and welfare by increasing service providers’ 
responsiveness to consumers’ tastes and preferences; and improving budget 
management efficiency by making the costs of providing the services clearer. 
Market mechanisms are widely used in education, hospitals, public transport, 
nursing homes, childcare, and waste collection, which are to a large extent under 
the responsibility SCGs in most OECD countries. 
Market mechanisms can be divided into three broad categories, each reflecting 
the properties of a market economy: private provision and contracting out (public 
and private partnerships, outsourcing, tendering, etc.), user choice and 
competition (letting users choose increases pressure on providers to deliver the 
desired good), and price signals in funding (extent to which public funding 
reflects actual service utilisation and/or performance).  
 An OECD index measuring the reliance on market mechanisms can be used for 
international comparisons. This index is divided in sub-indexes, which reveal 
that there is substantial diversity in the use of market mechanisms both across 
countries and across types of public services14. For example, private ownership 
and contracting seems very efficient in Sweden, Australia and Belgium (Flemish 
part) and less so in Italy, Switzerland and Mexico. User choice is also subject to 
great variations across countries. It is quite common in childcare and the hospital 
sector, while it is generally more restricted in primary and secondary education, 
reflecting the traditional system where parents are assigned a school where they 
reside. The third sub-index, price signals in funding shows the least variation 
across countries, and the smallest values, pointing at relatively weak use of this 
mechanism (within this sub-category, we can distinguish between user fees, 
which are widely used, and constitute an important revenue source for SCGs, and 
vouchers and other use-related funding15, which are still very seldom used). 
A composite index (summary indicator) measuring the use of market 
mechanisms can be used to evaluate the scope of each of these arrangements in 
OECD countries. Figure 2.6 indicates that the composite indicator shows little 
                                              
 
14 See Blöchliger (2008) for the precise values of each sub-index in each country. 
15 Pure “voucher” systems where consumers would receive a lump sum from government do not exist, but 
“use-related funding”, where the government pays the service provider according to a use indicator is 
becoming more common. Examples include schools funded according to the number of pupils, or nursing 
homes funded by the number of residents Blöchliger (2008). 
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variation across countries. Indeed, it appears that countries often compensate low 
values for one service with higher values for another. The index shows high 
values (i.e. more efficient market arrangements in public service provision) for 
Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands, and low values for Mexico, Turkey and 
Italy. 
Figure 2.6. Summary indicator: use of market mechanisms in public service 
provision (Additive aggregation) 
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Note: Values scaled between 0 and 10, with a higher value representing more efficient market 
arrangements in public service provision. For technical details on indicator construction, see the annex of 
OECD (WP 2008/6). 
 
Source: OECD (WP 2008/6) 
 
If market mechanisms can improve public service efficiency, by introducing 
competition, by increase user choice or by relying on price signals in funding 
arrangements, they can also have some drawbacks. Indeed, a wide use of market 
mechanisms can run against universal policy access objective, with undesirable 
social and geographical effects. User fees, for instance, might exclude poorer 
users from public services (hospitals, schools, universities, transportation, etc.). 
User choice can be a problem if it leads to screening of users by service 
providers, and contracting out could have negative effect on service coverage.  
These drawbacks can be addressed with a set of policy tools, such as setting 
minimum standards, obliging providers to accept all users, lowering fees for 
users in need, or giving specific population groups a direct income support to 
compensate for higher user cost. This can lead to the intervention of central 
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governments, which might wish to make sure that SCGs make good use of 
economies of scale and scope, while complying with nationally set objectives. 
Central governments can for instance use earmarked grants or other equalisation 
systems to allow all SCGs to reach given standard, but without compelling them, 
or they can set national standards and requirements for service delivery. Finally, 
central governments can just provide information and benchmarking about the 
performance of service delivery in other SCGs.  
c) Performance indicators 
The third tool we have mentioned to promote efficiency is the use of 
performance indicators or “indicator systems”. Indicator systems refer to the 
systematic collection of information to measure and monitor the activities of 
government Mizell (2008). The use of this type of system has greatly increased 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s, but analysis usually focuses on horizontal use of 
performance indicators by central or SCGs, to monitor their own performance. In 
this section, we examine how performance indicators can also be used by central 
governments to monitor public service delivery by lower levels of government, 
and to put pressure towards increased efficiency and effectiveness at sub-national 
level. 
Indeed, performance indicators can increase efficiency and effectiveness at sub-
national level, first, by increasing available knowledge and reducing information 
asymmetries between levels of government. This on the one hand, allows the 
central government to monitor sub-national activities, making sure that national 
objectives are achieved, and on the other hand, central government can act as a 
node in a network of SCGs, retransmitting the relevant information to other local 
governments, in order to disseminate best practices, or provide national 
benchmarks. Second, the use of performance indicators encourages performance 
improvements, by altering incentives faced by SCGs. Indeed, indicators can be 
associated with targets, or provide information to citizens which will then hold 
their local policy makers accountable for performance. 
Performance indicators can serve several specific objectives: allocation of 
resources, control or resources, evaluation of quality, cost, and coverage, 
transparency and communication with citizen stakeholders, promoting efficiency, 
etc. In most countries, benchmarking and learning from good practice are the 
main goals of the indicators system. Performance indicators are a key instrument 
in relations across levels of government. Indeed, on the one hand, they reduce 
asymmetries of information, both vertically, between SCGs and central 
governments, and horizontally, among different SCGs. And on the other hand, 
they can be used by central governments to set targets to SCGs, and monitor their 
performance. But this last point is delicate, as using indicators should not be 
perceived as an extension of central control. It is therefore very important to 
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involve SCGs in the construction of indicators systems, or else SCGs might 
comply with the reporting constraint, but not use the information produced by the 
indicators to actually improve their performance. Building indicator systems 
should therefore reinforce intergovernmental collaboration. Both levels of 
government may be motivated to collaborate if they perceive it will lead to new 
or better information for enhancing service delivery and/or if they can share the 
additional resources which result from efficiency gains (Mizell, 2008). 
 A good example of multi-level government collaboration in the building of an 
indicators system is the creation of KOSTRA in Norway. This system is 
described in Box 2.9 below. In practice, responses to an OECD questionnaire 
suggest that the link between performance indicators and national decision 
making is relatively weak, and the use of explicit targets very rare (only used in 
Finland and Berlin, Germany). The impact of indicators use is rather indirect, 
through the higher quality of information available for policy decisions, both at 
central and local levels (Mizell, 2008). 
Box 2.9. KOSTRA - Data reporting and information system in Norway 
 
KOSTRA is Norway’s information system for conveying data from the 
municipalities to the central government, between municipalities, and to the 
public. Launched for all municipalities in 2002, the system transformed the 
collection, processing, and dissemination of statistical information from 
local governments. Emphasis is placed on electronic transmission of data 
by municipalities to the central government. The latter adds value by 
combining municipal data and producing key indicators on financial figures, 
productivity, coverage rates, and priorities. At the municipal level there are 
about 40 key indicators and an additional 1 000 indicators covering 16 
service areas.  
 
The introduction of KOSTRA benefited both the central and sub-central 
governments. At the central level, the system rationalised data collection 
and processing, contributed to uniform standards thereby enhancing the 
comparability of municipalities and service sectors, helped the central 
government to determine if municipalities are complying with national 
standards and regulations, and facilitated a common assessment of the 
local economic situation which is used as the basis of a parliamentary 
discussion on the transfer of resources to municipalities. For the 
municipalities, KOSTRA lessened the administrative burden of reporting. It 
also provided a tool for internal planning, budgeting, and communication at 
the local level. In addition, it facilitated the sharing of knowledge between 
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municipalities which are able to use indicators for the purpose of 
benchmarking performance.  
 
While KOSTRA has brought benefits, there are limitations in the current 
system. First, the large amount of data collected makes ensuring quality 
challenging. Second, there is a tendency for the central government to 
request more and more data, causing both the administrative burden and 
the costs of data collection to rise in municipalities. Municipalities also 
receive much more data than in the past. 
 
Overall, KOSTRA has been perceived as a very successful information 
system with potential for further refinement. Looking forward, focus is being 
placed on collecting data regarding quality of public services and 
developing indicators of quality. “Soft data” collected outside of KOSTRA 
(test scores, reading proficiency and user satisfaction for various service, 
etc.) are gradually being used in combination with data from the KOSTRA 
system. This will permit policy makers and citizens to assess outcomes as 
well as outputs. 
 
Sources: OECD (2006), Statistics Norway (2002), “KOSTRA” online at 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/00/20/kostra_en 
 
If using a system of performance indicators can have positive effects on 
efficiency, its implementation poses some challenges. The first challenge to 
overcome is capacity building. Indeed, constructing and operating a system of 
indicators requires experience in defining good indicators, in assessing the 
quality of the data, the needs that should be covered, etc. Second, using indicator 
systems is costly. Costs occur in a direct form, by the necessary investments in 
information systems, training, communication, etc., but also in a more indirect 
way, through an increased administrative burden, which might be 
disproportionately high for small municipalities. This point can be tempered by 
coordinating information needs and reducing redundant requests, as well as 
carefully selecting the indicators, in order to reduce their number. Another type 
of possible cost is due to the risks of strategic behaviour (short-termism) or 
prioritization of resources to influence the measures of the indicators. The last 
challenge is measurement and data quality concerns. Indeed, public sector’s 
outputs and performance are very difficult to measure. Besides, there is a trade-
off between timeliness and quality of data, as using timely data can enhance the 
relevance of indicators for decision making, but it may be harder to review and 
validate recent data. Auditing can improve data quality, but may delay its 
availability. 
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2.7 Brief panorama of fiscal federalism reform agenda in OECD 
unitary countries 
The OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government is 
currently carrying out a study on the political economy of fiscal federalism 
reforms. Some preliminary findings show that there are a number of exogenous 
elements that influence the chances of a reform going through. For example, a 
strong leadership backed by a clear electoral mandate are obvious elements that 
facilitate reforms going through. The role of crises is more ambiguous. Indeed, 
on the one hand, they highlight the limits of the existing model and the need for 
reform. But on the other hand, reforms are costly and are therefore more difficult 
to implement in times of stringent financial resources (preliminary findings of the 
above mentioned OECD study show that these are never financially neutral for 
the CG, who at the very least has to put up money to compensate losers).  
Following the global financial crisis and stimulus measures, both central and sub-
central governments face large fiscal imbalances which will have to be 
addressed. This process will necessarily imply reforms in intergovernmental 
relations, as both levels of government will seek efficiency gains (through 
territorial reorganisation for example), and increased revenues. Coordinating 
central and sub-central fiscal consolidations plans will be a challenge in the years 
to come, as both levels of government will be fighting to raise revenues 
(competing for fiscal resources or lobbying for increased grants), while trying to 
shift spending responsibilities to other levels of government. But if the global 
financial crisis highlights the need to reform, it also makes it more difficult, as 
there is less money available to compensate losers, and it’s more difficult for 
CGs to take measures that may affect SCGs’ finances negatively. In Finland for 
example, the reform of the grants system was scaled down, as the government 
decided not to change the allocation formula in order not to increase the financial 
difficulties of SCGs. In France, the global financial crisis certainly hastened the 
repeal of the business tax (taxe profesionnelle). As this tax accounted for about 
80% of the revenues of the departments, this measure instigated the rethinking of 
the whole of the financing scheme of SCGs in France. This thus revived the 
debate on territorial organisation, the overlapping roles and responsibilities of the 
different layers of government and between the deconcentrated institutions (the 
Préfets), and the decentralised structures, etc. The debate is ongoing, and no 
decision has been taken yet. 
The study also identified a number of elements that help reforms go through and 
can be used by policy makers to design the reform package and process. Indeed, 
in all public administration reforms, there are different stakeholders with 
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diverging interests, and any reform produces winners and losers.16 For the reform 
to go through there must be more potential winners supporting the reform than 
losers blocking it. There are several ways of achieving this, and in most cases, 
successful reforms combine several of these elements.17 The most direct and 
frequently used instrument is to give financial compensations to the losers of the 
reform, so that they are indifferent to the reform. But frequently, reforms are 
blocked even though the expected number of winners is larger than the expected 
number of losers, only because of the uncertainty of individuals about whether 
they will be in the winners or losers pool. In the case of municipal mergers for 
example, some politicians and local civil servants may lose their jobs, but 
nobody can tell ex-ante to which group they will belong. So even if those 
keeping their jobs are promised to be better off, a majority of individuals may 
oppose the reform, because of the uncertainty about their personal outcome. To 
avoid such scenarios, governments can provide explicit guarantees to 
stakeholders, that there will be no losers (at least during a transitory period). For 
example, guaranteeing that there will be no layoffs in the five years following a 
municipal merger, or that local taxes will not be allowed to increase in the years 
following the reform, etc. Finally, bundling several reforms together can be a 
way to generate support for a reform package, as individual stakeholders may 
profit from some of the reform elements, while losing from other, thus being 
indifferent to the package. Reform bundling is very frequent in fiscal federalism 
reforms: most of the time, territorial organisation reforms (such as municipal 
mergers) are combined with a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of 
each level of government, and with a redesign of the revenue mix of SCGs. This 
appears clearly in Table 2.6 below, which presents a brief summary of some 
fiscal federalism reforms carried out recently in unitary countries. The recent 
Local Government Reform in Denmark is a good illustration of how these 
different elements can be successfully combined. Finland on the contrary appears 
as an exception, as it has implemented the three types of reforms sequentially, 
without bundling them or using cross-compensation mechanisms. 
                                              
 
16 For a broader discussion on the political economy of public administration reforms, see: Charbit, C., 
Vammalle, C. (2010), “Modernising Government”, in Making Reform Happen: Lessons for the Future, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
17 By successful, we do not mean that the reform has achieved its objectives, but only that it went through 
all the phases and was actually implemented. 
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Table 2.6. Preliminary summary of recent reforms and current proposals in 
some OECD unitary countries* 
 
Type 
of reform 
Country 
Territorial organisation Allocation of roles and 
responsibilities 
Financing of SCGs
Chile December 2006: creation of two new regions.
As of January 2007, regional planning responsibilities were transferred to 
regional governments; further responsibilities will soon be devolved to 
regional governments. The implementation of some social programs has 
recently been transferred to municipal governments. 
Just approved a constitutional reform on regional governments which 
includes the direct election of regional councils 
Denmark • Creation of 5 regions, reduction of the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 by voluntary mergers 
• Reallocation of roles and responsibilities between the central government, the newly created regions (mainly 
in charge of health services) and the municipalities  
• Reform of the funding of municipalities and equalization system 
Finland PARAS reform (2007): financial 
incentives for voluntary municipal 
mergers, with possibility of 
choosing municipal cooperation. 
The number of municipalities was 
reduced from 436 in 2000 to 332 
in 2009. 
ALKU administrative reform project 
(2008): transfers a number of 
responsibilities to the Regional 
Councils 
Reform of the grants system 
(2009): the three main grants for 
municipalities (education, health 
and general grant from Ministry of 
Finance) were merged into a 
single general purpose grant 
managed by the Ministry of 
Finance. In spite of an initial plan 
to change the allocation formula of 
the grants, this was finally not 
implemented as a consequence of 
the global financial crisis (to 
prevent municipalities from 
suffering further financial losses). 
France Local government reform currently debated (Réforme des collectivités territoriales): a single elected 
representative (conseiller territorial) would replace the representatives of the régions and the départments; 
creation of metropolis and metropolitan poles; consolidation of municipal cooperation bodies into new 
communes (communes nouvelles) and grouping of regions and departments; finishing the inter-communality 
map, review law on the assignation of responsibilities and competencies. 
With the recent repeal of the business tax (Tax Profesionnelle), discussions are under way on alternative 
sources of financing for the départements, for whom this tax represented about 80% of the revenues. 
Greece Kalikratis reforms: prior to the 
present Greek crisis, project of 
municipal mergers to improve 
efficiency. 
Japan Financial incentives for municipal 
mergers reduced the number of 
municipalities from 3,232 in 1999 
to 1,795 in 2008.  
“Trinity Reforms” since 2002: 
transfer of tax sources from the 
CG to SCGs, reconsideration of 
the equalization tax and decrease 
of a national grant. 
 
 
 
 
(continues on the next page) 
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Type 
of reform 
Country 
Territorial organisation Allocation of roles and 
responsibilities 
Financing of SCGs
Korea Programs to support voluntary 
integration of local governments 
In July 2008, the government 
announced a mid-term plan to 
devolve considerable powers from 
deconcentrated central 
government special agencies to 
local governments, but the reaction 
to the crisis has shown that policy 
making and implementation is still 
extremely centralized in Korea. 
Introduction of local taxes in 2010: 
Local Consumption tax and a 
Local Income tax.  
Luxembourg A comprehensive reform debate on territorial and administrative reform is 
underway. Proposals currently debated include the abolition of cantons 
and districts, the introduction of public regional coordinating agencies 
(comparable to French Prefectures), and the reform of inter-municipal 
structures and responsibilities  
Poland  A package of legislative proposals 
launched by the government in 
May 2008 include shifting 
responsibilities for a broad range of 
policy issues from the CG to 
SCGs. 
Portugal  Reform of the Local Finance Act in 
January 2007: measures to 
expand municipal competences 
(notably via the creation of a 
Municipal Social Fund – FSM – an 
earmarked grant to finance 
specific expenditure in education, 
health and social policy), and to 
increase municipal revenues (via 
the possibility for municipalities to 
receive up to 5% of the national 
income tax). Increase equalization 
transfers 
Slovenia Regionalization project discussed 
at the moment: creation of a new 
administrative regional level in 
charge of regional development. 
Spain  Reform of the financing of 
Autonomous Communities 
(AC)(2010): increases financing of 
the AC, and in particular, the 
share of taxes in AC’s revenues. 
Sweden Asymmetric decentralization: regionalization reforms, merging of existing 
counties, and reallocation of competencies to the regional level (such as 
regional development, special planning, public transport, etc.) 
* This table is not an exhaustive list of all the reforms carried out. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
One observes a wide array of multi-level government systems in the OECD 
because of differences across countries in institutions, the size of government, the 
tasks assigned the SCGs, and financing possibilities. Multi-level governance in 
the OECD thus involves a somewhat more complex assignment of tasks, and one 
with more constraints, than the classic assignment of expenditure and revenue 
functions of Oates. The OECD assignment is perhaps closer in nature to Olson’s 
theory of “fiscal equivalence,” albeit a fiscal equivalence with constraints that 
lead in many instances to an overlapping of functions. Some of the deviations of 
countries from the classic assignment can also be explained by the use of more 
than one policy instrument (e.g. local income taxes in combination with 
equalizing grants) that effectively turn an inefficient policy into an efficient one 
(Goodspeed, 1995).  
The recent global financial crisis has shaken some of the traditional principles of 
fiscal federalism, and highlighted the need for coordination between levels of 
government. This was true during the crisis, but will be all the more the case in 
the years to come, when all government levels will seek to consolidate their 
budgets, as deficits and debt levels have risen to unprecedented levels. 
Coordinating fiscal consolidation efforts to avoid a “war of attrition” between 
levels of government about who will bear the cost of the consolidation is 
probably one of the next greatest challenges. Achieving fiscal consolidation will 
require efficiency enhancing reforms of fiscal federalism in a wide range of 
OECD countries. But if the global financial crisis may have highlighted the need 
for reform, it may also make structural reforms more difficult, as there is less 
money to compensate losers. 
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3.1 Local government in Denmark 
Jens Blom-Hansen 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Compared to the other Nordic countries Denmark is a geographically small 
country where nature poses relatively few barriers to administrative districting 
and where the population is relatively evenly distributed across the country. 
These preconditions make the arrangement – and rearrangement – of the local 
government system a comparatively modest challenge. In addition, the Danish 
constitution provides no serious obstacles for central government decision-
makers bent on reforming local governments. Article 82 of the constitution states 
that municipalities have a right to manage their affairs autonomously, but it 
quickly adds that this is to take place under the supervision of the state. The 
constitution prevents the central government from abolishing the local 
government system. But it provides no protection against changes of the size of 
local authorities, their political system, functions, decision-making procedures, 
election system, income sources, or administrative organisation. In practice, the 
central government has a relatively free hand.  
Seen from the perspective of local governments, the only constitutional safeguard 
mechanism is that changes must be done by legislation and thus be acceptable to 
the Danish parliament, Folketinget. But history shows that this is a weak shield. 
In the post World War II period, the central government has shown no restraint in 
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using its free hand, and securing a parliamentary majority has not proven 
impossible. In both 1970 and 2007 large-scale local government reforms were 
carried through that fundamentally changed Danish local government. These are 
explained later in the chapter. 
While Danish local government has experienced fundamental changes across a 
relatively short span of time there are, however, also some persistent traits. Since 
the era of absolutist royal rule, which ended with the introduction of a democratic 
constitution in 1849, Denmark has had a three-tiered public sector. At the central 
level, the government has been responsible for regulatory functions and selected 
services such as the military and higher education. At the regional level, counties 
or regions have been entrusted with functions requiring a relative large 
population base such as hospitals. At the local level, municipalities have been 
responsible for welfare services and schools. Compared to most other countries, 
the distribution of functions across tiers has been highly skewed in favour of the 
local and regional level. In addition, Danish local and regional governments have 
traditionally enjoyed independent taxation rights to a higher extent than most 
countries. However, this picture has changed in recent years. After the 2007 
reform municipalities are responsible for more functions than ever, but local 
taxation is less autonomous. The balance that all local government systems must 
find between local self-government and central control policies has been tilted in 
the direction of the latter. 
This chapter provides an introduction to the Danish local government system and 
the challenges it faces today. The following section begins with a brief overview 
of the history of Danish municipalities and regions, but quickly moves on to a 
description of the organisation of the present system, including its political-
administrative organisation, functions and finances. In the third section the 
effects of the 2007 local government reform are discussed. This was a 
comprehensive reform that reduced the number of municipalities by two thirds 
and led to a new distribution of tasks across tiers. The fourth section provides an 
evaluation of the present system. In the fifth and final section the problem of 
macroeconomic management is taken up. The comparatively large local 
government sector means that using public expenditure and taxation as 
macroeconomic control instruments must include the local government sector. 
This is done in a unique coordination system known as the budgetary cooperation 
between central and local government.  
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3.1.2 The Danish local government system1 
The history of the system 
The foundation of the present Danish local government system dates back to the 
era of absolutist royal rule, which lasted from 1660 until 1849. In the 1830s the 
King established a new local government system. In the urban areas Denmark’s 
around 80 market towns were entrusted with all local functions. In the rural areas 
a two-tiered structure was established: approximately 1,100 parish municipalities 
would handle basic local functions such as primary education and social security, 
while county councils would be responsible for tasks that required a larger 
population basis such as hospital services.  
This structure was kept more or less intact until 1970 when three sets of reforms 
led to a complete overhaul of the local government system (Ingvartsen and 
Mikkelsen 1991). First, a dramatic geographical consolidation was initiated. 
More than 1,000 parish municipalities and 80 market towns were amalgamated 
into 275 new municipalities; the 25 counties were merged into 14; and the 
amalgamations abolished the old distinction between rural and urban local 
government systems. From then on, a new nation-wide two-tiered system was 
introduced: counties were responsible for regional tasks, the new municipalities 
for local tasks. Only Copenhagen was left untouched and thus functioned as both 
county and municipality in the new system. Second, following the 
amalgamations, a reform of local governments’ functions was carried through 
over the next 10–20 years. New tasks were transferred to local governments from 
the central government, and increased autonomy was introduced in the welfare 
areas that municipalities and counties already administered. Third, a financial 
reform was implemented. In a series of separate reforms, matching grants in a 
number of areas were gradually transformed into one general block grant which 
together with the local income tax became the main local income sources. In 
addition, an inter-municipal equalization system was established. These reforms 
strengthened local autonomy, but also stressed their role as providers of national 
services. 
However, this reform only lasted to the end of the millennium. In 2007 a new 
sweeping reform was enacted. Again, geographical consolidation was a major 
part. The 2712 municipalities were now amalgamated into 98 large 
municipalities, and the 14 counties into five new regions. This time, Copenhagen 
was included: it was split up into a regional part that was transferred to the new 
                                              
 
1 This sections draws on Blom-Hansen & Heeager (2010). 
2 The 1970 reform created 275 municipalities, but in 2003 the five municipalities on the island of 
Bornholm were amalgamated into one, leaving 271 municipalities in 2006. 
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Capital Region and a municipal part that continued as one of the new 
municipalities. This part of the reform was remarkable because Copenhagen had 
previously succeeded in resisting reform attempts from above. But this time the 
break-up of the county level was too fundamental for Copenhagen to resist it. 
This was probably eased by the fact that Copenhagen – and all its neighbouring 
municipalities – were not subjected to any amalgamations. Figure 3.1 shows the 
local map of Denmark after the 2007 reform.  
Figure 3.1.  Map of Denmark’s 98 municipalities 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior and Health 
 
The 2007 reform also included an overhaul of functions. Apart from health care, 
the old counties were stripped of almost all functions, which were divided 
between the central government and the new large municipalities. Finally, the 
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2007 reform was also a financial reform. The regions did not inherit the old 
counties’ taxation rights, but were to be financed by central government grants. 
At the municipal level, income taxation is still the cornerstone of the financial 
system, but the inter-municipal equalization system was reformed. From now on, 
rich municipalities have to pay more to poor ones (Blom-Hansen et al. 2006; 
Mouritzen 2006). 
By international standards these reforms are radical, and the question is how such 
large-scale societal changes are possible? The explanation consists of a 
complexity of factors. First, the development can be seen as a response to the 
functional needs of the central government. The rise of the welfare state in the 
1960s created a need for professional implementing agencies. Second, there is a 
large element of path dependency in the development. Local governments have 
always been responsible for basic welfare services in Denmark. In the 1960s no-
one questioned that the Danish welfare state was going to be municipal. This was 
taken for granted, and alternatives were not seriously considered. The agenda, 
both in 1970 and 2007, was how to create a local government system that was up 
to the job. Third, as noted by Page (1991: 97–138), in southern Europe, 
clientelism blocked local government reforms, while the absence of this type of 
close central-local government networks in Denmark and the other northern 
European countries left the central government free to shape local government 
according to its perceived needs.  
Despite the above mentioned facts, the far reaching reform in 2007 is still 
puzzling. First of all, the need for a reform was on the political agenda for only a 
few years before action was actually taken, and no-one had seen so radical 
changes coming. Second, amalgamation would lead to a considerable loss of 
local power for the Liberal power, one of the government parties, since many 
mayors in small municipalities belonged to this Party. Finally, municipalities and 
counties have strong national associations that protect their interests. Local 
Government Denmark (Kommunernes Landsforening), the municipalities’ 
national association, has even been considered a ‘fourth branch of government’ 
(Blom-Hansen 2002). The regions’ national association, Danish Regions (Danske 
Regioner) (before 2007 the Association of County Councils – 
Amtsrådsforeningen) plays a similar role. The national associations are regularly 
consulted by the central government as part of the Danish corporatist tradition, 
and they were wary of amalgamations and reshufflings of functions across tiers. 
As argued by Christiansen and Klitgaard (2008) the key to understanding the 
successful reform is probably to a large extent the personal capabilities of the 
Interior Minister as a reform manager. In order to create a strong reform coalition 
he effectively presented the municipalities with an offer to accept amalgamations 
in exchange for taking over substantial new tasks from both the old counties and 
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the central government. This tactic secured support from the municipalities for 
the reform, but at the cost of the old counties. 
The 2007 reform reduced the number of municipalities and regions. The reform 
amalgamated the previous 271 municipalities into 98 new and larger entities. 
Although not all municipalities were subjected to amalgamation, it had dramatic 
consequences for the size of municipalities. As Table 3.1 shows, Denmark has 
very few small municipalities today. The reform has almost tripled the average 
size of municipalities. At the regional level, the 2007 reform abolished the 14 
counties and established five new regions with populations varying from 0.6 
million (North Jutland) to 1.6 million (the Capital region). 
Table 3.1.  The size of Danish municipalities and regions before and after 
the 2007 reform 
 
 Municipalities  Regions 
 Before the 
reform 
(2005) 
Per cent 
After the 
reform 
(2007) 
Per cent 
 Before the 
reform 
(2005) 
Per cent 
After the 
reform 
(2007) 
Per cent 
No. of 
inhabitants:   
No. of  
inhabitants:   
Below 999 - - Below 250,000 28.6 - 
1,000–5,000 5.9 3.1 250,001– 
            500,000 57.1 - 
5,001–10,000 41.7 1.0 500,001– 
            750,000 14.3 20.0 
10,001–    
          50,000 46.1 61.2 
750,001– 
           1,000,000 - 20.0 
50,001– 
          100,000 4.8 28.6 
1,000,001– 
              1,500,000 - 40.0 
Above 
100,000 1.5 6.1 
1,500,001– 
              2,000,000 - 20.0 
Total no. of 
municipalities 271 98 Total no. of regions 14 5 
Average no. of 
inhabitants 19,900 55,200 
Average no. of 
inhabitants 344,100 1,089,400 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
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The organisation of the present local government system 
The political system in the municipalities consists of three bodies: a council, a set 
of standing committees, and a mayor. The council consists of 9–31 members, it is 
the supreme municipal body, and may be considered the local legislature. 
Executive power is exercised in a committee system with a division of labour 
between the mayor and the standing sectoral committees. The mayor is elected 
by and among the council members on a simple majority basis and is the head of 
the municipal administration and chairs the council as well as its financial 
committee. It is an influential post, and the mayor is widely regarded as the 
leading municipal politician (Berg & Kjær 2005). The members of the standing 
committees are also elected by and among the council members, but on a 
proportional basis. The committees are responsible for the day-to-day 
administration within the various policy sectors. In other words, they are the 
local executive organs within the various policy areas. The chairmen of the 
committees are elected by the committees on a simple majority basis. Although 
the chairmen only have few formal powers, they can be quite powerful since 
considerable influence is often delegated to them in practice. Consequently, the 
mayor and the chairmen of the sectoral standing committees together constitute 
the executive power in the Danish local government system. They are the 
functional equivalent of the government in the national system. But in contrast to 
the central level, due to its proportional composition local executive power is 
normally based on consensus and rests on a broad coalition of parties (Serritzlew 
et al. 2008). 
The municipal political system is assisted by a large professional Weberian 
administration. In formal terms it is a unitary service directed by the mayor, but 
due to two factors it has strong sectoral traits in practice. First, in substantial 
matters the administration does not answer to the mayor but to the committees. 
Second, the administration has traditionally been divided into sectoral 
departments corresponding to the committee structure. Nowadays this 
correspondence is often deliberately broken in order to reduce sectorization and 
in addition a cross-sectoral administrative directorship is often installed between 
the sectoral departments and the political level (Bækgaard 2008). 
At the regional level, the counties had a political system similar to the 
municipalities’ until the 2007 reform, but now there are important differences. 
The supreme body is the regional council, which has 41 members. There is also a 
regional chairman, a post that is comparable to the municipal mayor. However, 
the regions do not have a committee system. They may, but are not obliged to, 
leave daily administrative matters to an executive committee, but cannot 
establish standing sectoral committees like the municipalities and the old 
counties (Krogh 2008). 
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The election system to municipal and regional councils is proportional like the 
national system, but much simpler. Elections to municipal and regional councils 
are held at the same time. At the municipal level, each municipality is one 
constituency, and the number of seats in the municipal council is divided among 
the parties and lists by the d’Hondt’s method. There are no formal electoral 
thresholds, but given the relatively small number of council seats there are 
natural thresholds. For instance, in a council with 25 seats, the natural threshold 
is approximately four percent of the votes. Since the number of seats in the 
municipal councils was increased after the 2007 municipal reform, the natural 
threshold was lowered. This was an advantage for the small parties whose chance 
of local representation increased. The election system to the regional councils is 
identical to the municipal system (Elklit 2009). 
As in national politics, the proportional election system results in multiparty 
systems at the local level. Figure 3.2 shows the national result of municipal 
elections across a 45-year period, i.e. since the 1970 municipal reform. Three 
large municipal parties, all local branches of national parties, have dominated 
local politics throughout the period: the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal 
Party, and the Conservative Party. A varying number of other local branches of 
national parties are represented in local politics. In the figure, they are grouped 
together as ‘other national parties’, since they very rarely obtain more than ten 
percent of local seats. As the figure shows, their share of local seats has been 
growing since the 2007 reform, effective for the election period 2005–09. This is 
partly due the reform which increased the size of municipalities and lowered 
natural thresholds and thus made it easier for the smaller national parties to run in 
all municipalities. However, it is also partly due to a remarkable election victory 
in 2009 for the Socialist People’s Party which in this election doubled its share of 
seats. Finally, the municipal party system includes various local lists, i.e. parties 
that are not organized on a national basis. As the figure shows, these lists have 
lost ground since 1970. The amalgamation reform in 2007 accelerated their 
decline.  
Local government in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
 
 
 
71 
Figure 3.2.  Distribution of all seats in municipal councils among political 
parties and local lists between 1970–2013 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1970-
1974
1974-
1978
1978-
1981
1981-
1985
1985-
1989
1989-
1993
1993-
1997
1997-
2001
2001-
2005
2005-
2009
2009-
2013
The Social Democratic Party The Liberal Party
The Conservative Party Other national parties
Local lists
Per cent of seats in local councils
 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the national result of local elections, i.e. the average municipal 
party system. The situation in individual municipalities may, of course, differ 
considerably from this picture. But over time the municipal party systems have 
come to resemble the national party system more and more. The 2007 municipal 
reform caused a further ‘nationalization’ in the sense that local branches of 
national parties run for office in more municipalities and occupy a larger share of 
municipal seats than before the reform. Also, local lists occupy fewer seats than 
before the reform. At the regional level, party systems resemble municipal ones, 
but an even more pronounced nationalization has taken place (Elklit and Kjær 
2007). 
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The functions of municipalities and regions 
The provision of welfare to Danish citizens is decentralized to municipalities and 
regions to a greater extent than in most countries. The expenditure pattern of the 
municipalities is shown in Figure 3.3. The most important expenditure area is 
welfare and employment. This area comprises child care and elderly care, which 
have always been important functions for Danish municipalities. But it also 
includes functions which have recently been transferred to the municipal sector. 
First, the municipal reform in 2007 meant that specialized social services for the 
physically and mentally handicapped were transferred from the old counties to 
the municipalities. Second, in 2009 the municipalities took over the full 
responsibility for unemployment services. Until then, this system had been 
divided between the central government, which was responsible for insured 
unemployed persons, and the municipalities, which were responsible for 
unemployed without insurance. 
Figure 3.3.  Municipal expenditure functions (budget 2010) 
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Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
The second most important expenditure area is education and culture. This 
reflects the fact that Danish primary schools are run by the municipalities (while 
secondary and tertiary education is a central government responsibility). They 
have some autonomy to do this, for instance to decide the number, size, and 
geographical placement of schools, the size of classes, and the weekly number of 
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teaching lessons. But this area is also regulated in considerable detail by laws, 
administrative decrees, and collective agreements with the Teachers’ Union. In 
addition to schools, this expenditure area also includes public libraries, support to 
theaters, and leisure activities. 
Since the municipalities’ functions in the welfare and education areas involve 
considerable expenditure, efficiency and productivity is an issue of some 
concern. The central government is keen on encouraging the municipalities to 
solve their tasks as effectively and productively as possible. This is mostly done 
through benchmarking analyses and by pointing out municipalities with the “best 
practice” in selected areas. But evaluating efficiency and productivity in the 
welfare and education areas is difficult since the municipalities’ production in 
these areas is not easily measured. A good example is provided by the Finance 
Ministry which in 2010 published an analysis of municipal expenditure for 
primary schools, child care and elderly care. It was easy for the ministry to point 
out considerable expenditure differences among the municipalities. These are 
shown in Table 3.2. But explaining these differences is not straightforward. As 
the ministry stated “some of these differences are due to different objective 
conditions, some to different local decisions on service levels, but some 
differences are also due to the fact that the municipalities are not equally 
effective in utilizing their resources” (Finance Ministry 2010a: 15; my 
translation). The only conclusion on efficiency that the ministry drew was to 
encourage the municipalities to pay attention to factors that may influence 
productivity and efficiency in these areas: Teachers’ working time spent on 
teaching, size of school classes, size of institutions, and the division of 
administrative tasks between the institutions and the town hall. However, the 
ministry wisely refrained from specifying the exact relationship between these 
factors and expenditure levels. 
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Table 3.2.  Differences in municipal expenditure levels in welfare and 
education (2008) 
 
 Average of five 
most expensive 
municipalities 
Average of all 
municipalities 
Average of five 
least expensive 
municipalities 
Primary schools (annual 
DKK per pupil) 78,400 60,000 49,300 
Child care (annual DKK 
per 0–10 year old) 57,200 42,300 31,700 
Elderly care (annual DKK 
per +65 year old) 63,600 51,600 40,100 
 
Source: Finance Ministry (2010a). 
 
The remaining municipal functions are minor, at least in monetary terms. First, 
the municipalities have always had important responsibilities in the utility area. 
This area has led a quiet life in municipal politics because, financially, they are 
subjected to a balanced budget rule that requires expenditure to be fully financed 
by user charges and, organizationally, they have traditionally been left to cross-
municipal cooperative ventures. Water supply and sewage disposal are now by 
law required to be organized as private companies and are thus taken out of the 
municipal organization. Electricity, garbage collection, and heat supply are 
organized as either private companies, joint municipal ventures or as ordinary 
municipal departments. 
Second, municipalities have always been responsible for local roads. After the 
2007 municipal reform they also took over regional roads. Third, the 2007 
reform also gave municipalities some health functions, primarily within health 
care prevention and rehabilitation therapy. Finally, the municipalities have some 
functions within the environment, housing and land use planning areas. 
At the regional level, the 2007 reform stripped the old counties of almost all their 
functions, except health care. As is evident from Figure 3.4, health care is by far 
the most important task for the five new regions. This area comprises a primary 
and secondary part. The primary health care system offer basic health services 
and is organized as contracts between the regions and general practitioners, 
specialists and dentists. General practitioners function as gatekeepers to the 
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secondary health care system which consists of the hospitals which are organised 
as public institutions under the regions. 
Figure 3.4.  The regions’ expenditure functions (budget 2010) 
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Regional 
development 
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Administration 
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Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
In addition to health care the regions are responsible for running certain 
institutions for the physically and mentally handicapped, and they also have a 
coordinating function in relation to regional development. 
The finance system of municipalities and regions 
The expenditures of municipalities and regions are financed by different income 
sources, cf. Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Figure 3.5.  The municipal system of finance (budget 2010) 
Fees 14.4 %
Other* 1.6 %
Net borrowing 
0.5 %
Grants 
29.9 %
Taxes 
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* Other includes sale of capital assets, net interest payment, and use of liquid means. 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Figure 3.6.  The regions’ system of finance (budget 2010) 
Grants 88.0 %
Taxes 0.0 %
Net borrowing 
0.1 %
Fees 10.5 %
Other* 1.4 %
 
* Other includes sale of capital assets, net interest payment, and use of liquid means. 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
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For the municipalities taxes are the most important source of revenue. The most 
important one is the local income tax (86 per cent of all tax revenue in 2010). 
This is levied as a flat rate tax. Formally, municipalities are free to set the rate. 
But in reality the independent municipal taxation right is constrained by the 
central government. This is done through the system of annual economic 
agreements between the central government and the association of local 
authorities, Local Government Denmark. This is a system which the central 
government uses for macroeconomic control purposes. In practice, the annual 
agreements set an upper limit for local taxation, cf. below in sections 3.1.4 and 
3.1.5. Individual municipalities may adjust their rates up- and downwards, as 
long as this general limit is kept. In principle this system strikes a balance 
between central control and local autonomy, but in practice it leads to rigidity 
over the years. Municipalities are reluctant to lower their tax rate since they fear 
future tax constraints from the central government. This again means that there is 
less room to increase tax rates. So over time local taxation is becoming more and 
more similar across municipalities and in practice Denmark is approaching a 
system with a local fixed flat rate tax. 
In 2010 the average local income tax rate is 25.2. This is the highest ever and the 
result of a gradual increase in local taxation after the 1970 reform. The 
development over time is shown in Figure 3.7. The local tax rate has gradually 
increased from a level of approximately 15 per cent to about 21 percent before 
the municipal reform in 2007. This development reflects the expansion of the 
Danish welfare state which, cf. the previous section, is to a high extent a 
municipal phenomenon. In 2007 municipal taxes increased abruptly by about 
four percentage point because the reform abolished the old counties’ taxation 
right which was divided between the central government and the municipalities 
(Juul 2006: 15–21). The dotted line in Figure 3.7 shows the coefficient of 
variation, a standardized measure of the spread around the mean of the local 
income tax rate. It shows a down-ward trend over time meaning that the variation 
in local income taxation is decreasing. Local income tax rates gradually become 
more and more alike. 
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Figure 3.7.  The average municipal income tax rate in 1976–2010 
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Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
In addition to income tax, municipalities also levy taxes on property and receive 
a share of corporate income taxes. But these taxes generate far less revenue (11 
and 3 per cent, respectively, of all tax revenue in 2010).  
The second most important municipal income source is grants from the central 
government, cf. Figure 3.5. There are two different types. The first is a set of 
matching grants. Before the 1970 local government reform Denmark had a 
bewildering number of matching grants covering almost all types of municipal 
expenditure. But a series of reforms in the following decades abolished most 
matching grants. Today they are only used to help finance local transfer 
payments such as old age pensions, social security and housing benefits. 
The second type of central government grant is an unconditional grant known as 
the ‘general block grant’. This is used for a number of purposes, but common to 
them all is the fact that the grant comes with no strings attached. The major part 
of the general block grant is used as an equalization grant that compensates 
municipalities with high expenditure needs and/or a low tax base. Expenditure 
needs are calculated as a combination of demographic criteria and socio-
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economic characteristics. The tax base is calculated as a combination of taxable 
income and property values. This tax base is used to calculate each 
municipality’s normalised tax revenue from which then is subtracted the 
municipality’s calculated expenditure according to expenditure needs. This 
results in either a surplus or a deficit depending on the municipality’s overall 
economic situation. The surplus/deficit is then equalized by 58 per cent. In 
addition to this national equalization system there is an extra system for the 
municipalities in the Copenhagen area, a special grant system for very poor 
municipalities, and a number of minor grant schemes to help finance special 
purposes such as expenditure related to islands or immigrants.  
Once equalizing grants have been financed, the remaining part of the general 
block grant is distributed among the municipalities according to population size. 
This part of the general block grant is the prime instrument for macroeconomic 
control of the municipal sector. If the central government wants higher or lower 
activity in the municipal sector, adjustments of the general block grants is 
normally the instrument. It is also adjusted when functions are transferred across 
tiers in the public sector or if new laws or administrative decrees impose 
economic burdens on municipalities. The system means that the central 
government must finance new municipal expenditure due to central decisions. 
There are no unfunded mandates in the Danish system, although the 
municipalities sometimes complain of underfunded mandates. But this system 
also means that the central government can use the municipal sector to realize 
savings on the central government budget. If the central government transfers 
functions out of the municipal sector or introduces regulation that makes the 
provision of municipal services less costly, the savings are not left in the 
municipal sector but transferred to the central government budget via downwards 
adjustments of the general block grant.  
The third most important municipal revenue source is fees, cf. Figure 3.5. These 
are levied within the area of public utilities, where costs are fully financed by 
user charges, and social services, which can be partly financed by user charges. 
For example, 25 per cent of the costs of providing child care can be financed by 
user charges. 
Finally, municipalities may to some extent finance expenditure by loans. 
Although borrowing is generally forbidden there are almost permanent 
exemptions, so-called automatic borrowing facilities (Juul 2006: 78–89). This 
means that investments within public utilities and a number of other areas can be 
financed by loans without formal permission from the central government. 
Municipalities may also seek formal permission from the interior minister to 
obtain loans to other types of expenditure. Finally, municipalities can also use 
overdraft facilities without special permission from the central government. 
However, these facilities must equal liquid facilities on average over any twelve 
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months. If not, the municipality in question is put ‘under administration’ by the 
Interior Ministry. In practice, this means that the municipalities must seek an 
exemption from the rule on overdraft facilities from the Interior Ministry. By 
tradition, this requires an economic recovery plan to be presented to the Ministry. 
In sum, there is quite extensive regulation of municipal borrowing in Denmark. 
At the regional level there are no taxes after the 2007 reform. Now grants from 
both the central government and the municipalities are the main regional income 
sources, cf. Figure 3.6. There are two types of central government grants. The 
first is a block grant that is distributed among the five regions according to 
expenditure needs. The second is an activity based grant that depends on 
performance in the health sector. There are also two types of municipal grants to 
the regions, although both are minor. The first is a block grant the size of which 
can be negotiated between the individual region and the municipalities within the 
region. The second is an activity based grant that depends on performance in the 
health sector. The purpose is to make the municipalities co-responsible for health 
expenditure in order to provide them with an incentive to establish effective 
prevention systems within the health care area and thus reduce demand for 
expensive hospital treatment.  
As Figure 3.6 shows, fees are also important at the regional level. But they are 
only used in the social area where fees are levied on the municipalities for 
referring clients to the regions’ social institutions. This area must be fully 
financed by fees. No cross-subsidization from central government grants or 
municipal grants is allowed. Finally, borrowing is generally forbidden for the 
regions, but, again, some exemptions are allowed by the central government. 
3.1.3 Effects of recent reforms 
The local government reform in 2007 
As noted above the 2007 local government reform amalgamated the previous 271 
municipalities into 98 new large municipalities and the 14 counties into five new 
regions. In addition, it redistributed tasks across tiers and reformed the local 
government financial system, especially at the regional level. This may in the 
future lead to a higher quality of local service, but in the short term the major 
challenge was to prevent municipal expenditure from escalating. This is because 
amalgamations create common pool problems. Seen from the perspective of the 
old municipalities, the tax base of the new amalgamated municipality represents 
a common pool. There is an incentive to exploit it, since the benefits of doing so 
are private while the costs are collective. This is an example of the ”tragedy of 
the commons”.  
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The incentive to spend before closing time was recognized by the central 
government. To prevent overspending it introduced local spending restrictions 
that were gradually introduced and tightened over the reform years 2004–2006. 
In 2004, central regulation of local capital spending was introduced. Spending 
that exceeded the 2004 budget had to be submitted to the Ministry of Interior for 
approval. Since the 2004 budget was made in the autumn of 2003, this measure 
meant that all capital projects planned after the amalgamations were known had 
to be approved by the central authorities.  
In 2005 restrictions were tightened. The approval system for capital spending 
was continued, but in addition a compulsory saving scheme was introduced. All 
local liquid assets above a certain amount (so-called ‘surplus liquidity’) had to be 
deposited at special bank accounts until 2007. This was the first restriction on 
local current expenditure. 
In 2006 restrictions were tightened again. This was a transitional year between 
the old and the new municipal structure. The new municipalities were 
established, but the old ones were not yet closed down. The recently elected new 
local councils in the amalgamated municipalities functioned as local 
amalgamation committees in charge of preparing the amalgamations. At the same 
time the old municipalities carried on for one final year as caretaker 
governments. Hoping that the amalgamation committees possessed more insight 
into local conditions, the central government trusted them with the approval 
system on capital spending. The amalgamation committees were also to approve 
all supplementary appropriations in the old municipalities, both current and 
capital ones. In addition to empowering the local amalgamation committees, the 
central government continued and strengthened its own regulation. Compulsory 
saving of local ‘surplus liquidity’ was continued in 2006. Furthermore, a tax 
freeze was introduced so local income and property taxes could not be raised 
above their 2005 levels. Finally, the central government introduced fees on all 
local supplementary appropriations in 2006. 
At the same time, the ordinary ‘budget cooperation’ between the central 
government and the local government associations continued during these years. 
This is a system of annual negotiations in which the central government and the 
associations agree on spending and revenue levels in the local governments. Each 
year from 2004 until the amalgamations had been implemented in 2007, 
agreements were made on local government revenue and expenditure budgets. 
And each year the local government complied with the budget agreements – 
except from in 2006 when the budgeted expenditure level exceeded the agreed 
level. However, threatening to cut down on central government grants, the 
Minister of Finance persuaded the municipalities to adjust their budgets 
downwards. In every year before the amalgamations local government budgets 
have thus been in line with central government guide lines. 
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In total, an impressive array of central government precautions was put in place. 
But they were nonetheless only partially successful. The evidence suggests that 
the old municipalities engaged in overspending in the areas of capital 
expenditure, local roads, and schools just before the reform in 2007 (Blom-
Hansen 2010).  
This meant that the new municipalities were given a difficult start. The economic 
challenge was considerable also because a new amalgamated municipality must 
find a service level that is uniform throughout its territory. Unless this process is 
to lead to increasing expenditure, some citizens must accept a reduced service 
level. This is because the old municipalities differed in service levels, and 
averaging – by definition – also means reducing service. Since this process may 
be politically awkward, there is a pressure to harmonize service levels at the 
highest common denominator. This is probably one of the reasons why municipal 
expenditure increased immediately after the 2007 reform. The increase is shown 
in Figure 3.8. As can be seen, municipal expenditure was kept constant during 
the reform years 2004–2006. But in 2007 local expenditure began to grow again, 
although most of the increase in this year is due to the functions which the 
municipalities took over from the old counties. This accounts for about two thirds 
of the increase in this year (Ministry of the Interior 2007; 2009a). So there has 
been an annual real growth of about 2–3 per cent in the years following the 
reform. This development has again led to a new round of central government 
restrictions (which are discussed in more detail in section 3.1.4 below on the 
effects of the local fiscal system). 
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Figure 3.8.  Annual real growth in municipal expenditure  
in 2000–2009 (per cent) 
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Note: The figure shows annual percentage change in municipal expenditure in 2009 prices (inflator: 
municipal price and wage index). 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
 
The employment reform in 2009 
Employment policy has traditionally been a divided area in Denmark. The central 
government has been responsible for persons who carry insurance with an 
unemployment fund, while municipalities have been responsible for persons 
without insurance who therefore have to rely on social security in case of 
unemployment. In 2009 the system was unified and placed with the 
municipalities. This was widely hailed as a victory for the municipalities whose 
position in the public sector appeared stronger than ever. However, this new 
function did not come without conditions. The new regime is not only heavily 
regulated by laws and administrative decrees, but also by requirements to 
systemically consult the organisations of employers and employees who have 
traditionally had privileged access to central decision-makers (Christiansen & 
Klitgaard 2009). 
This set-up follows a path that was begun with the local government reform in 
2007 which transferred a number of functions from the old counties to the 
municipalities, most importantly specialized social services and selected health 
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care tasks. But although the new municipalities were larger than the old ones, 
they are still too small to solve these tasks on their own. So a new system of 
municipal joint ventures, cooperative arrangements with the region and central 
government supervision had to be installed. In short the employment reform in 
2009 continued a trend towards more local functions, but less local autonomy. 
3.1.4 Evaluation of the present system 
The 2007 local government reform and the 2009 employment reform have given 
rise to three challenges. First, the reforms have strengthened the municipalities as 
implementers of national policies and left more functions at the local level. This 
leads to a challenge of coordinating policies across both tiers and neighbouring 
municipalities. Second, the 2007 reform fundamentally reformed the regional 
level. The central government did not want a strong regional level and 
deliberately created weak regions. For the regions the challenge is demonstrate 
that they are not too weak to survive. Third, keeping municipal and regional 
expenditure within limits set by the central government has proven difficult, and 
the central government has found it necessary to install systems of tight control 
and thus reducing local autonomy. This is supposed to be a temporary 
arrangement, but relaxing control without causing an explosion in local 
expenditure and taxation is a challenge. In the following these three challenges 
are discussed in more detail. 
Vertical and horizontal coordination. In the new system municipalities and 
regions have to coordinate their actions. This is especially the case in three areas. 
In the health care area, the regions are responsible for most of both primary and 
secondary care, but the municipalities have taken over health care prevention and 
rehabilitation. In the area of specialized social services the municipalities have 
taken over all formal responsibility, but a number of institutions are run by the 
regions. Finally, in the area of regional planning and growth municipalities and 
regions are required to formulate policies together.  
To promote coordination the central government requires that each region and 
the municipalities within the region must negotiate and adopt relatively detailed 
agreements. These agreements are political, not legal; strictly speaking they are 
declarations of intent. However, the central government has carefully defined 
how they are to be made, for example by specifying participating actors and 
negotiation procedures, it has introduced special coordinating bodies where 
negations are to take place, for instance the new municipal-regional contact 
commission, and in some areas the central government has to formally endorse 
the agreements.  
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This system of semi-voluntary vertical coordination is demanding for the 
municipalities. Each region contains 11–29 municipalities whose interests are not 
necessarily identical since they differ in terms of size, demography, business 
conditions, and political ideology. They are vulnerable to a divide-and-rule 
strategy from the region’s side. To avoid this scenario the municipalities’ 
national association, Local Government Denmark, has created regional branches, 
Municipal Contact Councils. In effects, these councils are the municipalities’ 
regional interest organisation. Their purpose is to enable the municipalities to 
match the region in negotiations. They have no formal decision-making power, 
but can act as mediators and providers of information (Heeager 2009). 
It still remains to be seen whether vertical and horizontal coordination functions 
in practice in the new system. One cause for concern is the fact that central, 
regional and municipal interests are seldom identical. So can a system of semi-
voluntary negotiations achieve sufficient coordination? 
Can the regions survive? The old counties and their national association, the 
Association of County Councils (Amtsrådsforeningen), lost the battle about the 
2007 reform. The five regions that were built on the ruins of the 14 old counties 
were crippled institutions. First, compared to the old counties, the functional 
competence of the new regions is circumscribed. The old counties had a general 
competence, that is, they could take regional initiatives in all areas that were not 
strictly forbidden by law. The new regions have no general competence. They 
can only deal with tasks that are explicitly allowed by law. These tasks are 
basically limited to primary and secondary health care, although the regions are 
also responsible for running a number of social institutions and for coordinating 
regional development activities. But for all practical purposes, the new regions 
are single-purpose entities. 
Second, the new regions have a reduced political capacity. The old counties had a 
committee system in which the politicians specialized in the functions for which 
their committee was responsible. The regions only have a council and an 
executive committee. The central government’s rationale is that since the regions 
are practically single-purpose entities, a committee system does not make sense 
(Krogh 2008). However, seen from the regions’ perspective, this political system 
makes for less specialization and professionalization among politicians, reduced 
distribution of power, and more concentration of influence with the regional 
chairman, the only full-time regional politician in the new system. Speculations 
about both ‘presidentialization’ of the regional chairman and recruitment 
problems for the regional council are already raised (Christoffersen and Klausen 
2009: 157–167; Krogh and Skött 2008: 44–6). 
Third, the regions’ economic autonomy is reduced. The counties had independent 
taxation rights, but the regions cannot raise taxes. They are dependent on grants, 
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primarily from the central government, but also from the municipalities within 
the region. On the one hand, this means that the regions are at the mercy of the 
central government and the municipalities. On the other hand, it also means that 
decision-making competence and economic responsibility are no longer 
connected at the regional level. The regions decide the expenditure side of the 
budget – that is, activity and service levels within the health area – but the central 
government pays the bill. The regions thus have an incentive to join forces with 
the interest organizations in the health care area and press the central government 
for increased funding. A new expenditure pressure is thus built into the system 
(Blom-Hansen et al. 2006). 
Fourth, the new regions have less control over their labour force. The personnel 
at the regional institutions and the regional administrative offices are employed 
by the region. Their wages and terms of employment are decided in collective 
agreements made by the regions’ national association, Danish Regions, and the 
trade unions of the personnel. But compared to the old counties’ national 
association, the new association has less autonomy to negotiate these agreements. 
The regions’ position is now decided by a board composed of representatives 
from the regions, the municipalities, and the central government. The latter can 
veto agreements that do not respect the central government’s expenditure 
policies, which turns wage negotiations into a complicated game of alliance 
building on the employers’ side of the negotiation table. 
In sum, the new regions are given a difficult start. Compared to the old counties 
they are vulnerable organizations. Not only do they have to build up a new 
political-administrative system on the ruins of the old counties, they also have to 
constantly defend their position in the public sector. The debate about the proper 
organisation of the regional level is not over, and speculations abound about 
abolishing the regions and establishing hospitals as independent organisations 
controlled by user boards. For example, when it became clear in the spring of 
2010 that the counties’ 2009 accounts ended in deficit, the Danish People’s 
Party, the government’s permanent support party, declared that it was time to 
plan the abolishment of the regions. The Interior Minister followed up by stating 
that the regions are “up for examination” (Politiken, 27 March 2010). In June 
2010 the Conservative Party, one of the two government parties, suggested that 
the five regions be replaced with three hospital districts run by indirectly elected 
boards (Berlingske Tidende, 21 June 2010). Although this proposal was quickly 
rejected by the other government party, the Liberal party, it shows that the 
existence of the regions cannot be taken for granted. The 2007 government 
reform introduced a regional tier whose sustainability is far from self-evident. 
Their existence is probably only guaranteed as long as an effective alternative 
institutional set-up for the hospital sector is not available. 
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Controlling municipal and regional expenditure. In the new system after the 
reforms in 2007 and 2009 more Danish public expenditure than ever is decided 
by municipalities and regions. This means that macroeconomic control of the 
local and regional government sector is more relevant than ever. But keeping 
local and regional expenditure within central government guidelines has proven 
difficult. 
At the municipal level, the central government tightly controlled expenditure and 
taxation in the reform years 2004–2007. This was widely accepted, but on the 
implicit condition that control should be eased once the reform was in place. In 
2007 the government lived up to this expectation and abolished the control 
instruments and negotiated a traditional economic agreement with the municipal 
national association, Local Government Denmark, for the coming year 2008. 
Macroeconomic control was to be conducted just as before the reform – that is, 
by negotiations and agreements. However, the municipalities broke the 
agreement. The agreement was made in the summer of 2007, but when the 
individual municipalities enacted their budgets three months later in October, 
both expenditure and taxation exceeded the agreed guidelines dramatically.  
The government’s immediate reaction was to accept the municipal budgets. This 
was probably because national elections were held at the same time, and 
intervening in local budgets meant taking the responsibility for unpopular cuts in 
local welfare. But after the elections the government introduced two novel 
control instruments. First, if the municipalities raise taxes above the agreed 
guidelines, the general block grant is reduced by the same amount. Second, part 
of the general block is made conditional on the agreement being kept when local 
budgets are made. 
These new rules of the game have completely changed the annual negotiations 
between the central government and Local Government Denmark. The incentive 
to keep the agreement is now so strong that there is hardly any doubt that the 
agreement will be kept. And both the 2009 and 2010 agreement bore witness to 
this fact. 
In sum, macroeconomic control seems to have been reinstated. But the price is 
high. No municipality dares lower its taxes anymore, so the system has become 
inflexible and local autonomy is severely reduced. This may be bad or good 
depending on political taste. But the new rules of the game introduce some 
perverse incentives in the system that should be cause for worry irrespective of 
political taste. They are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
First we need to take a look at economic control at the regional level. Since the 
regions do not possess any taxation rights but are financed by grants, the 
government is in principle in firm control of the level of regional expenditure. 
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The years after the 2007 reform have also shown that the regions’ budgets follow 
the central government’s guidelines. However, it has proven difficult to keep the 
budgets. Especially in 2009 a considerable deficit arose. There are multiple 
reasons for this development, but one reason is the budget system which the 
central government has imposed on the regions. It is a combination of traditional 
spending caps and activity based financing. The major part of the regions’ 
expenditure is financed by a block grant from the central government. This grant 
is fixed so it represents a traditional spending cap approach. However, there is 
also a special health grant from the central government that depends on activity 
levels – but up to a limit. Once the limit is reached, activity must stop. Otherwise 
the regions are heading towards a deficit. However, fine-tuning when to stop 
activity under this new regime has proven difficult in practice for both technical 
and political reasons. 
3.1.5 Effects of the local fiscal system on macroeconomic performance 
Danish municipalities and regions are heavy weights in the Danish public sector. 
As Figure 3.9 shows they have been responsible for about two thirds of public 
consumption since the local government reform in 1970. The 2007 reform 
increased the municipalities’ share because they took over tasks from old 
counties; and the reform reduced the regional share because many of the old 
counties’ functions were not transferred to the new regions, but taken over by 
either the central government or the municipalities.  
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Figure 3.9.  Municipalities’ and regions’ share of public consumption  
in 1971–2008 
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Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Since the municipalities have both taxation rights and autonomy to decide service 
levels in many of their expenditure areas and since the same was true for the old 
counties (but not the new regions), coordinating the economic dispositions of the 
local and regional government sector with the central government’s 
macroeconomic policies has been a challenge throughout the past 30–40 years. 
The Danish solution to this challenge has been a system of annual negotiations 
and agreements between the central government and the associations of local 
governments (Local Government Denmark) and regional governments 
(Amtsrådsforeningen before 2007; Danske Regioner after 2007), the socalled 
budgetary cooperation between central, local and regional government. 
When evaluating this system the first yardstick is to examine the extent to which 
the agreements are kept. The record for the municipalities for the period 1980–
2010 is shown in Table 3.3. It shows, first, that this system has been in operation 
almost without interruptions for the whole period. It is an institution in Danish 
intergovernmental relations. Second, it shows that it has varied over time whether 
the object of control has been the expenditure or revenue side of local budgets. 
But since local budgets must balance, this is mostly a technical question. Third, 
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the table shows that the annual agreements are far from kept every year. The 
system is obviously not perfect. But it should be kept in mind that although 
broken, the agreed guidelines are often only broken slightly. This is actually no 
small achievement since keeping the agreement requires a coordinated effort 
from 98 municipalities (273 before 2007). Furthermore, a comparative analysis 
of Denmark, Norway and Sweden for the period 1980-1997 shows that Norway 
and Sweden have not been more successful in controlling local expenditure 
(Blom-Hansen 1998). In other words, there are no obvious alternative systems of 
control. 
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Table 3.3.  Annual economic agreements between the Danish central 
government and Local Government Denmark in 1980–2010 
  
Budget 
year Core element of agreement 
Agreement 
kept? 
1980 Max. 3 per cent growth in expenditure Almost 
1981 Max. 2 per cent growth in expenditure Yes 
1982 Max. 1 per cent growth in expenditure Yes 
1983 Max. 1 per cent growth in expenditure No 
1984 Reduction of expenditure by 2 per cent. Unchanged tax level. Yes 
1985 Unchanged expenditure and tax level No 
1986 (no agreement) - 
1987 Unchanged expenditure  No 
1988 Unchanged expenditure No 
1989 Unchanged expenditure and tax level Yes 
1990 Reduction of tax level by 0.2 percentage points Almost 
1991 Reduction of tax level by 0.2 percentage points No 
1992 Unchanged tax level No 
1993 Unchanged tax level No 
1994 Unchanged tax level Yes 
1995 Unchanged tax level No 
1996 Tax level to be kept almost unchanged Almost 
1997 Unchanged tax level No 
1998 Unchanged tax level Yes 
1999 Unchanged tax level. Max 1 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
No 
2000 Unchanged tax level. Max 1 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
Almost 
2001 Unchanged tax level. Max 1 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
Almost 
2002 Unchanged tax level. Max 1 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
No 
2003 Unchanged tax level. Max 0.7 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
Yes 
2004 Unchanged tax level. Max 0.7 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
Yes 
2005 Unchanged tax level. Max 0.3 per cent growth in expenditure on 
services 
No 
2006 Expenditure on services equals 146 bill. DKK No 
2007 Expenditure on services equals 194 bill. DKK  Yes 
2008 Expenditure on services equals 205 bill. DKK; taxes to be raised by 
750 mill. DKK 
No  
2009 Expenditure on services equals 219 bill. DKK Yes 
2010 Expenditure on services equals 228 bill. DKK Yes 
Note: In some years there may be different interpretations of the extent to which the agreement is kept. 
The table shows the central government’s interpretation. 
Source: Updated version based on Serritzlew and Blom-Hansen (2008) 
Jens Blom-Hansen – Lars-Erik Borge – Matz Dahlberg 
 
 
 
92 
In sum, the Danish system appears relatively efficient. It enables the central 
government to effectively use the local and regional government sector for 
macroeconomic control purposes. One recent striking example of this fact is the 
convergence program that the Danish government introduced in February 2010 
as part of its obligation under the EU rules (Finance Ministry 2010b). According 
to this program Denmark needs to cut public expenditure by 31 billion DKK, 
which is equivalent to approximately five per cent of the central government’s 
budget. But thanks to the annual negotiation system with the municipalities, the 
central government can incorporate local government budgets in its thoughts on 
how to deal with this problem. As the central government states in the 
convergence program, “the concrete adjustment of the finance policy in 2011 will 
be decided in the negotiations with the municipalities in May and the process 
around the annual finance bill in the autumn” (Finance Ministry 2010b: 14; my 
translation). 
At the same time, however, the Danish macroeconomic control system is plagued 
by a number of perverse incentives that have grown in importance over the years. 
They are all due to the fact that the agreement is an informal, negotiated outcome 
made by the municipalities’ association, Local Government Denmark. The 
association cannot make a legally binding agreement on behalf of its members. 
So in reality the annual agreement is a declaration of intent. 
The first incentive problem is a collective action problem. The annual agreement 
is general and covers all municipalities. If an individual municipality does not 
want to follow the guidelines it can ignore them and refer to the collective 
character of the agreement. In other words, the collective and private interests of 
the municipalities may not coincide. 
Second, it is difficult to identify who exactly breaks the agreement when it is not 
kept. Since it is collective, the agreement is not necessarily broken by the 
municipality that raises taxes and expenditure. The culprit may be the 
municipality that despite a positive economic situation does not reduce taxes and 
expenditure so that other municipalities can adjust upwards. This problem makes 
it difficult to implement effective sanctions when the agreement is broken. 
Third, the system may lead to perverse incentives in a temporal perspective. If 
the municipalities fear sanctions at some future point, they may be reluctant to 
lower taxes and expenditure because this would put them in a vulnerable 
situation and make the handling of potential future sanctions more difficult. This 
problem is probably the main reason why fewer and fewer municipalities adjust 
their taxes downwards. 
Finally, the annual agreements may lead to less local variation. They contain 
clear signals about what the central government considers proper behaviour in 
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terms of both tax and expenditure policy. Although these signals are negotiated, 
the negotiating partners are not equal. There is always a risk of central 
intervention which over time may function as a pressure to live up to these 
guidelines. Figure 3.7 above showed that municipal tax rate become more and 
more alike over time. The same pattern has been identified on the expenditure 
side of the budget (Houlberg 2000). 
In total, the Danish system of annual negotiations and agreements is handicapped 
by severe incentive problems. When the agreement for 2008, the first agreement 
after the 2007 reform, was dramatically broken, the government chose to short-
circuit the system by introducing the harsh control instruments described above. 
This has made the annual agreement much more credible but also introduced new 
incentive problems. In effect, the new system locks the tax rate of the individual 
municipalities because no one dares lower taxation. Taxation, however, is locked 
at an historically arbitrary level. This again means that tensions are built into the 
system because some municipalities face rising costs, for instance due to the 
local demographic development. They can react by either pressurising the central 
government for help or by cutting down local welfare. It is doubtful whether this 
state of affairs is sustainable in the longer run. 
Before a final verdict on the Danish negotiation system is made, it should also be 
mentioned that the annual negotiations function as an arena where all types of 
issues and problems in intergovernmental relations may be brought up. The 
agreements normally cover 15–20 pages. But only 3–4 pages deal with tax and 
expenditure policy. The rest deals with problems in the various areas under 
municipal control. The agreements normally include a series of new initiatives on 
the provision of local service, cutting down red tape, introducing new municipal 
control instruments, and so on. Since all this is done in collaboration between the 
central government and Local Government Denmark, and since initiatives are 
often based on reports from joint working groups or commissions, they are made 
in a relatively information-rich environment. In this way the system of annual 
agreements may lead to more informed policies and thus maybe also to a more 
efficient local government sector than would otherwise be the case. 
At the regional level a similar negotiation system has been in place since around 
1980. However, after the 2007 reform and the abolishment of the regional 
taxation right, negotiations have changed. They now concern the annual block 
grant to the regions and activity levels in the health care area. Since the central 
government directly controls the size of the block grants, the regions do not have 
much to offer in return for influence on central policies. Consequently, the 
negotiations have taken on a more hierarchical nature after 2007. 
In conclusion, macroeconomic control of local and regional governments in 
Denmark has traditionally been done by annual negotiations. After the 2007 local 
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government reform these negotiations have increasingly been supplemented by 
more hierarchical control instruments. This had led to tensions which will 
become more and more serious over time. But so far no solutions to this problem 
have been devised. 
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3.2 Local government in Norway 
Lars-Erik Borge 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The organization and financing of the local public sector in Norway attempt at 
combining local democracy with an agency role in welfare services. Local 
governments are an integrated part of the welfare state and run about half of 
public service production.3 Since equalization of services is a central goal of the 
welfare state, service provision and financing are subject to central regulation. 
The local governments have been integrated in the welfare state by national laws, 
and the legal and financial framework established for the local public sector must 
be understood in this context. 
This chapter describes the Norwegian local public sector from an economic 
perspective. It starts out in section 3.2.2 by giving a historical overview of the 
development from extreme decentralization in the 19th century to extreme 
centralization in the 20th century. Section 3.2.3 discusses the present 
organization of the local public sector, emphasizing division of tasks, financing, 
and regulatory framework. Section 3.2.4 is devoted to trends and reform 
discussion, while section 3.2.5 concludes by discussing reforms that could 
improve the working of the Norwegian model. 
3.2.2 The historical development: From decentralization to 
centralization 
The Norwegian local public sector has developed from extreme decentralization 
in the nineteenth century to extreme centralization during the twentieth century. 
From the establishment of local democracy and local self rule in 1837 and 
throughout the 1800s, local governments developed a high degree of autonomy, 
and Kjellberg (1981) has characterized this early period as laissez-faire national 
policy. Activity and service production increased as the local governments took 
on new responsibilities. They engaged in building of infrastructure related to 
water supply, sewage, garbage collection, gas and electricity supply, roads, and 
tramways, as well as welfare services within education and health care. Local 
                                              
 
3 I use the concept local government to describe both levels of the local public sector, municipalities and 
counties. 
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governments were also engaged in housing policy and poverty relief. The 
activities were primarily financed by local taxation, and initially the property tax 
was the dominating local tax. Soon the income tax became more important due to 
industrialization and transition from barter economy to money economy. The Tax 
Act of 1882 introduced a compulsory income tax. The design and coverage of the 
income tax was determined by national law, but each local government could 
determine its own tax rate. By 1900, the income tax had become the most 
important local tax (about 60% of tax revenues) and the tax rate varied 
substantially across local governments. Central government grants represented 
only about 10% of local government revenue. Although activity and revenues 
had increased sharply, the local public sector was still small compared to present 
standards. Total revenues amounted to less than 4% of GDP. 
The local autonomy regime broke down primarily because economic differences 
developed. Income tax rate variation increased, and many local governments 
entered a debt crisis during the overall economic contraction in the 1920s. 
Redistributive concerns motivated a national response to evolving economic 
differences, and a maximum local income tax rate was introduced by the 1911 
Tax Act. Since the regulation of the income tax rate did not address the 
underlying inequalities in tax bases, more national intervention was necessary. At 
first, ad hoc economic support to specific local governments was motivated by 
their unemployment problems. The role of equalization grants was formalized by 
the introduction of the “tax equalization fund” in 1936, marking the beginning of 
a new grant policy. A block grant based on objective and measurable criteria (per 
capita income, unemployment, and so on) was financed by a national tax on bank 
deposit interest. This redistribution scheme, introduced to help poor local 
governments, became the vehicle of increased national control of local revenues 
and spending. 
After World War II, the regulation of the local income tax continued and the 
local public sector became an integrated part of the welfare state. While most 
public assistance were taken over by central government and included in a 
national social security system, the local public sector maintained responsibility 
for provision of the main welfare services. The welfare services expanded and 
new services were introduced (expansion of primary schools and compulsory 
lower secondary schools, later expansion of the health care system, then care for 
the elderly, and most recently daycare). The expansion of the welfare services 
was to a large extent financed by matching grants, and by 1980 central 
government grants amounted to nearly 40% of local government revenue. 
Equalization was achieved by differentiating the matching rates. However, the 
matching rates did not only take into account spending needs and tax base, they 
were also used to “punish” local governments with below maximum tax rate. 
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Finally, all low-tax governments gave in, and since 1980 all local governments 
have used the maximum tax rates in income and wealth taxation. 
The rising level of national control was also of concern, and a commission was 
established in the early 1970s to propose reforms in the local public sector. The 
commission proposed changes in the system of financing that were implemented 
during the first half of the 1980s. The process culminated with a large grant 
reform in 1986, where most of the selective grants were consolidated into a 
single block grant to promote local democracy, local accountability, and 
efficiency. The reform gave the local governments large discretion in the 
allocation of resources between service sectors, but did not address the limited 
discretion to influence own revenues. Since 1986 there has been a fairly balanced 
growth of central government grants and local taxes. The division of tasks 
between the different tiers of governments has also been fairly stable. The main 
exception is that the responsibility for hospitals was shifted from the counties to 
the central government in 2002. 
3.2.3 The present organization of the local public sector 
Overview of organization, tasks, and revenues 
Norway is quite large in terms of area, but small in terms of population. By 
January 2010 the population size was nearly 4.9 million. The public sector is 
divided in three tiers; the central government, the county governments, and the 
municipal governments. The 19 counties and the 430 municipalities constitute 
the local public sector. As in the other Nordic countries, the local public sector is 
an important provider of welfare services. The sector accounts for nearly 50 
percent of government consumption and their revenues make up 17 percent of 
(mainland) GDP. Nearly 20 percent of the workforce is employed in the local 
public sector. 
There is considerable variation in population size across the municipalities, from 
a few hundred in the smallest rural communities to nearly 600,000 in the capital 
Oslo. More than 50% of the municipalities have less than 5,000 inhabitants. 
Despite the huge variation in population size, all municipalities have the same 
responsibilities (except that Oslo also is a county government). The counties are 
more homogeneous in terms of population size, with variation from just above 
70,000 to nearly 600,000. 
The political system at the local level is a representative democracy where the 
members of the municipal and county councils are elected every fourth year. The 
national parties are important actors, but at the municipal level also local lists are 
frequently represented in the councils. The traditional, and most common model, 
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is not a parliamentary system. Rather, an executive board with proportional 
representation from all major parties is established. The executive board is led by 
the mayor, and all members of the executive board are elected among the council 
members. Some counties and larger municipalities have chosen to have a 
parliamentary system, and some municipalities (mainly smaller ones) have 
experimented with direct election of mayor. 
In terms of revenues and expenditures the competence of the municipalities is 
much larger than the competence of the counties. This was also the case before 
the responsibility for hospitals was moved from the counties to the national 
government in 2002. In terms of revenues the municipal level is now more than 5 
times as large as the county level. 
Figure 3.10 provides an overview of the municipal responsibilities. It is evident 
that welfare services within the educational, health, and social sectors account for 
the bulk of expenditures. The welfare services under municipal responsibility are 
day care, primary and lower secondary education (1st to 10th grade), care for the 
elderly (nursing homes and home based care), primary health care (general 
practitioners, health centers and emergency ward), and social services (mainly 
social assistance and child custody, social assistance). These services amount to 
77 percent of the total budget. The more local services include a large number of 
activities, but make up less than 20 percent of the budget. They can broadly be 
categorized as culture (libraries, cinemas, sports facilities, etc), infrastructure 
(roads, water, sewage and garbage collection), and planning (including land use 
planning), industry, and housing.   
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Figure 3.10.  Municipal service sectors, percent of current expenditures  
in 2008 
Day care 12 %
Primary and 
lower secondary 
education 24 %
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elderly 30 %
Primary health 
care 4 %
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Social services 
7 %
Infrastructure 
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Housing, 
industry and 
other 5 %
Administration 
7 %
 
Note: The capital Oslo, which is both a municipality and a county, is excluded. 
 
The main responsibilities of the counties are shown in figure 3.11. After the 
national government took over the responsibility for the hospitals, upper 
secondary education (general and vocational) is the largest task for the counties. 
It amounts to more than half of the total budget. The second largest service sector 
is transport (roads and public transport), which accounts for 20% of the budget. 
The remaining services are dental health (mainly for the young and residents in 
nursing homes), culture (libraries, museums, sports facilities, etc), and regional 
development (planning and business development). Together, the welfare 
services upper secondary education and dental services make up a bit more than 
60 percent of county expenditures. However, if we consider county transport as 
part of a national infrastructure, this share increases to 80 percent. 
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Figure 3.11.  County service sectors, per cent of current expenditure in 2008 
Upper secondary 
education 56 %
Dental health 
5 %
Culture 5 %
Transport 20 %
Administration 
6 %
Social services 
7 %
 
Note: The capital Oslo, which is both a municipality and a county, is excluded. 
 
Total local government revenue amounts to around 17 percent of GDP, and table 
3.4 gives an overview of the major revenue sources. Local revenues (taxes and 
user charges) amount to 55 percent of total revenues in the local public sector. 
Block grants and earmarked grants are of roughly the same magnitude, and 
account for nearly 20 percent each. Interest and dividend) amount to nearly 5 
percent of total revenues. The significant role of financial revenues reflects the 
local governments’ historical role as owners of power companies. After the 
deregulation of the electricity market in the early 1990s many local governments 
reduced their ownership in power companies and increased their holdings of 
financial assets. 
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Table 3.4.  The financing of the local public sector (%) in 2008 
 
Revenue source Total Municipalities Counties 
User charges 12.9 14.3 4.4 
Taxes 41.5 41.8 39.3 
Block grants 19.9 17.2 36.0 
Earmarked grants 19.0 20.0 13.1 
Interest and dividend 4.8 4.7 5.1 
Other 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: Oslo, which is both a municipality and a county, is included in the figures for the municipalities. In 
these figures VAT-compensation is defined as an earmarked grant. 
 
The main differences between the two local government tiers are that the 
counties are more dependent on central government grants, while user charges 
are more important for the municipalities. The municipalities apply user charges 
for a wide range of services, but technical services (water, sewage, and garbage 
collection), day care, and care for the elderly account for most of the revenue. 
User charges cannot be applied in primary and secondary education. 
Table 3.5.  Revenues, activity, and net operating surplus, 2002–2008 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Revenue, share of 
GDP 
16.3 16.7 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.0 16.3 17.6 
Real revenue growth 0.3 0.6 3.8 3.4 5.6 1.4 1.0 3.9 
Activity growth 1.6 0.9 1.6 -1.1 2.9 5.3 3.2 3.4 
Net operating surplus 0.6 0.6 2.2 3.6 5.5 2.5 0.4 3.0 
 
Note: Activity growth is an index of growth in employment and purchase of goods and services 
(including investments). Net operating surplus is current revenues minus current expenditures, net 
interest, and net installment on debt. It is measured in percent of current revenues. 
 
Table 3.5 shows that local government revenues as share of GDP has been fairly 
stable around 16–17 percent since the national government took over the 
responsibilities for the hospitals from 2002. The real revenue growth however, 
Jens Blom-Hansen – Lars-Erik Borge – Matz Dahlberg 
 
 
 
102 
shows substantial variation from year to year. Revenue growth was quit low in 
2002–2003, high in 2004–2006, modest in 2007–2008, and high in 2009. 
Activity, as reported in table 3.5, is an index of the growth in employment and 
purchase of goods and services (including investments). During the period 2002–
2009 activity growth has on average been 2.2 percent, which is the same as the 
average revenue growth. The activity growth tend to be lower (higher) than the 
revenue growth in years with high (low) revenue growth, implying that there is a 
positive relationship between revenue growth and the main indicator of fiscal 
balance (the net operating surplus). 
Local governments all over the world were negatively affected by the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. As can be seen from table 3.5, this was not the 
case for Norwegian local governments who experienced a high revenue growth 
and improved fiscal balance. This partly reflects that Norway was not severely 
hit by the financial crisis as the oil price quickly came to back to a relatively high 
level. The unemployment rate increased only modest and the local governments 
did not experience a sharp decline in tax revenues. In addition, the large oil-fund 
gave the central government financial resources to run a very expansionary fiscal 
policy. And an important element in the expansionary fiscal policy was to 
increase the grants to the local governments. 
On the other hand, many Norwegian local governments have substantial financial 
wealth4 that is invested in national and global financial markets. They 
experienced severe financial losses in 2008 when the financial markets dropped 
and large gains in 2009 when the financial markets picked up again. The 
development in the financial markets contributed to the low net operating surplus 
in 2008 and the sharp recovery in 2009. 
Tax financing and tax discretion 
Local taxation in Norway is based on the following four tax bases: 
• Income tax (individuals) 
• Wealth tax (individuals) 
• Property tax (individuals and businesses) 
• Natural resource tax (power companies)  
                                              
 
4 Historically local governments have been major owners of power companies. After the deregulation of 
the electricity market many local governments chose to sell these companies. The revenues were used to 
build up funds that are invested in financial markets. 
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The base for the local income tax is so called general income (alminnelig 
inntekt), which is labor income, pensions and capital income less allowances. 
Since 1992 tax reform general income is taxed at flat rate of 28 percent and the 
revenue is shared between the municipalities, the counties and the central 
government.5 The tax rate for each government tier is decided annually by the 
Parliament. The 2010 tax rates are respectively 12.8 percent (municipalities), 
2.65 percent (counties) and 12.55 percent (the central government).6 
Wealth tax is levied at the municipal and the central government level. The tax 
base is net wealth less a standard basic deduction. The municipal part of the 
wealth tax has a flat rate of 0.7 percent, whereas the central government wealth 
tax has a more progressive rate structure. 
Property tax is levied at the municipal level only and comprises both residential 
and business property. Before 2007 the property tax was restricted to urban areas 
and certain facilities (notably hydroelectric power plants)7, and was in practice 
not available for all municipalities. The law did not provide any precise 
definition of urban areas, and several municipalities were taken to court by 
property owners arguing that their property was not located in an urban area.  In 
2006 the Property Tax Law was changed to avoid confusion and to increase 
fairness among tax payers, and since 2007 property tax can also be levied in rural 
(non-urban) areas. The change has lead to increased use of the property tax in 
rural municipalities. In particular, it became more attractive for municipalities 
with a lot of cottages (typically located in non-urban areas) to introduce 
residential property tax or to extend it to also include non-urban areas.8 Property 
taxation of cottages is a prime example of tax exporting, and cottage owners have 
heavily opposed the introduction of a “cottage tax”. In 2008 a total of 293 
municipalities used the property tax. Among these, 145 taxed certain facilities 
only. Residential property tax is levied in 148 municipalities, and in a majority of 
these (83) it applies to both urban and rural areas.  
                                              
 
5 In the tax system there is a second income tax base, personal income, which is a gross income tax base 
comprising labor income, income from self employment and fringe benefits. The tax on personal income 
is highly progressive and is received by the central government. 
6 In the most northern part of Norway the central government tax rate is 9.55 percent and the total tax on 
general income is 25 percent. 
7 The law did not provide a definition of these certain facilities, but in practice they are defined as larger 
works used for production of goods or maintenance. Property tax can be levied on certain facilities 
without taxing all property in urban areas. 
8 The residential property tax applies to all residential property, and the municipalities cannot tax cottages 
without taxing other residential property. However, they can still choose to have the property tax in urban 
areas only. 
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Municipal and county governments receive natural resource tax from power 
companies. The base for the tax is power production above a specified minimum 
level. The municipal governments receive 0.011 NOK per kWh and the county 
governments 0.002 NOK per kWh.  
Table 3.6.  The composition of the local tax base, billion NOK and 
percentage of total tax revenue in 2008 
 
 Municipal governments  Country governments 
 Billion NOK Percentage  Billion NOK Percentage 
Income taxa 95.8 85.8  17.3 98.9 
Wealth taxa 8.4 7.5    
Property tax 6.2 5.5    
Natural resource tax 1.3 1.2  0.2 1.1 
Total 111.7 100.0  17.5 100.0 
 
a The separation between income and wealth tax for the municipalities is based own calculations. 
Source: Tax accounts, Statistics Norway 
 
Table 3.6 reports the revenues from the different tax bases in 2008. As in the 
other Nordic countries, income tax from individuals is the most important local 
tax. It amounts to 86 percent of municipal taxes and 99 percent of county taxes. 
Other taxes constitute a small share of aggregate local tax revenue, but property 
tax and the natural resource tax are important revenue sources for individual 
municipalities. The most prosperous municipalities are small rural communities 
with waterfalls, where property tax and natural resource tax from power 
companies make up substantial amounts per capita. 
The grant system 
It is common to separate between earmarked grants and grants within the block 
grant system. All grants not included in the block grant system are labeled 
earmarked grants. They are conditional in the sense that they must be spent on a 
specific program or a specific purpose. The largest earmarked grants are for day 
care, care for elderly and disabled, and for refugees and immigrants. 
The degree of earmarking has steadily increased during the last two decades 
(Borge 2010), but the actual level of earmarking is to some extent a matter of 
definition. If we include all earmarked grants (as in table 3.4), earmarked grants 
and block grants are of roughly equal size. However, then the general VAT-
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compensation scheme is classified as an earmarked grant. The VAT-
compensation was not intended to (and does not) affect local government 
priorities across services. If it rather is classified as a block grant, the degree of 
earmarking drops to 39 percent. Moreover, the ministries use a revenue concept 
that excludes earmarked grants related to labor market policy and refugees and 
immigrants. With this revenue concept the degree of earmarking drops further to 
33 percent. 
Despite the steady growth of earmarking, it is the block grant system that is most 
important for the distribution of revenues. The block grant system has two main 
purposes; to equalize the economic opportunities across local governments, to 
promote regional policy goals, and to transfer resources to the local public sector. 
Equalization is achieved through tax equalization and spending needs 
equalization. The role of the tax equalization scheme is to reduce the differences 
in per capita revenue due to differences in tax bases. The present tax equalization 
scheme for the municipalities consists of a symmetric part with a compensation 
rate of 60 percent.9 This means that municipalities with tax revenues (per capita) 
below average are compensated for 60 percent of the differences and that 60 
percent of tax revenues above the average is withdrawn to the state. In addition 
there is an extra 35 percent compensation for municipalities with tax revenues 
below 90 percent of the average. As an example, a municipality with a tax base 
of 80 percent of the average first receives 60 percent of the difference between 80 
and 100 percent from the symmetric part. In addition, this municipality receives 
35 percent of the difference between 80 and 90 percent. It is also important to 
notice that tax equalization only applies to the income tax, the wealth tax, and the 
natural resource tax.10 Property tax revenues are not taken into account. This 
peculiarity is of great advantage to the small municipalities that have substantial 
property tax revenues per capita from hydroelectric power plants.11 The tax 
equalization scheme for the counties implies that counties with tax revenues 
below 120 percent of the average are compensated for 90 percent of the 
difference. 
                                              
 
9 The tax equalization was made more ambitious from 2009. The compensation rate will gradually 
increase from 55 to 60 percent. The description refers to the situation in 2011 when the new system is 
fully implemented. 
10 For these taxes all municipalities use the same rate so there is no need to distinguish between tax 
revenues and tax base. 
11 The statement refers to the municipalities where the hydroelectric power plant is located. Other local 
governments, typically counties and larger municipalities, are owners of some of the power plant and 
receive the profit. Since these local governments have a large population size, the profit does not amount 
to large amounts per capita. 
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Spending needs equalization is in place because equalization of per capita 
revenues is insufficient to equalize the economic opportunities for service 
provision. Local governments have different costs conditions due to differences 
in population size and settlement pattern. The age composition of the population 
affects the demand for important services education and care for the elderly. And 
social criteria like unemployment rate and divorce rate influence expenditures on 
social services like welfare payments and child custody. The spending needs 
equalization scheme compensates local governments with unfavorable cost 
conditions (small population size and sparse settlement pattern), expensive age 
structure, and social problems. Spending needs equalization cover so-called 
national welfare services. The spending needs equalization for the municipalities 
include primary and lower secondary education, primary health care, care for the 
elderly, child welfare, social assistance, and administration. For the counties 
upper secondary education, dental health, and transport are included in the 
spending needs equalization. Spending needs equalization is arranged as a pure 
redistribution between municipalities and between counties. This means that 
transfers to local governments with needs (per capita) above average are financed 
by contributions from local governments with spending needs below average. 
The equalization system is largely self-financing and can be carried out without 
large net transfers from the central government to the local public sector. The 
spending needs equalization and the symmetric part of the tax equalization for 
the municipalities are completely self-financing. Only the tax equalization for the 
counties and the extra tax equalization for municipalities with tax base below 90 
percent of the average are financed by the central government. Actually, more 
than 90 percent of total block grants are distributed through the so-called per 
capita grant. The role of the per capita grant is to transfer resources to the local 
public sector (close the vertical fiscal gap) without distributional implications. 
While tax and spending needs equalization promotes equality of service 
provision, the elements motivated by regional policy create new differences. 
Through the regional policy elements rural municipalities in the southern part of 
the country and municipalities and counties in the northern part of the country 
receive extra grants. The design of the regional policy elements have changed 
over time, but during the 1990s they were separated out as specific grants and 
their regional policy purpose was clarified. The justification of the grants is that 
rural and northern local governments should be able to provide better services 
than the rest in order to promote employment and population growth. The grants 
are now named Grant for Small Municipalities (for municipalities with less than 
3,200 inhabitants), Regional Grant Southern Norway (for rural municipalities in 
Southern Norway with population above 3,200), and the Northern Norway Grant 
(for municipal and county governments in the three most Northern counties 
Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark, as well as some municipalities in Nord-
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Trøndelag). A requirement for receiving the Grant for Small Municipalities and 
the Regional Grant Southern Norway is that per capita tax revenue has been 
below 120 percent of the average the last 3 years. The Northern Norway Grant is 
paid out as a flat amount per capita (mainly differentiated by county), the Grant 
for Small Municipalities as a fixed amount per municipality (differentiated by 
regional policy zone), and the Regional Grant Southern Norway as a mix of a flat 
amount per capita and a fixed amount per municipality (both differentiated by 
regional policy zone).12 
Both the spending needs equalization and the regional policy grants imply that 
municipal mergers will lead to a reduction in block grants. The reduced spending 
needs equalization reflects (long term) cost savings due to a larger population, 
while the reduction in regional policy grants represent lower “real” revenue. 
These features of the system are obviously hindering municipal mergers, and a 
merger grant is established to avoid a block grant reduction the first 10 years 
after a merger.13  
In addition to the grants described above, the block grant system consists of a 
specific grant for fast growing municipalities, a grant to limit reduction in total 
block grant, and a judgment grant. The judgment grant takes account of specific 
local conditions not captured by the objective criteria in the system. 
The capital city Oslo is both a municipality and county,14 and it is included in the 
block grant system for the municipalities and the block grant system for the 
counties. Technically this is done by splitting the Oslo’s tax revenues in a 
municipal part and a county part. Since Oslo has high tax revenues per capita, it 
is a large contributor to the municipal tax equalization (where 60 percent of tax 
revenues above the average are withdrawn to the state). In the spending needs 
equalization there is large city criterion for Oslo and a few other cities. The 
underlying argument is that they face social problems that are not sufficiently 
captured by the other criteria. 
The distribution of taxes and block grants 
Figure 3.12 illustrates the revenue distribution among the municipalities after the 
block grant system has done its job. The starting point for the revenue measure 
                                              
 
12 In 2005 a government commission (headed by the author of this chapter) proposed a major 
simplification of the regional policy grants. The political outcome (as described in the main text) was to 
make the system even more complicated.   
13 The merger grant makes sure that the merged municipalities get the same block grant as if they still 
were separate municipalities. After 10 years the merger grant is gradually reduced. 
14 Strictly speaking it is a municipality that also has county responsibilities. 
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applied is the sum of block grants and local tax revenues. Since high per capita 
revenue to some extent is compensation for unfavorable cost conditions, the 
revenues must be “deflated” in order to capture the real differences across local 
governments. The cost index from the spending needs equalization system is 
used as deflator. It captures unfavorable cost conditions related to population 
size, settlement pattern, the age composition of the population, and social factors. 
The importance of deflating can be illustrated through an example. Consider a 
small and sparsely populated local government that is unable to exploit 
economies of scale. It will have high per capita revenues because the unfavorable 
cost conditions are compensated through the grant system, but the fiscal capacity 
will not be in tandem with the per capita revenues.  
Figure 3.12.  The distribution of fiscal capacity, 2008 
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Figure 3.12 reveals that few municipalities have very low fiscal capacity. Only 
41 municipalities (less than 10 percent) have fiscal capacity below 90 percent of 
the national average. Around 60 percent of the municipalities are within 10 
percent of the national average. The main peculiarity by the distribution of fiscal 
capacity and the system of financing is that some municipalities are allowed to be 
very rich. There are basically three types of municipalities that end up with high 
levels of fiscal capacity; small rural municipalities with substantial tax revenue 
from hydroelectric power plants, small rural municipalities that receive regional 
policy grants, and urban municipalities with high levels of income and wealth 
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taxes.15 However, in the upper 10 percent of the distribution we only find local 
governments of the first two types. The substantial variation in fiscal capacity 
reflects the working of the present centralized system of financing, and in 
particular centrally determined tax and grant design. 
Budgeting and regulatory framework 
At the local level, the decision-making is organised around the annual budget and 
a long-term economic plan. The long-term economic plan covers at least the next 
four years and provides a forecast of revenues, expenditures, and priorities in this 
period. The plan also includes a survey of debt, interest payments, and 
installments. The executive board and the chief administrative officer 
(rådmannen) play a prominent role in the early stages of the budgetary process, 
and the executive board puts forward a budget proposal for the local council. The 
local council is free to make amendments and to work out alternative budget 
proposals. 
The main requirement for the annual budget is operational budget balance. In the 
budget, current revenue must cover current expenditures, interest payments and 
regular installment of debt. Loan financing of current spending is not allowed, 
but the budget may be balanced by use of ‘rainy-day’ funds.  
A balanced budget ex ante does not rule out an actual deficit when the account is 
settled. In particular local taxes and expenditures linked to rules (like social 
support) may deviate from the budget. Actual deficits are allowed to be carried 
over, but as a main rule they must be ‘repaid’ within 2 years.16 In understanding 
with the central government, the local council can extend the period to 4 years if 
faster repayment has severe consequences for local service provision. 
Until 2001, budgets and borrowing for each and every local government were 
controlled and approved by the central government. For the municipalities the 
control was carried out by the county governor (fylkesmannen), who is the central 
government’s representative in the county. The annual budget would not be 
approved if it implied an operational deficit, and the budget would be sent back 
to the local government for revision. Moreover, borrowing would not be 
approved if planned loan financing were inconsistent with the economic balance 
projected in the long-term economic plan. The regulatory framework that has 
prevailed since 2001 is more selective. Budgetary control and approval of 
borrowing only applies to local governments that violates the rules described 
                                              
 
15 Income and wealth tax are subject to tax equalization, but the equalization is only partial. 
16 The surpluses in the following two years must be large enough to cover the deficit. 
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above regarding the annual budgets, the long-term economic plan, or the period 
for ‘repayments’ of deficits. 
Local governments subject to budgetary control and approval of borrowing are 
registered in ROBEK (the register for local governments with economic 
problems). The register receives a lot of media attention, and it is politically 
costly for the ruling parties if the local government is on the list. The number of 
local governments in the register varies with the general fiscal position of the 
local public sector. In December 2004 as much as 118 municipalities (more than 
25 percent) were in the register. Currently around 50 municipalities are on the 
list. 
3.2.4 Trends and reform discussion 
Abolition, reintroduction, and abolition of a local corporate income tax 
In 1995 a government expert commission was set up to evaluate the financing of 
the local public sector and to propose reforms in grant and tax financing. The 
evaluation of the tax financing was based on four criteria derived from the 
economics literature on tax assignment: 
• The principle of residence and benefit taxation 
• Low mobility 
• Even distribution 
• Stability over the business cycle 
The commission’s most controversial tax proposal was to abolish the corporate 
income tax as a local tax based on the argument that it did not meet the criteria 
for good local taxes. First, the corporate income tax was very unevenly 
distributed between local governments. The max-min ratio was 20:1 across the 
municipalities and 8:1 across the counties. Second, the corporate was strongly 
procyclical. It was referred to the booming year 1995 where the aggregate 
corporate income tax base grew by 21 percent, more than three times the growth 
of the personal income tax base. At the local level the corporate income tax was 
even more volatile, mainly because industry is less diversified at the local level. 
Another source of unpredictability and instability at the local level was the 
coordination of tax assessment of companies with activity in several 
municipalities. A local firm that ran a surplus did not generate much tax revenue 
if it was included in a company or concern that ran deficits in other 
municipalities. Third, the mobile corporate income tax base encouraged tax 
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competition. The municipalities and counties did not compete by lowering tax 
rates, but rather by offering subsidized sites and buildings, and advice and 
services from the local development agency. The opponents of the proposal 
argued that the corporate income tax was important in order to give 
municipalities and counties proper incentives to promote economic development, 
an argument that also was acknowledged by the commission. 
Although the proposal was controversial politically, the parliament, with a 
majority comprising the center parties and the socialist parties, decided to abolish 
the corporate income tax as a local tax from 1999. The conservative party was 
against the proposal, and when a center-right government was formed after the 
2001 election it took initiative to reintroduce a municipal corporate income tax.17 
A new municipal corporate income tax was introduced from 2005, and implied 
that a fraction (that may vary from year to year) of the corporate income tax is 
reserved for the municipalities. For companies with activity in several 
municipalities the tax is distributed according to the municipalities’ share of the 
company’s employment. In the old tax the distribution was based on a detailed 
calculation of economic profit in each municipality. The new tax was considered 
to give a more just distribution of the corporate income tax across municipalities. 
It also required less tax administrative resources, but did otherwise have the same 
weaknesses. A more ambitious tax equalization program was proposed to 
counterbalance the adverse distributional implications (see section “Tax 
discretion” for further discussion). 
After the 2005 election the center-right government was replaced by a red-green 
government. The new government proposed several changes in the financing of 
the municipalities from 2009, and one of the proposals was to abolish the 
recently introduced municipal corporate income tax. The government 
emphasized that abolition of the municipal corporate income tax would give a 
more stable and more evenly distributed tax base.  
Tax discretion 
If we only look at the tax rules described in Section 3.2.3, Norwegian local 
governments have substantial tax autonomy. The municipalities can choose tax 
rate within an interval for the income tax, the wealth tax and the property tax, and 
the counties can choose tax rates within an interval for the income tax. The real 
picture is quite different since all local governments have used the maximum tax 
rates in income and wealth taxation during the last 30 years. In practice tax 
discretion is restricted to the municipal property tax. The municipalities can also 
                                              
 
17 It was never considered to reintroduce a corporate income tax for the counties. 
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influence their revenues through user charges. The county governments have less 
tax discretion than the municipalities since they do not have property tax and 
because user charges to a less extent can be levied on their services. It is widely 
accepted that local tax autonomy is more restricted in Norway than in the 
neighboring countries Denmark and Sweden where the local governments have 
discretion to set the income tax rates (e.g. Blom-Hansen, 1998). 
Given that the discretion of income and wealth taxation is not utilized, it is of 
great interest to analyze how the remaining instruments to influence current 
revenues, property tax and user charges, are applied. A central issue in our 
context is how property tax and user charges are affected by other revenue 
sources, mainly block grants and regulated income and wealth taxes. Property tax 
and user charges are fiscally motivated if they tend to increase when other 
sources of revenue become more restricted, and also if they respond positively to 
the costs of serving the municipal debt. Several empirical analyses (Borge 1995, 
Hanssen and Pettersen 1995, Spjøtvoll 1995, Follestad 1999, Klungerbo 1999, 
Borge 2000, Borge and Rattsø 2004) document that this is the case. Many of the 
studies also find significant effects of political institutions. Both a fragmented 
local council and a high share of socialists contribute to higher property tax and 
user charges.   
From time to time the issue of local tax discretion is raised in the political debate, 
most recently by the Local Democracy Commission (NOU 2005: 06). An 
important background for the appointment of the commission was a drop in voter 
participation to 55 percent in the 2003 local elections. The commission 
considered more tax discretion as an important mean to increase democratic 
participation and local accountability. Other commissions like the Property Tax 
Commission (NOU 1996: 20), the Local Public Finance Commission (NOU 
1997: 8), and the Tax Commission (NOU 2003: 9) have more explicitly 
suggested an extended property tax with local tax discretion. Proposals to 
increase local tax discretion are typically met with two types of concern from 
national politicians. Conservatives are concerned that local tax discretion will 
increase public spending and the overall level of taxation, while socialdemocrats 
are concerned that tax discretion will cause larger differences in service 
provision. Although they use different arguments, the socialdemocrats and the 
conservatives constitute a grand coalition against more local tax discretion. 
The main economic argument in favor of local tax discretion is related to the 
decentralization theorem of Oates (1972): When the local tax rate can adjust to 
varying spending preferences and cost conditions, a decentralization gain can be 
achieved compared to a situation with a uniform tax rate decided at the national 
level. Borge (2003) provides some tentative calculations of which effects more 
local tax discretion may have for efficiency (decentralization gains) and service 
provision in the Norwegian setting. The analysis is based on a median voter 
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model that is calibrated on Norwegian data for 1996. The decentralization gain is 
calculated to nearly 1000 NOK per taxpayer or 3 billion NOK in aggregate. In 
addition increased local tax autonomy may give a much more equal provision of 
local public services. The main driving force is that small, rural communities 
(with high levels of service provision and low private disposable income within 
the present system) are predicted to reduce their tax rates, whereas larger, urban 
communities (with relatively low levels of service provision) are expected to 
increase their tax rates. 
In a median voter model tax limits will always be associated with allocative 
efficiency losses. However, a major argument for imposing such limits is that 
median voter model may not be the correct description of the workings of local 
democracy (e.g. McGuire 1999). To deal with this issue Borge analyzes how the 
decentralization gain is modified when he allows for overspending and X-
inefficiency. The calculations indicate that the net gain is close to zero if tax 
discretion is combined with overspending of 15 percent or cost inefficiency (X-
inefficiency) of 3 percent. The sensitivity of the net gain to assumptions 
regarding cost efficiency indicate that cost efficiency considerations may be of 
great practical importance for the design of the system of financing. 
Large variations in fiscal capacity: A challenge to the block grant system  
Despite substantial tax and spending needs equalization, the remaining 
differences in fiscal capacity are quite large (see figure 3.12). The remaining 
differences reflect that tax equalization is partial and that regional policy grants 
create new differences. Differences in fiscal capacity will tend to be reproduced 
into similar differences in service provision. The relationship between service 
provision and fiscal capacity is illustrated in figure 3.13 where we take advantage 
of a global output measure developed by the Advisory Commission on Local 
Government Finances (Det tekniske beregningsutvalg for communal og 
fylkeskommunal økonomi – TBU) which has been published annually since 2001. 
The commission’s idea was to establish a measure of aggregate output based on 
indicators of production for several service sectors. Six service sectors are 
included: care for the elderly, primary and lower secondary education, day care, 
welfare benefits, child custody, and primary health care. Borge et al. (2008) 
provides a more detailed description of the aggregate output measure.  
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Figure 3.13.  Aggregate output and fiscal capacity, 2005 
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Fiscal capasity
Aggregate output
 
Note: Output and revenue are normalized such that the weighted averages (for the 374 municipalities in 
the sample) equal 100. In order to ease visual interpretation of the plot, two municipalities with revenue 
above 200 are excluded from figure. The straight line is the regression line. 
 
As shown in figure 3.13, there is a positive relationship between fiscal capacity 
and service provision. That is, municipalities with high fiscal capacity are able to 
provide more services to their citizens than municipalities with low fiscal 
capacity. The global output measure varies from 80 to around 180, implying that 
service provision is more than twice as high in the municipality with highest 
service provision compared to the municipality with the lowest. 
The large differences in service provision represent a challenge for the system of 
financing. When the differences are identified and illustrated in the media, 
national politicians tend to address the consequences rather than the underlying 
causes. The solution to the problem is typically earmarked grants and/or 
minimum standards to improve the situation in local governments with low 
service provision, and not to rethink the central tax and grant designed that have 
produced the differences in fiscal capacity and thereby service standards. During 
the last 15 years there a been a series of centrally initiated action plans for several 
service sectors, starting with the action plan for elderly care in the mid 1990s, 
followed up by plans for school buildings and psychiatry, and most recently 
daycare. A main problem with such action plans is that they tend to reward local 
governments that have not given the actual service sector sufficient priority, and 
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to punish those who have. In the longer run one may fear that local governments 
shift their focus from local problem solving to guessing where the next action 
will come, and also that local governments will be less innovative in terms of 
developing the welfare services. 
The regional policy grants are important sources of the differences in fiscal 
capacity, and thereby also for the pressure on the block grant system. It is not 
obvious that providing grants to municipalities and counties is the most efficient 
way of stimulating economic development in rural areas. Other means like direct 
support or tax reductions for businesses or individuals could be more efficient.18 
And if so, one could achieve a better regional policy and less variation in fiscal 
capacity across by reducing the role of grants to local governments in the 
regional policy. 
Unfortunately, we have limited knowledge about the effectiveness of regional 
policy grants compared to other regional policy means. Berg and Rattsø (2009) 
analyze the general effects of municipal revenues by utilizing the abolition of the 
local corporate income tax in 1999. They are only able to document modest 
effect on population size, basically reflecting the direct effect of increased 
revenues on municipal employment. The study does not compare local 
government to other regional policy means, but at least it indicates that the 
regional policy grants to local governments have little impact on economic 
development in rural areas. 
Efficiency in service provision 
Norwegian local governments are the main providers of welfare services, and one 
of the justifications for giving them this role is that they are supposed to provide 
these services efficiently. A necessary condition for proper evaluation of 
efficiency is reliable and comparable information on service provision. The 
national indicator system KOSTRA has been in place since 2001 and integrates 
information from local government accounts, service statistics, and population 
statistics. It includes indicators of production, service coverage, need, quality, 
and efficiency. The information is easily accessible via internet and facilitates 
detailed comparison of the performance of local governments. The information is 
frequently used by the local government themselves, and by media and 
researchers. Although individual local governments still could use KOSTRA 
more efficiently (e.g. by systematic benchmarking), the system has contributed to 
                                              
 
18 Notice that the regional policy grants are general purpose grants that are not earmarked for economic 
development. The grants are supposed to promote economic development by improving local public 
services generally. 
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increased attention and a more informed discussion of local government service 
provision. 
Borge et al. (2008) have utilized the information in the KOSTRA data base to 
analyze municipal efficiency. The analysis is based on the global efficiency 
measure discussed before and shown in figure 3.13, and departs from the 
observation that there is substantial variation in aggregate output between 
municipalities with similar levels of fiscal capacity. Some municipalities seem to 
be more efficient than others in the sense that they get more services out of their 
revenues. The authors consider the ratio between service provision and fiscal 
capacity (the two series in Figure 3.11) as an indicator of efficiency. That is, 
efficient municipalities have a high level of service provision relative to their 
fiscal capacity, while inefficient municipalities have low service provision 
relative to fiscal capacity. With this definition of efficiency, there is substantial 
variation in efficiency across municipalities. The most efficient municipality is 
nearly three times as efficient as the least efficient, and the aggregate efficiency 
potential is slightly above 30%. The authors investigate whether the degree of 
efficiency is related to political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and 
democratic participation. They find strong evidence that high fiscal capacity and 
a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency. In addition 
there is some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency, while a 
centralized top-down budgetary process is associated with low efficiency. 
Political ideology, measured by the share of socialists in the local council, does 
not have a systematic impact on efficiency. 
A few studies have investigated the relationship between efficiency and methods 
of financing. In an analysis of cost efficiency in the municipal sewage industry, 
Borge and Rattsø (2005a) find that municipalities with residential property tax 
have lower costs than others. The interpretation is that having a visible and 
controversial local tax related to property stimulates voter interest in local 
government activities and thereby may help cost control. In a companion paper 
(Borge and Rattsø 2005b) find that a high degree of user charge financing 
contributes to lower costs. Here the underlying argument is that the combination 
of user charge financing of net budgeting provides incentives for high production 
(rather than budgetary slack) and thereby low costs. Borge and Haraldsvik (2009) 
document a similar effect of user charge financing in a study of efficiency in the 
care for the elderly sector. 
During the last decade the performance of the educational sector has received 
large attention. The main reason is that international knowledge tests have 
provided new and easily accessible information that facilities comparison of 
educational performance across countries. These tests have revealed a mismatch 
between performance and resource use in the Norwegian educational system. 
Norway stands out as one of the countries with highest resource use per student, 
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but student performance is generally below average. This mismatch has triggered 
a political debate regarding resource use, curriculum, and the organization of the 
educational sector. Borge and Naper (2006) perform an efficiency analysis of the 
lower secondary schools in Norway. Using DEA analysis with grades in core 
subjects (adjusted for student characteristics and family background) as outputs, 
they calculate an efficiency potential of 14 percent. This means that resource use 
can be reduced by 14 percent without affecting student performance.  
The middle tier 
The county level is the oldest of the three government tiers in Norway, and dates 
back to the 17th century. However, in its present form it is the youngest and was 
“born” in 1976. Then the county level was established as separate political level 
with direct elections to the county councils. Prior to 1976 each municipality 
appointed members to the county council among the members of the municipal 
council. The aim of the reform was to strengthen local democracy by establishing 
the county level as a strong political unit. The counties were never able to live up 
to these high expectations and have not gained legitimacy on par with the 
municipalities and the central government. When the central government took 
over the hospitals in 2002, the county level became even weaker. 
The hospital reform initiated a debate on what to do with the county level. Two 
alternatives to the present organization are discussed: 
• Larger regions with larger responsibilities 
• A two tier system 
The first alternative (larger regions with larger responsibilities) assumes mergers 
of counties, more precisely that the 19 counties are transformed into 5–10 
regions. The new and larger regions can then be given larger responsibilities. 
They can get back the hospitals, take on responsibilities within higher education 
(regional colleges), and increase their responsibilities within transport, culture, 
and economic development. This alternative was considered by the present red-
green government in 2007, but it did not propose it. A main argument was that it 
was too early to reverse the hospital reform that had been implemented a few 
years before. The outcome was to give the counties slightly more responsibilities 
within transport, culture, and economic development, but to keep the 19 counties. 
It is not an unfair interpretation that the outcome was close to status quo. 
The second alternative is to abolish the middle tier as a separate political system, 
and to divide the tasks between the municipalities and the central government. 
The proponents of a two tier system argue that there is mismatch between the 
current county responsibilities and a political and administrative system designed 
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for much larger responsibilities. A two tier system would facilitate a reallocation 
of resources from administration and political institutions towards service 
provision for the citizens. The main problem with this alternative is that most 
municipalities are too small to take on larger responsibilities, for example within 
upper secondary education. And since the central level is still struggling with the 
organization of the hospitals, it is reluctant to take over more county 
responsibilities. 
Municipal mergers 
The last wave of municipal mergers took place in the 1960s when the number of 
municipalities was reduced from 744 (in 1957) to 454 (in 1967). The reform 
discussion started in the late 1940s with the building of the welfare state after 
WWII and the increased municipal responsibility for welfare services. Larger 
municipalities were seen as a necessary condition for increased responsibilities. 
The number of municipalities has been pretty stable since the 1960s, but during 
the last two decades there has been a heated debate on the need for municipal 
mergers. The starting point was a government expert commission that in 1992 
proposed a major reduction in the number of municipalities. As a main rule the 
commission proposed that no municipality should have less than 5,000 
inhabitants. Keeping in mind that more than half of the municipalities are below 
that size, the proposal implied a large number of municipal mergers (mainly 
affecting rural municipalities). The main arguments for this reform proposal was 
(i) that the municipal responsibilities had further increased since the 1960s and 
larger municipalities were needed to exploit economies of scale, and (ii) better 
communications had led to substantial reduction in travelling time. The 
commission also proposed mergers in city areas comprising several 
municipalities. 
The politicians did not follow the expert advice. Although many agreed with the 
need for larger municipalities, the outcome was a compromise stating that all 
municipal mergers should be voluntary. The Parliament will not vote for a 
merger if one of the municipalities involved are opposing the merger. The 
problem with this decision is that the combination of this voluntarity principle 
and the generous treatment of the small municipalities in the block grant system 
(described section 3.2.3) is not likely to result in many mergers. Why merge if 
the outcome is reduced fiscal capacity and lower service provision? 
Several actions were taken to stimulate municipal mergers. First a merger grant 
was introduced in the block grant system to avoid grant reductions the first 10 
years after the merger. Later the central government initiated a process where all 
municipalities were obliged to consider mergers with neighboring municipalities. 
Project money was supplied for analyses of concrete merger plans and state 
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financing of infrastructure projects was used as carrot for realization of the plans. 
However, the policy has not resulted in many mergers. There have been a total of 
5 mergers (all involving 2 municipalities) and a reduction in the number of 
municipalities from 435 (in 1994) to 430 in 2009. In the aftermath it is clear that 
the voluntarity principle has been in favor of those who oppose municipal 
mergers. 
The lack of mergers, either as a national reform or voluntarily, is a challenge for 
efficiency and quality in service provision. It is difficult for the smaller 
municipalities to recruit competent personnel to satisfy national regulations and 
meet the demand from citizen. In the longer term the large number of small 
municipalities may have the effect that the central government takes on more 
responsibilities for provision of welfare services, as it recently has done with the 
hospitals and to some extent also in child welfare. 
Cooperation among municipalities is a possible solution to this challenge. In 
Norway there is no register of all cooperation agreements, only some survey 
evidence. ECON (2006) conducted a survey of 158 municipalities, and reports 
that the number of cooperative agreements per municipality is 14.19 Cooperation 
is most widespread within administration (e.g. information technology) and 
primary health care (e.g. emergency ward). First and foremost municipal 
cooperation applies to specialized functions and not to whole service sectors. 
Obviously there are different opinions on the potential of municipal cooperation. 
Proponents of maintaining the present municipal structure argue that cooperation 
is the answer to the challenges of efficiency and quality in service provision. On 
the other hand, the proponents of mergers argue that cooperation is unlikely to 
fully solve the efficiency and quality problems, and also that it weakens the 
political control with service provision. However, it is my view that in the 
perspective of division of tasks between different tiers of government it is hard to 
see that cooperation is a serious alternative to mergers. In the choice between 
central and municipal responsibility the municipal option will have a weaker 
position when it is based on an (ex ante) unspecified cooperative agreement. 
3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
In Norway, as in the other Nordic countries, the local public sector has an agency 
role in the welfare state with important responsibilities for education, health and 
social services. The financing of the local public sector seeks to balance the goals 
of equal provision of welfare services and local self-rule. This chapter has 
provided an overview of the historical development, grant and tax design, 
                                              
 
19 A broad definition of cooperative agreements is applied, including oral agreements. 
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national control of budgets and borrowing, and trends and reform discussion. I 
close the chapter by summarizing some reforms that, in my view, could improve 
the Norwegian model. 
Municipal structure and responsibility for welfare services 
As the welfare services are getting more complicated and require more skills, it 
will be increasingly difficult for the smaller municipalities to obtain efficiency 
and quality in service provision. The combination of the present municipal 
structure and large responsibilities for welfare services will be difficult to 
maintain. The future will either bring municipal mergers, more municipal 
cooperation, or increased state responsibility for welfare services. In my view the 
preferred outcome is a national reform of the municipal structure to establish 
robust municipalities that can provide welfare services efficiently and also take 
on new tasks. I find the alternatives less attractive. Municipal cooperation is 
more complicated and less robust, and state responsibility for welfare services 
means too much centralization. 
The middle tier 
The counties have a very small portfolio after the central government took over 
the responsibility for the hospitals, and the present organization of the counties is 
far from ideal. It is hard to defend a political system with direct election to 
county councils with such limited responsibilities. On the other hand, it is more 
difficult to have strong opinions on where to go. Larger regions with increased 
responsibilities is one alternative, but is unlikely in the near future because it 
means reversal of the hospital reform. Based on the experience from the counties, 
I also have doubts on whether regions could gain sufficient political legitimacy.  
The other end of the spectrum is a two-tier system, but that is not realistic until a 
reform of the municipal structure is accomplished. In the short term we therefore 
need a middle tier, but with a downscaled administration and political system 
(possibly with council members appointed by the municipalities). 
Grant design 
The main argument for the centralization of the system of financing after WWII 
was to promote equalization of welfare services. It is therefore a paradox that the 
present grant system contributes to substantial variation in fiscal capacity and 
welfare service provision through the regional policy grants. The large variation 
in service provision is a challenge for the system of financing, and the working of 
the system could be improved by a redesign of the regional policy with less 
emphasis on grants to local governments. 
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Tax design 
Compared to the other Nordic countries, Norwegian local governments have less 
tax financing and less tax discretion. The relatively low level of tax financing can 
partly be understood by the municipal structure. The large number of small 
municipalities leads to large variation in tax bases, and a high share of taxes 
would lead to large variation in tax revenues. However, in my view the share of 
taxes could be somewhat increased given the present municipal structure. And 
after a merger reform it should be substantially increased. More tax discretion 
may be necessary to increase local accountability and local responsibility for 
welfare services, preferably through an extended property tax. Given the current 
system of financing, more tax discretion will not necessarily lead to more 
variation in service provision. 
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3.3 Local government in Sweden 
Matz Dahlberg 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the Swedish case will be presented. After a description of the 
organization and tasks for the local governments in section 3.3.2, section 3.3.3 
will discuss which effects different reforms affecting the municipalities have had. 
Section 3.3.4 will discuss the effects of decentralization per se, section 3.3.5 will 
discuss reforms that might be considered for Sweden, and section 3.3.6 will 
conclude with some comments on the Finnish system. 
3.3.2 Swedish local government: A short description 
Organization 
There are two types of local decision-making bodies in Sweden, the 
municipalities and the counties. In the year 2010, there are 21 counties and 290 
municipalities. The two types of local governments are not hierarchically 
dependent on each other, but are rather horizontally lined under the central 
government. 
Elections to the central government and to the county and municipal councils are 
held on the same day (third Sunday in September) every fourth year. Sweden has 
a proportional election system, and the next elections will be held on September 
19, 2010. 
Sweden has a long tradition of strong local self-government. Since 1974 the right 
to local self-government is given in the constitution and both the municipalities 
and the counties can set their own local income tax rates (the income tax is the 
only local tax), they can decide on spending levels (above certain required 
minimum levels) and they are allowed to borrow freely on both domestic and 
international credit markets. The Local Government Act contains provisions on 
the powers of the local councils, on the elected representatives and on the 
decision-making procedures. When the municipalities or the counties are 
provided with new tasks, their right to self-government must be taken into 
account.  
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The local governments constitute an important part of the Swedish economy. 
Their expenditures amount to approximately 24 percent of GDP and they employ 
25 percent of all employed people in Sweden (Regeringens skrivelse,  2010). Of 
the two local governments, the municipalities are responsible for more tasks than 
the counties and handle a much larger budget. The counties are mainly 
responsible for health and medical care, while the municipalities are responsible 
for several services related to social welfare, daycare, schooling, elderly care and 
local infrastructure. The municipalities’ total expenditures amount to a little less 
than 20 percent of GDP, and they solely employ approximately 20 percent of all 
employed individuals in Sweden. Given their size and the importance of their 
services, it is no surprise that a clear majority of all local government reforms 
have been related to the municipalities. It is also the case that it is almost 
exclusively the reforms related to the municipalities that has been evaluated, 
probably due to the fact that the number of municipalities provide a larger 
variation in the data than the number of counties do, a variation that eases the 
identification of the sought after effects. For these reasons, this chapter will 
concentrate on the municipalities and the reforms related to them. 
Tasks for the municipalities 
The municipalities have a broad range of areas for which they are responsible. 
According to the law, some areas are compulsory for the municipalities, such as 
education, child care, social care (including care for the elderly and welfare 
assistance), local planning, waste management, water and sewage. Examples of 
areas that are not compulsory are culture, recreational activities, housing and 
energy.20 
The areas, and the spending within each of these areas, are given in Table 3.7. As 
is clear from the table, the most important areas, at least in an economic sense, 
are schooling, elderly care, child care and social care.  
A majority of the services that the municipalities provide are labor intensive, 
implying that many individuals have the municipalities as their employer. As 
mentioned earlier, the municipalities employ approximately 20 percent of all 
people in Sweden. An implication is then also that wage costs constitute an 
important part of the municipalities’ total expenditures; in the year 2008, their 
share was approximately 50 percent (including payroll taxes). 
 
 
                                              
 
20 For a more detailed discussion on these issues, see Boadway and Mörk (2003). 
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Revenues for the municipalities 
The three main revenue sources for the municipalities are local tax revenues, 
generated entirely from the local income tax and the local income tax base, 
intergovernmental grants, and fees. In the year 2008, each of these sources 
amounted to 63 (tax revenues), 15 (grants) and 6 (fees) percent of total revenues 
(c.f. Table 3.8).  
Table 3.7.  Municipal spending by area (for the year 2008). 
 
Area Costs (million SEK) Costs (% of total) 
Education 133,940 30 
Assistance for the elderly 91,733 21 
Child care 62,472 14 
Assistance for the disabled 51,682 12 
Individual and family assistance 30,815 7 
Infrastructure, shelter, etc 33,058 7 
Recreation 12,141 3 
Culture 10,730 2 
Specially targeted activities 10,850 2 
Political activity 5,305 1 
Other activities 4,389 1 
Total 447,115 100 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden, Statistiska meddelanden, serie OE 25; Statistikdatabasen: Offentlig ekonomi. 
Also published in Statistical Yearbook for 2010, Public Finances. 
 
Table 3.8.  Revenues for the municipalities (in the year 2008). 
 
Revenue source Revenues (million SEK) Revenues (% of total) 
Tax revenues 330,645 63 
Grants 77,061 15 
Fees 29,963 6 
Other revenues 84,047 16 
Total 521,716 100 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden, Statistiska meddelanden, serie OE 25; Statistikdatabasen: Offentlig ekonomi. 
Also published in Statistical Yearbook for 2010, Public Finances. 
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In such a decentralized system as the Swedish, where Sweden must be 
considered as one of the most decentralized countries in the world, 
intergovernmental grants naturally play an important role. The intergovernmental 
grant system in Sweden contains three main parts: tax equalizing grants, cost 
equalizing grants, and structural grants. In the year 2008, the total amount of 
grants was, on net, estimated to be around 50 billion SEK (Sveriges Kommuner 
och Landsting och Finansdepartementet, 2008). The tax equalizing grants 
constitute the absolute largest part (approximately 52 billion SEK in 2008), 
followed by the cost equalizing grants (approximately 5 billion SEK in 2008) and 
structural grants (approximately 1.5 billion SEK in 2008). 
The main purpose of the tax equalizing grants is to equalize differences in the 
local tax base. As is clear from the frequency distribution of the local tax base in 
the year 2009, presented in Figure 3.14, there exist large differences in the 
municipal tax bases; from a minimum of 125,829 SEK per capita to a maximum 
of 300,491 SEK per capita. It is, however, also clear that the majority of the 
municipalities are relatively centered on the mean tax base (which is 155,642 
SEK per capita).  
Figure 3.14. Frequency distribution of local tax bases in the year 2009 
 
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
u
e
n
cy
100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
taxbase  
Source: Statistic Sweden’s statistical database (statistikdatabas), available at www.scb.se. 
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The tax equalizing grants are based on the difference between the own taxable 
income and a tax base that corresponds to 115 percent of the average tax base in 
the country. For receiving municipalities, i.e. municipalities with a tax base lower 
than 115 percent of the average tax base in the country, the grants are calculated 
from 95 percent of the average tax rate in the country in the year 2003 (corrected 
for county-wise tax exchanges between the counties and the municipalities that 
followed from switching of responsibilities from the counties to the 
municipalities in the 1990s). For municipalities that have to pay to the system, 
i.e. municipalities with a tax base higher than 115 percent of the average tax base 
in the country, the fee is calculated from 85 percent of the same average tax base. 
The tax equalizing grant for a receiving municipality is then calculated as 
follows: 
(1) 20030,95 (1,15 )j jGrant t SB SB= −  
where the grant per capita in municipality j is given by Grantj, 2003t  is the average 
tax rate in the country in the year 2003, SB  is the average tax base (per capita) 
and jSB  is the municipality’s own tax base. A municipality with a tax base below 
115 percent of the average tax base in the country thus gets 95 percent of the 
deviation to the average tax base covered. In an international comparison, this is 
a high degree of equalization. In the year 2008, eleven of the 290 municipalities 
had a tax base that was higher than 115 percent of the average tax base in the 
country, and that hence had to pay a fee to the system. Nine of these eleven 
municipalities are located in the Stockholm area, two in the Malmö area. 
The tax equalizing grants were estimated to be around 52 billion SEK in 2008 
and the tax equalizing fee to be around 3,7 billion SEK (Sveriges Kommuner och 
Landsting och Finansdepartementet, 2008). The tax equalizing grant system is 
hence mainly state financed, a consequence of the fact that general grants from 
the year 2005 is part of the tax equalizing grants. Figure 3.15 shows the 
frequency distribution of the tax equalizing grants over the municipalities in 
2008. As is clear from the figure, there is a large variation in these grants, from 
the municipality that pays a fee of 18,461 SEK per capita to the municipality that 
receives 13,257 SEK per capita.  
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Figure 3.15.  Frequency distribution of tax equalizing grants over 
municipalities for year 2008. 
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Source: Statistic Sweden’s statistical database (statistikdatabas), available at www.scb.se. 
 
The purpose with the cost equalizing grants is to equalize for costs that the 
municipalities themselves cannot affect (structural cost differences), and where 
the principle is to only equalize for structural cost differences within areas that 
are compulsory fo the municipalities. 
The calculations of the cost equalizing grants are based on the ”standard costs 
method”, which consists of nine different models: one for child care, one for 
compulsory school, one for high school, one for elderly care, one for individual- 
and family care, one for children with a foreign background, one for population 
changes, one for housing structure, one for wage structure, and one for public 
transportation (joint between the municipalities and the counties). In sum, the 
standard costs method equalizes for a large amount of variables (dealing with 
different aspects of the municipalities’ demographic structure, ethnicity, socio-
economic situation, and geography).  
The municipalities can affect how much cost equalizing grants to receive by 
trying to affect de variables that determine the distribution of these grants. While 
some factors are hard to affect (like, for example, geographic location), others 
can be affected. The municipalities can, for example, through their policies affect 
individuals’ migration decision (and thereby the demographic and socio-
economic structure in the municipality) and the share of foreigners in the 
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municipality. Hence, the variables cannot be considered to be completely 
exogenous, something that must be hard to fulfill in reality.  
The cost equalizing grants to the municipalities were estimated to be 5,2 billion 
SEK in 2008 (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting och Finansdepartementet, 
2008). The cost equalizing grants constitute a financially neutral system (from 
the State’s point of view). From Figure 3.16 it is clear that the variation in the 
cost equalizing grants is lower than the variation in the tax equalizing grants (c.f. 
Figure 3.15), but it still varies from a municipality that contributes with 3,905 
SEK per capita to a municipality that receives a grant of 10,409 SEK per capita.  
Figure 3.16.  Distribution of cost equalizing grants over the municipalities,  
for the year 2008. 
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Source: Statistic Sweden’s statistical database (statistikdatabas), available at www.scb.se. 
 
The structural grants are related to regional politics and their aim is to strengthen 
municipalities with a small population and/or municipalities with a problematic 
labor market. In the year 2008, the structural grants are estimated to be 1.5 billion 
SEK and 94 out of the 290 municipalities will receive these grants. Of the 94 
municipalities that will receive structural grants, the amounts varies from 4 SEK 
per capita to 5,438 SEK per capita. 
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What does the picture look like when taking all grants together? The frequency 
distribution over municipalities of the sum of all grants is given in Figure 3.17. 
As is clear from the Figure, the municipal equalization system in Sweden plays 
an important role in equalizing incomes over the municipalities, with a variation 
from the municipality that pays 12,860 SEK per capita to the system to the 
municipality that receives 24,313 SEK per capita from the system. 
Figure 3.17.  Frequency distribution of the sum of all grants 
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Source: Statistic Sweden’s statistical database (statistikdatabas), available at www.scb.se. 
 
A related, and perhaps even more important, question is how important the 
intergovernmental grants are for the municipalities relative to their own-
generated incomes. From Table 3.8 we note that the grants constitute 15 percent 
of the municipalities’ total revenues on average. Compared to many other 
countries this is a fairly low share, implying that there is a low degree of vertical 
fiscal imbalance in Sweden on average. The variation over municipalities on how 
dependent they are on intergovernmental grants is however quite large. To 
illustrate this I have calculated the ratio between the total amount of grants that 
each municipality receives per capita from the grant system (i.e., the data 
presented in Figure 3.17) and each municipality’s own-generated tax revenues. 
The distribution of this ratio is given in Figure 3.18. It is clear that the grants 
constitute a relatively large share of the own-generated tax revenues for some of 
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the municipalities; 17 municipalities have a grant share that is larger than 50 
percent, and 7 municipalities have a grant share larger than 65 percent.  
Figure 3.18.  The degree to which the municipalities depend on 
intergovernmental grants in the year 2008. Frequency 
distribution over the municipalities of the grants’ share of the 
municipal tax revenues (a measure of vertical fiscal imbalance). 
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Some notes on the path to present day situation for the municipalities 
The municipal sector has grown enormously during the last half century. The 
really large increase started in the mid 1960s when the publicly provided child 
care sector was rapidly built out in the municipalities. Successively, the 
municipalities have become responsible for more services over the years, and, as 
noted earlier, some of these services are economically very large. To point out a 
few of these additions, in the early 1990s primary school and high school were 
decentralized from the state to the municipalities, in 1992 the municipalities 
became responsible for elderly care that the counties earlier had been responsible 
for (elderly care reform; “ÄDEL-reformen”), and the same thing happened with 
care for the mentally ill in 1995 (psychiatric care reform).  
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On the revenue side, the three main revenue sources have evolved a bit 
differently over time. Figure 3.19 shows tax revenues, grants and fees as shares 
of municipalities’ total revenues for the years 1965–2003. As is clear from the 
figure, the respective shares were quite stable for many years in the beginning of 
the period; from 1965 and 20 years ahead in time fees constituted approximately 
15–20 percent, grants approximately 25 percent and tax revenues approximately 
45 percent of the total revenues. From 1985 and onwards there has however been 
a change since both the grants’ share and the fees’ share has decreased (to 
approximately 15 and 8 percent respectively) while the tax revenues’ share has 
increased to approximately 65 percent. During the last two decades, own-
generated tax revenues have thus become relatively more important for financing 
the municipalities’ responsibilities. 
Figure 3.19.  Municipal tax revenues, intergovernmental grants and fees as 
shares of the municipalities total revenues. 
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Regarding the intergovernmental grants system, there was a major reform in 
1993. The largest change in the 1993 grant reform was that the majority of the 
earmarked grants were replaced with a general grant to the municipalities. This is 
clear from Figures 3.20 and 3.21. Figure 3.20 shows the different types of grants 
as share of the municipalities’ total revenues. From 1965 to 1992 the earmarked 
grants made up approximately 20 percent of the municipalities’ total revenues, 
while the corresponding figure for general grants was less than 5 percent for the 
whole period. This was altered by the grant reform, and from 1993 general grants 
constitute a larger part of total revenues than earmarked grants do; a little more 
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than 10 percent for general grants compared to less than 5 percent for earmarked 
grants. During some years from 1993 and onwards, there was an economic 
squeeze in the Swedish economy, which, among other things, meant that the total 
grants supplied by the state to the municipalities decreased; this explains the 
decreased share overall after 1993. To get a clearer picture of the change in 
connection with the 1993 reform, Figure 8 shows the two types of grants as 
shares of total grants received. Before the reform, general grants constituted less 
than 20 percent of total grants, after the reform they constituted more than 80 
percent.  
As a final note on intergovernmental grants, it can be worth mentioning that 
Sweden has had a long tradition of using discretionary grants. Between 1974 and 
1992, there existed for example a grant program in which municipalities in 
financial distress could apply annually to the central government for financial 
assistance, and the central government decided discretionarily who to grant 
assistance at the end of each year. On average over this period, the central 
government spent an annual 282 million SEK (in 1991 prices) on this program. 
While less than 50 municipalities received such funds between 1975 and 1980, 
between 100 and 150 municipalities did so during the 1980s and until 1992. 
Similar programs existed in the 1990s. During the early 1990s, several of the 
Swedish local governments ran into severe economic problems manifested in 
large recurrent deficits. As a consequence, a large number of municipalities 
turned to the central government for financial relief. To handle their demands, the 
central government set up two temporary committees, the Housing Delegation 
(in 1998) and the Local Authority Delegation (in 1999). The Housing Delegation 
focused primarily on cases where the municipalities’ financial problems were 
connected to a municipal housing company. The Local Authority Delegation was 
established after the central government realized that many municipalities would 
not meet the balanced budget requirement by the year 2000. The local 
governments concerned claimed that their inability to balance their budgets was 
due to external factors. Responding to such claims, the central government 
decided to establish a transfer program for municipalities where this was found to 
be true. Municipalities could apply for such funds and the Local Authority 
Delegation was appointed to prepare the cases and to propose which 
municipalities that were to be granted a positive response. The central 
government did, however, have the final decision.  
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Figure 3.20.  Grants as share of the municipalities total revenues. 
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Figure 3.21.  Different grants as share of total grant revenues. 
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3.3.3 Effects of local government reforms  
This section will discuss some of the more important reforms that have affected 
the municipalities in Sweden during the last decades. The reforms have had 
effect on the number and size of the municipalities, the municipalities’ 
responsibilities, the municipalities’ revenue side, and the degree of competition 
that the municipalities face. A brief description of the reforms will be provided, 
as well as their effects. 
Reforms affecting the number and size of the municipalities: Amalgamation 
reforms 
One set of reforms have been related to the number and size of the 
municipalities. There have been two major boundary reforms in Sweden during 
the last half century; one in 1952, which reduced the number of municipalities 
from 2,498 in 1951 to 1,037 in 1952, and one spanning over the period 1962-
1974, which decreased the number of municipalities from a little more than 1,000 
in 1962 to 278 in 1974. In the reform process initiated in 1962, the amalgamation 
was expected to take place voluntarily among the municipalities (given the new 
borders that were determined centrally in 1963). By 1969, only 38 new 
municipalities had however been formed, which forced the central government to 
decide that the reform should be fully implemented by 1974. After 1969, the 
remaining merging of municipalities took place at two points in time; the first 
wave was done by the end of 1970, and the final wave by the end of 1973. 
In the 1952 reform, the average population increased from approximately 1,500 
to 4,000. In the later reform, the aim was to construct municipalities with no less 
than 8,000 inhabitants. The main motivation for the two reforms was to gain 
economic efficiency in the provision of social services (for example through 
economies of scale in services and administration), even though this motivation 
was more clearly spelled out in connection with the later reform.21  
The main arguments in favor of larger local governments are hence related to 
economic efficiency. However, since efficiency in production is hard to measure 
in general, and perhaps even more so in the production of publicly provided 
welfare services, there do not exist, as far as I know, any reliable studies on 
Swedish data examining whether efficiency increases when the size of the 
municipalities increases. Something that is measurable is however economic 
growth. Larger units can take advantage of economies of scale, which in turn can 
lead to economic growth (see Niklas Hanes and Magnus Wikström, 2008, for a 
discussion of different channels in which amalgamations into larger units might 
                                              
 
21 A good overview of the amalgamation reforms is provided in Jordahl and Liang (2010). 
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affect the growth rate). Even though the empirical literature examining this 
question is scarce as well, there do exist one study on Swedish data. Hanes and 
Wikström (2008) use the amalgamation reform in 1952 to examine if it had an 
impact on the population and income growth rates of the amalgamated 
municipalities. They examine the growth of treated and untreated municipalities 
after the reform had been enacted. They find mainly no effects. The only 
significant effect they find is on the population growth rate for initially very 
small municipalities.  
A potential problem with amalgamations of municipalities into larger units is that 
it might create common pool problems. In the common pool problem, a 
municipality that are to join another municipality has an incentive to raise its per 
capita debt before the amalgamation, realizing that the larger, amalgamated, 
municipality will have a larger common pool of tax revenues that can be used for 
repaying the loans after the amalgamation is done (before the amalgamation, debt 
financed expenditures almost exclusively benefit the own municipality, while all 
debt will be shared by all municipalities involved in the amalgamation). The 
smaller a pre-reform municipality is relative to the amalgamated post-reform 
municipality, the higher is the municipality’s incentive to free ride on the future 
common pool of taxes. 
Björn Tyrefors (2009) examines the effects of the amalgamation reform that 
ended in 1974 on the municipalities’ pre-reform behavior on raising per capita 
debt. He finds empirical support for incentive effects generated by the common 
pool problem; the stronger a municipality’s incentive to free ride is, the more 
does it increase its per capita level of debt in the period preceding the 
amalgamation. Evaluated at the mean of the incentive to free ride, the effect is 
estimated to be approximately 17 percent of the initial level of debt. He also finds 
that the more time the municipalities have to raise debt before the amalgamation 
has to take place (i.e., whether they amalgamated in 1970 or 1973), the more they 
increase their debt. As noted by Tyrefors (2009), this type of pre-amalgamation 
behavior is counteracting the potential positive effects resulting from the 
amalgamation. 
A test of the common pool problem is also conducted by Henrik Jordahl and 
Che-Yuan Liang (2010). They use data from the years before the 1952 reform, 
i.e., a period in which all municipalities knew with certainty if they were to be 
amalgamated with some other municipalities in 1952, and, if so, which 
municipalities they were to merge with. They find strong support for free-riding 
behavior. Their conservative estimates indicate that the common pool increased 
per capita debt by 52 percent of new debt issued by the municipalities in the 
common pools. Jordahl and Liang conclude that the risk of free-riding may 
inhibit voluntary amalgamations, and amalgamations that are decided by the 
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central government may need to follow strict protocols to prevent efficiency 
losses resulting from opportunistic behavior. 
An important downside of amalgamations of municipalities into larger units is 
also from a democratic point of view. While economics of scale and the existence 
of externalities speak in favor of large government units, accountability and a 
better possibility to tailor output to local needs and preferences (preference 
matching) speak for keeping down the size of each unit. Matz Dahlberg, Eva 
Mörk and Hanna Ågren (2009) examine the preference matching-argument. 
Using survey data from the 1960s, a period when it existed really small 
municipalities in Sweden, they find that the smaller the political jurisdiction is, 
the better is the match between local politicians’ and their voters’ preferences for 
local services. They also find that local politicians have better knowledge about 
their voters’ preferences in small local governments. However, the jurisdictions 
must have less than approximately 5,000 inhabitants in order for the 
correspondence to be really close. The results in Dahlberg, Mörk and Ågren 
hence indicate that regardless of whether politicians implement their own 
preferred policy or the one preferred by the voters, it is only in fairly small 
political jurisdictions that voters’ most preferred policy will be implemented. It 
could of course be the case that in larger municipalities, the politicians 
implement policies that are in accordance with the voters’ preferences (and not 
with the politicians’ own preferences), something that is assumed in the 
commonly used median voter model. When examining the role of politicians’ 
and voters’ preferences in determining actual policy (municipal spending on 
child care, schooling, social care and total municipal spending), Hanna Ågren 
(2005) does however find that politicians’ preferences affect actual spending 
even after the voters’ preferences have been controlled for.22 
That the size of a municipality also might affect other dimensions of local 
democracy is evident from the analysis in Peder Nielsen (2003). He finds that 
amalgamations can have negative effects on local democracy; the larger the 
municipality is, the lower is the voters’ political participation and the lower is 
their view on the legitimacy of democracy. The voters also feel a larger 
communion with the municipality the smaller the municipality is. Nielsen 
concludes that the optimal division, from a democratic point of view, is one with 
small municipalities with only one dominating urban area in each municipality. 
                                              
 
22 Swedish evidence that the politicians’ own preferences matter is also provided in Svaleryd (2009), who 
finds that the degree of female participation in the municipal council affects the spending pattern, and 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), who finds evidence of a party effect on municipal tax and spending policy.  
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Reforms affecting the municipalities’ responsibilities 
During the last decades, there have been some reforms that have affected the 
municipalities’ areas of responsibilities. Some of these are the decentralization of 
schools in the early 1990s, the decentralization of elderly care in 1992 (a switch 
from a responsibility for the counties to a responsibility for the municipalities), 
the decentralization of care for the mentally ill in 1995 (also a switch from a 
responsibility for the counties to a responsibility for the municipalities), and the 
centralization of social welfare services in 1998. Most of these reforms have not 
been evaluated. Here I will mainly discuss the decentralization of schools, which 
is a reform that has been evaluated. I will also briefly discuss the centralization of 
social welfare services. 
Decentralization of responsibilities for schools 
Before 1991, the Swedish school system was heavily centralized. There were 
strict central government regulations and controls, centrally employed teachers 
and a system of intergovernmental grants that were ear-marked for specific 
categories of school spending. The municipalities had little freedom to allocate 
expenditures on different items within the school system. The decentralization 
reform started in 1991, with the main change being that the municipalities could 
freely allocate their money across schools and items within schools. Thus, even 
though the grants that the municipalities received were still ear-marked for 
schools, the municipalities received much more freedom in how to spend the 
money. In 1993 the big change came; in connection with that year’s grant reform 
the ear-marked grants turned into a general grant to the municipalities. From 
1993, the municipalities can freely allocate resources over its responsibilities. 
Finally, in 1996, the wage setting for teachers were decentralized to the school 
level. Up until 1996, the wages had been set in central negotiations implemented 
nationwide. The decentralization process is well described in Björklund et al. 
(2005) and Ahlin and Mörk (2008).  
In the 1990s, Sweden experienced an overall decline in education expenditures 
relative to GDP. Expenditures per student in compulsory schools, as share of 
GDP per capita, declined from 34 percent in 1991 to 24 percent in 1999 (see 
Anders Björklund, Melissa Clark, Per-Anders Edin, Peter Fredriksson and Alan 
Krueger, 2005). Björklund et al. (2005) also document a decrease in the teacher 
density in compulsory schools; from 1990/1991 to 1999/00 the median 
teacher/student ratio decreased from 9.1 to 7.4 percent. To what extent the 
decline is due to the recessing economy and to what extent it is due to the 
decentralization of schools is very hard to tell. It is however possible to say 
something about the distributional effects of the reform. 
Jens Blom-Hansen – Lars-Erik Borge – Matz Dahlberg 
 
 
 
138 
Åsa Ahlin and Eva Mörk (2008) examine the effects of the decentralization of 
schools on the allocation of school resources over municipalities. They find that 
the municipal tax base per capita (i.e., average taxable income) does not seem to 
matter more for the municipalities’ per pupil spending or for their teacher/student 
ratio after the decentralization than before. They conclude that there is no 
evidence supporting the view that your residence municipality has become more 
important for determining the amount of school resources that you are treated 
with. 
Björklund et al. (2005) and Peter Fredriksson and Björn Öckert (2008) examine 
how the decentralization affected the distribution of resources over students. 
They find that after the reform there is an upward trend in the 90/10 percentile 
ratio of the distribution of the teacher/student ratio. Decomposing the 90/10 ratio 
into a 90/50 ratio and a 50/10 ratio, they find that the widening of the distribution 
mainly have taken place in the bottom of the distribution. That is, after the 
decentralization of compulsory schools, the school resources (measured through 
the teacher/student ratio) have decreased the most among those students that 
were already treated with low resources (i.e., with a low teacher/student ratio). 
Fredriksson and Öckert (2008) find that, using the decentralization reform as the 
identifying variation, increases in the student/teacher ratio have a significant 
impact on student achievements. They conclude that their result on student 
achievements suggest that student performance deteriorated throughout the 1990s 
in Sweden as a result of the falling teacher/student ratios over the same period. 
Centralization of social welfare spending 
Before 1998, the municipalities were free to set their own benefit norms (there 
was no mandatory rule for the benefit levels, but general guidelines were 
provided by The National Board of Health and Welfare). This decentralized 
decision-making in the setting of welfare generosity led to a large variation in the 
benefit paid out. For the period 1990-1994, the mean benefits paid out per benefit 
month was 3,960 SEK, with a standard deviation of 600 SEK (and with a 
minimum of 2,000 and a maximum of 7,900 SEK) (all monetary variables are 
deflated to 1990 year values). There was also a significant variation in the benefit 
norms set by the municipalities. During the years 1991, 1992 and 1994, the 
benefit norm averaged 112, with minimum and maximum levels at 80 and 145 
and with a standard deviation of 7.8.23  
It was the great variation between the municipalities, in particular the tendency to 
set the levels below the recommendations of the Board, that finally led to the 
                                              
 
23 The norm is defined as the percentage of the basic amount and the figures presented are the unadjusted 
levels for a single individual. 
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introduction of a mandatory minimum level in 1998 (Matz Dahlberg and Karin 
Edmark, 2008). Dahlberg and Edmark also found that there was a race-to-the-
bottom in the setting of welfare benefit levels before 1998 (see section 3.3.4 
below), which also argues for a centralization of welfare assistance. 
Reforms affecting the municipalities’ revenue side 
As mentioned earlier, there are three main revenue sources for the municipalities: 
income tax revenues, intergovernmental grants and user fees. There has in 
principle been no reforms regarding the local income tax, which for decades has 
been the completely dominating local tax (and today is the only local tax). There 
have however been important grants and fee reforms. 
Grant reforms 
Since the first general grant system was imposed in Sweden in 1966, there has 
been several reformations of the system. Several of the changes have been related 
to the tax equalization formula, mainly regarding the degree of compensation 
(which is 0.95 today; c.f. equation (1)) and to the reference level (which today is 
115 percent of the average tax base; c.f. Equation (1)). Given the size of the tax 
equalizing grants in Sweden and the incentive effects they (theoretically) have on 
the municipalities’ tax and growth-enhancing behavior, it is unfortunate that 
there does not exist any empirical studies examining the effects these grants have 
on municipal behavior.  
The perhaps most dramatic grant reform took place in 1993. One of the major 
changes in that reform was a switch from mainly targeted (earmarked) grants to 
mainly general grants (c.f. Figures 3.20 and 3.21).  Using data for the period 
1988–1995, Pål Bergström, Matz Dahlberg and Eva Mörk (2004) utilize the grant 
reform in 1993 to identify which type of grants that have the largest effects on 
municipal employment. They find a larger municipal employment elasticity with 
respect to grants before the reform, which they interpret as evidence that general 
grants have lower employment effects than specific ones. Similar results are 
found in Ahlin and Mörk (2008). Using the same grant reform, they find that the 
less targeted the grants are the lower is the teacher/student ratio. They do 
however not find any statistically significant effects of the reform on per pupil 
school-spending. 
From 1993 until today, the major part of the intergovernmental grants in Sweden 
are general grants with no strings attached. An interesting question is therefore 
what effects general grants have on municipal tax and spending decisions. Matz 
Dahlberg, Eva Mörk, Jørn Rattsø and Hanna Ågren (2008) investigate the causal 
effect of general intergovernmental grants on local public spending and taxes.  
Using a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system to solve the endogeneity of 
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grants, they find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to 
more local spending, but not to reduced local taxes. They cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that an increase in general grants with 1 SEK/capita increases local 
spending with 1 SEK/capita. In other words, they cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of full crowding-in of general grants.  
Fee reforms 
During the last decades there have been a couple of reforms that have imposed a 
cap on user fees that the municipalities can set; the maximum fee (maxtaxa) 
within child care and the maximum fee within elderly care. These kinds of 
reforms do probably not have that large effects on the municipalities’ budget 
(recall from Table 3.8 that user fees on average only stood for 6 percent of the 
municipalities’ total revenues), but they do of course affect the local self-
government. What is more important is that they might have large impacts on a 
single individual’s budget and behavior (which was the main idea with the child 
care fee reform). While the maximum fee reform within elderly care has, as far as 
I know, not been evaluated, the fee reform within child care has.   
Before the child care fee reform was implemented in 2002, the user fees varied 
considerably over the municipalities and constituted a fairly large share of the 
households’ net income. After the reform the price on publicly provided child 
care was considerably reduced and the variation over municipalities had almost 
gone to zero (Daniela Lundin, Eva Mörk and Björn Öckert, 2008).  
The child care reform implied that similar households experienced different price 
changes depending on in which municipality they resided. Lundin, Mörk and 
Öckert (2008) use the variation in price changes that the reform generated to 
estimate the effect of the price of childcare on mothers’ labor supply in a 
difference-in-differences regression matching framework. They find no effects 
on mothers’ labor supply; their estimates are very precise and close to zero. 
Should the central government impose caps on user fees that the municipalities 
can charge? In the end there is a trade-off where one has to value the costs in 
terms reduced local self-government and a reduction in the municipalities’ 
possibilities to raise revenues against the benefits resulting from the cap (like 
effects coming from a change in individual behavior, e.g. increased labor 
supply).  
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Reforms affecting local competition: Privatization reforms 
For a long time the public sector was the monopolist supplier of welfare services. 
During the last two decades this has changed quite dramatically. Several of the 
services that the municipalities earlier were the only providers of, now have 
private providers as well. We have for example seen privatization reforms within 
the school sector and within the sectors for elderly care, social care and child 
care. There has been a marked increase in market solutions and individual choice 
within these areas and, as a consequence, competition has increased. For most of 
these sectors we do not yet know the effects of the increased competition. The 
exception is the school sector for which recent research provide us with several 
answers of the effects of the privatization reform.  
In 1992, a radical change in the school system appeared in Sweden. From that 
date, the municipalities were required to fund independent, privately run, 
schools. This led to a sharp increase in the number of pupils in private schools. In 
1992, less than one percent of the pupils attended a private school in ninth grade. 
In 2003, the corresponding figure was five percent. In 2003, private schools with 
ninth grade pupils existed in 93 out of 2003 municipalities. Among these 93 
municipalities, the average private school share was nine percent, but the 
variation was quite large with one municipality having a share of almost 40 
percent of private schools.24 Since the start in 1992, the students have been 
completely free to choose between the two types of schools. The reform hence 
led to an increase in the competition that the municipalities face in the provision 
of education. What effects have this increased competition had on the quality of 
schooling?  
From a theoretical point of view, increased possibilities to make individual 
choices between private and public schools can affect the quality of schooling via 
two channels. Either because private schools are better than public schools 
(average school performance would then increase through the mere reallocation 
of pupils from the inefficient public sector to the more efficient private sector) or 
because the competition between schools for pupils, teachers and resources 
induced by increased individual choice improve overall school quality. In the 
first channel, increased competition only benefits pupils in private schools. In the 
second channel, all pupils benefit from increased competition (both those in 
private schools and those in public schools).  
There are several papers empirically examining the effects of increased school 
competition on school quality (measured by student performance through grades 
                                              
 
24 The figures come from Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007, 2008), where also a more detailed description of 
the reform and the development over time can be found.  
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and test results); see Åsa Ahlin (2003), Mikael Sandström and Fredrik Bergström 
(2005), Björklund et al. (2005), and Anders Böhlmark and Mikael Lindahl (2007, 
2008). The most comprehensive and detailed of these studies are those by 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007, 2008). Investigating the effects of increased school 
competition by using a large register data set on pupils grading from compulsory 
school in 1988–2003, Böhlmark and Lindahl find in their 2007 paper that a ten 
percentage point increase in the private school share lead to an increase in the 
average grade by one percentile rank point. Is the positive effect on school 
quality from the introduction of school choice driven by better and more efficient 
private schools or by increased competition between schools? By using variation 
in school choice among siblings, Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) are able to 
disentangle the role played by the two channels. They find that approximately 90 
percent of the effect is driven by increased competition. The increase in private 
schools and the associated increase in individual school choice hence seem to 
benefit all pupils (i.e., pupils in both private and public schools) via an effect 
from competition that forces all schools to improve. This positive effect from 
competition seems however to be short-lived. In their 2008 paper, Böhlmark and 
Lindahl find very little support for a lasting effect of their estimated positive 
compulsory school effect on an improved performance in high school for the 
same individuals. Also, they do not find any effects of the increased competition 
at the compulsory level on subsequent university attainment or years of 
schooling. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) conclude that the positive first-order 
effect, which they consider to be small, vanishes over time and do not seem to 
lead to lasting positive effects. 
Even though school competition might lead to increased productivity that gain all 
students, critics of a privatization of schools are worried that it might induce 
segregation between the two types of schools (by e.g. ability, income or ethnic 
background) and can lead to a worse situation for those pupils that remain in 
public schools (for example through a lower quality of the peer group and a 
migration of good teachers from public to private schools). Another issue of 
concern is the effects of privatization on overall costs in the school sector. 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) examine these issues and find that there are some 
segregation effects (children with well-educated parents and/or children with an 
immigrant background have a higher probability of choosing a private school) 
and some cost effects (an increase in the private school share by ten percentage 
points lead to approximately two percent higher municipal school costs on 
average). 
To sum up the results, it hence seems like there is a small positive short-run 
effect of competition on student achievements at the compulsory level. These 
effects do however not last into positive achievement effects at the high school 
level or to more years of schooling. At the same time there is some sorting on 
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background characteristics going on between the two types of schools and the 
overall school costs for the municipalities are increased.  
3.3.4 Effects of the decentralized system in Sweden 
In the former section we saw how different reforms have affected the 
municipalities. But it is of course also highly likely that (different degrees of) 
decentralization per se will affect the economy; it might for example affect 
outcomes such as economic growth, economic stability, public sector efficiency, 
equity, and income distribution. Even though it would be beneficial and 
important for policy making to have information about these effects, our 
knowledge of these issues for Sweden is very limited. As far as I know, we know 
nothing about the effects of decentralization on economic growth, stability, and 
income distribution. One reason for this lack of knowledge is that it is genuinely 
hard to know the counterfactual, and hence difficult to get a trustworthy estimate 
of the coefficient of interest. We do however know some things about the effects 
of decentralization in Sweden on different efficiency and equity outcomes.  
Strategic interactions and competition 
In a decentralized system, strategic interactions and competition among the 
municipalities might arise. This can for example be in the form of tax 
competition, where the municipalities use the local income tax to compete with 
each other to attract rich, mobile households. It can also be in the form of 
yardstick competition, where voters use information about the efficiency in the 
supply of services in some reference municipalities (for example neighboring 
municipalities), to get a measure on how well the own local decision-makers are 
doing. If politicians know about this, this might enhance efficiency. While the 
theory of tax competition predicts that the tax rate in a decentralized setting will 
be lower than the social optimum, the yardstick competition theory in general 
predicts increased efficiency of the political system through better informed 
voters. In the same vein as tax competition there can also be welfare competition, 
where the municipalities use the benefit norm to compete with each other to 
avoid attracting poor, welfare prone households. In the presence of welfare 
competition, the generosity in the welfare system, measured by the benefit norm, 
will be lower than what is socially optimal.  
Karin Edmark and Hanna Ågren (2008) examine if there is any strategic tax 
setting in Swedish municipalities. Their analysis provides evidence of spatial 
dependence in the tax rates among Swedish municipalities; a tax cut of on 
average 1 percentage point in a neighboring municipality is correlated with a 
decrease of about 0.74 percentage points in own taxes. Using an equalization 
grant reform and different political variables (such as election dates and political 
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strength in the municipal council), Edmark and Ågren also try to sort out if the 
observed strategic tax setting is driven by tax competition or yardstick 
competition. They find evidence for tax competition but no evidence for 
yardstick competition. 
Regarding welfare competition, Matz Dahlberg and Karin Edmark (2008) 
investigate whether there existed such competition in Sweden before the setting 
of the benefit level was centralized in Sweden in 1998. They do this by 
examining how local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in 
neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. They use a policy 
intervention as an instrument to solve the simultaneity problem that arises from 
the welfare game that the local governments play; a centrally geared placement 
of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities. 
Dahlberg and Edmark find a significant and positive effect from the setting of 
welfare benefit levels in neighboring municipalities on the setting of the welfare 
benefit level in a given municipality. The point estimates indicate that if the 
neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level with 100 SEK, a 
municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 41 SEK. The 
estimates for neighbors’ benefit level hence provide indications of strategic 
interactions among the local governments in the setting of welfare benefit levels, 
implying that there exists a “race-to-the-bottom”. 
Soft budget constraints 
A potential problem with decentralized decision-making is the risk that local 
governments engage in strategic behavior to attract financial resources from the 
central government. Decentralization can lead to soft budget constraints at the 
local level. The local budget constraint defines the total amount of resources, 
collected from local sources and received as transfers from other governments, 
expected to be available to finance local public policies during a fiscal year. The 
budget constraint is soft if local governments perceive that the central 
government lacks the ability or will to keep them to fixed budget constraints. 
That is, if the local governments expect to receive financial help from the central 
government (i.e., to receive more grants than what was determined ex ante) in 
case of future financial problems and that this expectation affects their financial 
behavior, we have the problem of soft budget constraints at the local level. 
The problem with soft budget constraints can materialize in two different set-ups. 
Either they can materialize when there exist grants to the municipalities with 
financial problems but where there are no clear rules for how and when the grants 
shall be distributed and when the central government can discretionary decide 
how to distribute the grants (as was the case with the extra grants that existed in 
Sweden until 1992; see section 3.3.2). Or they can materialize if there is an 
expectation that additional grant programs will be installed in case of financial 
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problems at the local level (which for example was the case with the set-up of the 
Housing Delegation and the Local Authority Delegation in Sweden in the wake 
of the financial problems during the 1990s; see section 3.3.2). 
Using the discretionary grant program that existed in Sweden between 1974 and 
1992, Per Pettersson-Lidbom examines if there are any soft budget constraints 
among Swedish municipalities. He examines whether the municipalities’ 
expectations to receive extra grants in the future (i.e., future financial help from 
the central government) affects their financial behavior today. This is the 
important question for the presence of soft budget constraints. The grant program 
he uses is well suited for testing for soft budget constraints. It is a program with 
no strict rules and where the central government has the power to decide itself 
how the grants shall be distributed over the municipalities (if there were strict 
rules that were followed by an independent authority there would not exist any 
uncertainty whether a municipality should receive extra grants or not). In 
addition, the program was expected to be used for municipalities with financial 
problems. The main result in his study is that the municipalities’ expectations 
about future financial help leads to higher municipal debt today. The estimated 
effect is that, on average, a municipality that goes from a probability of zero to a 
probability of one of knowing that they will receive a future bailout increases its 
debt by approximately 20 percent. He further finds that the municipalities’ 
expectations about a future bailout only affect their expenditures; their revenues 
are not affected by the soft budget constraint. Swedish municipalities hence seem 
to have been involved in strategic behavior to extract extra money from the 
central government. That is, the soft budget constraint is, or at least has been, a 
real problem in Sweden. 
It can also be mentioned that discretionary grant programs like those that have 
been in use in Sweden for large periods of time might have other effects as well. 
They can for example be used by the central government for strategic reasons. 
Dahlberg and Johansson (2001) do for example find support for the hypothesis 
that the incumbent government in Sweden used a discretionary grant program for 
ecological sustainable investments in the municipalities in order to win votes. In 
particular, they find strong support for the hypothesis that the incumbent 
government distributes transfers to regions where there are many swing voters.  
Adapting to local conditions 
The main argument for decentralization is perhaps that it is easier for local 
decision-makers to tailor publicly provided services to local needs, local 
preferences and local cost conditions. As we saw earlier it takes really small 
municipalities to get a perfect match between voters’ and local politicians’ 
preferences. It might of course still be the case that the locally provided services 
are better matched to local conditions than what would have been the case under 
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central decision-making for the same services, but that we do not know anything 
about. Another take on this is that too much variation over municipalities and 
individuals for certain services is not desirable from society’s point of view. As 
we saw earlier, the large variation in welfare benefit norms over municipalities 
was the main argument for the centralization of the norm in 1998. Likewise, 
research on decentralization of schools in Sweden indicate that decentralization 
might have led to an, from society’s point of view, undesirable large variation 
over students in school resources (see former section). Decentralization of 
schools might hence lead to decreased equity. 
3.3.5 Potential reforms in Sweden and some comments on the Swedish 
system 
It is of course possible to come up with many types of changes or reforms 
regarding the state-local relationship in Sweden, but I think there are two reforms 
that might be especially urgent to considered.  
One reform concerns centralization of schools. Sweden is one of the most 
decentralized countries in the world, where several welfare services are 
decentralized to the municipal level. One might ask whether all types of welfare 
services are suitable to decentralize. It is not obvious that it is a good idea, for 
example, to decentralize primary schools and welfare. Research has shown that 
when social welfare (welfare assistance) was decentralized in Sweden, it lead to 
welfare competition among the municipalities and a, from society’s point of 
view, sub-optimal level in the welfare generosity (there was a “race to the 
bottom”). In 1998, social welfare was centralized in the sense that the generosity 
in the welfare system became centrally determined. Likewise, research on 
decentralization of schools in Sweden indicate that decentralization might lead to 
an, from society’s point of view, undesirable large variation over students in 
school resources (measured, e.g., through the teacher/student ratio). Thus, from 
an equity perspective, a decentralized school system might not be desirable. 
Some centralization of schools might be called for.  
The second reform is related to the urge to decrease potential negative effects of 
business cycle swings on specific municipal services. Since the major part of the 
municipalities’ revenues comes from a local income tax, where the local tax base 
only consists of labor income, the municipalities’ revenues are sensitive to 
business cycle swings. In addition, expenditures within certain areas are also 
sensitive to changes in the business cycle, like welfare assistance. Taken 
together, this implies that the risk for short-term fluctuations in welfare services 
such as education, child care and elderly care is considerable. This is unfortunate 
since these are services that should be supplied on a long-term and stable basis. A 
reform that decreases the swings in services such as education, child care and 
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elderly care could be of considerable importance. Such a reform could have 
ingredients like centralizing some services (e.g., centralizing primary schools), 
tying grants to the general macro economy, so that they adjust with swings in the 
business cycle, or relaxing the municipalities’ balanced budget requirement, 
which opens up the possibility for the municipalities to conduct business cycle 
adjustments themselves by building up funds in good times to be used in bad 
times. 
Apart from these two reforms, there are some comments on the Swedish system 
that might be worth considering: 
• Sweden has a long history of discretionary grants. Since research has 
shown that these types of grants create soft budget constraints at the local 
level and invites to strategic behavior at the central level in its allocation, 
discretionary grants should be avoided in the future. 
• There is a need to evaluate the tax equalization system in Sweden. Given 
the size of the tax equalizing grants in Sweden and the incentive effects 
they might have on the municipalities’ tax and growth-enhancing 
behavior, it is unfortunate that there does not exist any empirical studies 
examining the effects these grants have on municipal behavior. 
• There is a need to find out what effects general grants have in different 
phases of the business cycle. In the recent recession, it was clear that it 
would have been beneficial if the decision-makers had known about what 
effects general grants have in deep recessions. 
• There is a need to examine the effects from different types of grants on the 
municipal development at large (income growth, population growth and 
employment growth). We know nothing about these effects. 
• The political decision-makers should implement reforms in such a way 
that trustworthy evaluations of the reforms are facilitated. Sweden has a 
sad record in this respect. 
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Chapter 4 
Public Services at the Local Level  
– The Finnish Way 
Antti Moisio – Heikki A. Loikkanen – Lasse Oulasvirta 
 
  
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Finland is by population a small Nordic country with a challenging environment 
for arranging local public services and fiscal equalisation. The country is large in 
area and therefore mostly sparsely populated. Despite the rapid urbanisation in 
recent decades, around one third of the 5.3 million inhabitants still live in rural 
areas. Also the age structure of the population varies considerably between 
municipalities. As a result, the service needs and the operating environment as 
well as the ability to raise own source revenues differs much between areas in 
Finland. Despite these obstacles, Finland has been able to build an extensive 
public service system so that the country is considered to be a “Nordic welfare 
state”.  
Although Finland clearly belongs to the Nordic countries’ group with regards to 
its high degree of decentralisation, the Finnish case differs from the other 
Nordics in many ways. The most obvious difference is that in Finland public 
administration is organised by only two tiers of government, the central 
government and the municipalities, whereas in Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
the local government consist of municipalities and intermediate government 
level.  
Due to the intense decentralisation and a single tier of local government, the 
Finnish municipalities bear a heavy burden of tasks. Municipalities are 
responsible for providing social welfare and health care services as well as most 
education and culture services. In addition, municipalities provide the basic 
environment and technical infrastructure services. The fact that nearly half of the 
Finnish municipalities have population of less than 5000 inhabitants means that 
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many municipalities are too small to organise all these services alone. As an 
answer to the economies of scale problem, the Finnish solution has been to 
organise the most demanding tasks through cooperative arrangements. At the 
beginning of 2010, there were 326 municipalities and 226 joint authorities.  
Finnish municipalities are self-governing entities by constitution. But despite 
their self-governing status, the provision of many public services has been 
delegated from central government to the municipal sector in Finland. And 
because a number of municipal tasks are regulated in detail by central 
government legislation, the municipalities may have little or no room to 
maneuver independently. In practice, it is often only the wealthiest municipalities 
that can afford to provide services above the set standards.  
Due to the many tasks assigned to municipalities, the overall economic 
importance of the municipal sector is considerable. Municipality spending as 
share of GDP is around 18% and municipalities employ roughly 20% of the total 
Finnish workforce. 
Municipal finances are based on own source revenues and grants from central 
government. On average, grants cover some 20 per cent of the total municipal 
revenues. The main source of revenue is the municipal income tax that makes up 
41 percent of all revenues. Municipalities are the sole receivers of property taxes 
but the share of property taxes is only 2.5 per cent of revenues. Municipalities 
also receive a share of corporate tax revenues. The rest of the municipal revenues 
consist of user fees and sales incomes. Due to big differences in size between 
municipalities, the small rural municipalities rely on the grant system and 
equalisation. In 2009, grants covered more than 50 percent of all revenues in 
every fourth municipality.  
The rapidly aging population and domestic migration is threatening to erode the 
tax bases and increase the service needs in Finnish municipalities. To rescue the 
local service system, the central government has launched various new policy 
programmes. These include municipal mergers, enhanced cooperation and 
productivity programmes. The political discussion about further measures has 
started and the new government will have to make decisions on these after the 
parliamentary elections in 2011.  
The main purpose of this paper is to describe the organisation, tasks and 
financing of the Finnish local government. The description concentrates on 
welfare, health and education tasks and their financing. The other municipal tasks 
are mentioned only briefly. When possible, we refer to the latest available 
research results. Although the most important aim is to give the reader a general 
picture of Finnish local government, some assessment of the present system is 
also provided.  
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This paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the local government 
organisation, tasks and finance. Section four compares Finnish local government 
to other Nordic countries and some OECD countries. Section 5 concludes the 
paper with discussion on the present stage and future prospects of Finnish local 
public sector.      
4.2 Finnish local government in short 
Historical perspective 
After Finland gained its independence in 1917, a provision on local self-
government was added to the first Finnish Constitution in 1919 and universal and 
equal voting rights were introduced for municipal elections. The municipal 
assemblies of rural municipalities were replaced by councils. In towns, the 
councils that were elected in general elections got the highest decision making 
power displacing the old bodies of magistrates and aldermen. (Heuru 2003). 
In 1932 provisions on inter-municipal co-operative organisations and joint 
municipal authorities were added to municipal legislation. This was a significant 
decision because since then Finland has kept the model of a single tier local 
government system. In 1949 the municipal legislation was updated so that towns 
and rural municipalities were brought together under one Local Government Act.  
Since the end of the 1950’s many new statutory obligations have been assigned 
to municipalities. As a result of this process, all basic social and health services 
are today performed by municipalities or by joint municipal authorities. In 
addition, all education except universities belong to municipal tasks. The 
enlargement of local government tasks was especially rapid in the 1970’s and 
1980’s.  
The growth of municipal sector was halted in the beginning of 1990’s. Between 
1990 and 1994 Finland faced a severe economic slump during which GDP fell 
cumulatively by more than 10 per cent. The recession caused difficulties in 
municipalities. As the unemployment rate rose from 4 per cent at the end of the 
1980s to over 16 per cent in 1994, the tax revenues of municipalities decreased 
sharply. Municipalities reacted to the decreasing income tax base by raising tax 
rates, increasing fees for health care and social welfare services, borrowing, by 
holding back investments and restraining the health care and social welfare 
expenditures. Municipal salary expenditures were reduced by discharging part-
time labour and also by laying off full-time employees.  
The deep economic recession added momentum to grant system reform in 1993, 
but the reform actually culminated a preparation that had begun already in the 
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1980’s. By the beginning of 1990’s it was already widely accepted that further 
enlargement of local public services had become unwanted. The reform meant a 
change from a pure matching grant system to a formula based block grants 
system. In addition, the new Local Government Act was enacted in 1995. These 
reforms gave municipalities more independence to decide their own matters. The 
economic situation started to improve from 1994, but the municipal finances 
were still tight for many years partly due to grant reductions during the years 
1993–1998.  
Organisation 
At the beginning of 2010 there are 342 municipalities. In 1945 there were 558 
municipalities and 460 in 1990. The reduction in the number of municipalities 
was based on voluntary mergers. Since the 1990’s the central government has 
tried to step up the voluntary merger process with supplementary merger grants 
and lately by setting minimum population bases for some services.  
Although municipalities can organise their administration relatively freely, the 
Local Government Act stipulates that each municipality must have a municipal 
council, a municipal board, an auditing committee, and a committee for 
organising elections. A municipality must also have a municipal manager, a civil 
servant, elected by the municipal council. The municipal manager is not a 
member of the council.  
A municipal council is elected by the residents in a secret ballot for four year 
terms. The number of councillors is proportional to the population of the 
municipality and may vary from 17 to 85. As in all Finnish elections, votes are 
given to individuals rather than party lists. The municipal council must decide 
upon strategic and financial outlines and on the main objectives for different 
municipal activities. Councils can set up committees that handle functions of a 
permanent character, for example, social and health care services, education, 
urban planning and environment and cultural and leisure services. The committee 
members are usually local politicians but not necessary members of the council. 
The members of the municipal board are chosen by the municipal council. The 
composition of the municipal board is based on the political makeup of the 
council: the parties represented in the council get seats in the municipal board 
according to their share of council seats. Thus, there is no real opposition in local 
politics and municipal elections do not typically cause major changes in local 
politics. The municipal board is responsible for municipal administration and 
financial management. It prepares matters to be decided by the council, executes 
the decisions and ensures their legality. Municipal boards hold a strong 
administrative position, because the most important matters prepared for the 
council are politically agreed in advance in the board. 
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The municipal manager is a civil servant who works under the municipal board 
as the head of municipal administration, financial management and other 
functions. This arrangement differs from most other European countries, where 
municipality managers are (directly or by councils) elected mayors, who are also 
chairs of local councils or boards or both.1 In Finland, the municipality managers 
hold their position either for a fixed term or the positions are permanent. The 
choices of city managers do not necessarily take place close to local elections. 
The situation is however slightly different for the biggest cities. City managers 
(called mayors and deputy mayors) in the biggest cities are often de facto 
politicians, who have risen up from city councils or national politics to this 
position elected by local councils.   
Figure 4.1. Main bodies of Finnish municipal organisation 
COUNCIL
MUNICIPAL 
EXECUTIVE BOARD
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES
Main tasks:
Education and culture
Social welfare and health care
Environment and technical
infrastructure
Auditors
Municipal manager
Audit committee
 
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (modified) 
 
Decision-making  
Municipal councils approve the annual budget. In addition, the councils approve 
the financial plan for at least the next three years. The emphasis of the budget is 
on performance budgeting, i.e. the council sets operational goals that the 
                                              
 
1 According to the Local Government Act, it is also possible to establish an elected mayor post in Finland 
but this possibility has been used so far only by couple of municipalities. 
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committees and agencies must realise with the budget money allowed by the 
council.2  
Some of the budgetary power can be delegated to lower level committees in the 
municipality. The committees that work under the council are responsible for 
municipal service departments (such as health and welfare, education etc…). The 
decentralised power within the municipal organisation is mainly based on net 
budgeting and frame budgeting principles (Kallio et al. 2005). 
The municipal board prepares the proposals for the council and executes the 
decisions of the council. It is often the case that the municipal board together 
with the leading civil servants have the real budget power, although the council 
has the ultimate formal power (Kallio et al. 2005). 
The budgetary power of the municipalities is somewhat limited by the Local 
Government Act. By law, the municipalities are obliged to draw up a plan for 
covering accumulated deficits3. The aim of this rule is to prevent the accumu-
lation of deficits on municipal balance sheets and to avoid economic imbalance 
in municipalities. However, there are no sanctions for not following the plan.  
The municipal auditing consists of two elements: a professional external auditing 
and performance auditing. The external auditors concentrate on the municipal 
financial statements and annual reports. The external auditors are certified public 
sector auditors and each municipality selects the auditing company through a 
public tendering process.4 The performance auditing is executed by special 
auditing committee and its role is mainly in “value for money auditing”. The 
obligatory auditing committee is appointed by the council for the duration of its 
term of office. In addition to the performance auditing accomplished by the 
obligatory auditing committee, some of the bigger cities have established internal 
                                              
 
2 According to the Local Government Act the budget must include performance objectives and 
appropriations needed to fulfil these performance objectives. 
3 The deficit concept defined in the Local Government Act has been criticised for not giving an accurate 
picture of the real balance of municipal economy. According to this critic, the mere profit and loss 
statement may give too narrow view of the municipality’s real economic balance. When considering 
economic balance, one should also take into consideration that municipalities with growing populations 
need surplus in order to finance investments, whereas in a shrinking municipality with minor investment 
needs, a deficit is not necessarily a sign of economic imbalance. In addition, the imbalance of the local 
government sector may be a signal that central government policy towards municipalities is out of 
balance and that obligatory municipal tasks stipulated by legislation are not in concord with 
municipalities’ own income sources and State grants (Kärki et al. 2006). 
4 The external auditing process was established in connection with the 1993 grant reform. The external 
auditors replaced the central government monitoring that was necessary during the matching grants 
system.  
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auditing (internal audit units, usually with 1–5 internal auditors) serving the top 
management.  
Tasks  
Finnish municipalities are self-governing entities by constitution. This means that 
central government cannot assign new responsibilities to municipalities without 
first passing legislation to this effect. Despite this, the decentralisation of public 
services to local level has been very extensive. Municipalities are responsible for 
supplying all health and welfare services and all education services except for 
university education. These services comprise about 70 per cent of the municipal 
sector expenditures (Figure 4.2). In addition to these main services, munici-
palities and joint authorities run or organise a wide variety of other tasks such as 
cultural, environmental, leisure and planning services (see Table 4.1 for a list of 
the most important service categories).  
In the Finnish context, those tasks related to providing (mostly also producing) 
merit goods like health, social and education services are the most important 
economic activities carried out by municipalities. In providing these services, 
municipalities act as the agents of central government (=principal) whereas the 
national parliament makes key decisions on these services. The most important 
locally controlled task performed by local governments is the provision of local 
public goods in their area. A key function in this respect is that municipalities are 
responsible for land use planning in their area. Local policies in land use affect 
settlement structures, location of businesses, residential areas and transportation. 
These choices affect productivity in the private sector (World Bank 2009) and the 
efficiency of public service provision because merit goods (health units, schools 
etc) and other services need spatial networks of units. Land use decisions 
(zoning) affect the nature of these networks and costs of provision.   
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Figure 4.2. Expenditures in municipalities and joint municipal authorities  
in 2008 
Health and 
welfare
47 %
Education and 
culture
22 %
Waste, 
infrastructure 
and environment
3 %
Other services
1 %
Business
7 %
Investments
11 %
Loan costs
4 %
Other 
expenditures
2 % General 
administration
3 %
 
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 
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Table4.1. Services that are organised by municipalities 
Education 
Comprehensive and upper secondary schools 
Vocational institutes  
Polytechnics 
Adult education 
Basic music and art education 
Culture 
Libraries 
Other culture services (theatres, museums, orchestras…) 
Health care 
Primary care  
Specialist care 
Dental care 
Environmental health care (health protection) 
Welfare 
Child day-care 
Elderly care 
Care for disabled and the mentally handicapped 
Child protection and welfare 
Income support 
Welfare for intoxicant / drug abusers 
Public utilities 
Water and energy supply  
Waste management 
Street and road maintenance  
Environmental protection 
Public transport  
Sports and leisure 
Parks and outdoor areas 
Sports facilities 
Other 
Land use planning and building supervision 
Promoting commerce and employment 
Municipal housing, public building 
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Municipal finances 
Municipal finances are based on own source revenues and a single block grant 
from the central government. Municipalities are also free to borrow for 
investment purposes and to finance running expenditures, although the latter is 
quite rare. Municipalities are obliged to draw up a plan for covering accumulated 
deficits. The aim of this rule is to prevent the accumulation of deficits on 
municipal balance sheets and to avoid economic imbalance in municipalities. 
Figure 4.3 shows how the municipal finances were constructed in 2009. 
Figure 4.3. Total municipal sector income (2009 estimate) 
Operating 
revenues 
27 % Tax revenues 
47 %
State subsidies 
for current 
expenditure 
19 %
Other income
1 %
Loans 
4 %
Investment 
income
2 %
 
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 
 
The main source of municipal revenue is the municipal income tax5 revenue that 
makes up 47 per cent of all revenues. Municipal income tax is a flat rate tax, 
although central government policy for tax allowances for persons with low 
incomes has made the local tax more like a progressive tax. Hence, the local 
income tax base is determined by the central government but municipalities have 
full control over the rate.  
                                              
 
5 In Finland the dual income tax (DIT) system is applied (adopted in 1993), which divides personal 
income into two components: capital income (which includes dividend income, interest receipts, realised 
capital gains and rental income) is taxed at a flat rate of 28%; and earned income (which includes wages, 
salaries, pensions and social security benefits) is subject to central government income tax at progressive 
rates and to municipal and church taxes at proportional rates. In addition, there are social security 
contributions. 
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Municipalities are the sole receivers of the property taxes but the share of 
property taxes of total municipal revenues is only 2.5 per cent. Compared to 
income taxation, municipalities have little discretion over property tax rates as 
maximum and minimum rates are legislated by the central government.  
Municipalities also receive a share (22 percent since 2005) of the state corporate 
tax revenue. For companies with activity in several municipalities the tax is 
distributed according to the municipalities’ share of the company’s employment. 
As part of the central government fiscal stimulus package, the municipal share 
was temporarily increased to 32 percent from 2009 to 2011. The high volatility 
of corporate income tax revenues is often claimed to cause problems because of 
difficulties to predict the revenues and because windfall gains may lead to higher 
expenditure that is difficult to reverse. Municipalities have strongly opposed all 
proposals to drop the corporate tax revenue from the municipalities’ revenues 
menu, because of concerns that municipalities would not be fully compensated 
by higher state grants. 
The block grant is defined using formulae. The formulas used are based on 
variables that measure service need and cost differences in the municipalities. 
The revenue equalisation is organised separately, but block grant and revenue 
equalisation are united in the payments phase. Revenue equalisation is based on a 
municipality-specific calculation of the tax revenues that the municipalities could 
raise, if they used the country average tax rates. The revenue equalisation system 
is to guarantee all municipalities 91.86 per cent of the average per capita 
calculatory tax revenues. The municipalities whose calculatory tax revenue is 
below this threshold receive the difference as a supplement to their block grants. 
The municipalities whose calculatory tax revenue is above the threshold, must 
pay 37 percent of the exceeding amount to the funding of the equalisation. In 
2009, the total amount of grants paid to municipalities and joint authorities of 
municipalities was 9.4 billion €, whereas the funds in the revenue equalisation 
system were around 800 million €.  
Municipally collected fees and charges account for about a quarter of municipal 
revenues. Most of the customer charges are collected for services such as water 
supply, waste disposal, power supply and public transport. Just under one tenth 
of social welfare and health expenditure is covered through customer and patient 
charges. Basic education is free. 
Municipal cooperation 
Many small Finnish municipalities have opted to organise the most demanding 
tasks through cooperative arrangements. The main form of cooperation is the so 
called joint authority, but there are also other forms of cooperation such as host 
municipality arrangements. At best, the variety of cooperation and contracting 
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out solutions have resulted in decentralised, network-based operations models 
that give the municipalities a flexible way to organise the local public services.  
Joint authorities are set up by two or more municipalities mainly for tasks that 
require a larger population base than the small municipalities can have alone. The 
most important joint authorities include hospital districts, basic health care 
(health centres), districts for care of the disabled, vocational education and 
regional councils. Joint authority is the traditional form of municipal cooperation 
in Finland. Membership in a joint authority is voluntary with few exceptions, the 
most important example being hospital services, where each municipality is 
obliged by law to belong in a hospital district. 
Joint authorities are independent legal public entities governed by municipal 
legislation. They have no taxation rights and their decision makers are chosen by 
the member municipalities. Joint authorities for social and health care (hospital 
districts, districts for care of the disabled) are not recipients of State grants. 
Instead, they are financed by selling their services to municipalities. Joint 
authorities running hospitals are therefore fully dependent on municipalities 
buying their services while municipalities pay hospitals according to actual usage 
at full cost pricing.6 In 2010 there are 226 joint authorities. 
In addition to joint authorities, some municipalities have set up client-producer 
arrangements, in which one municipality manages some tasks on behalf of the 
other municipalities. This is called a "host municipality model". The clients are 
municipal governments and the producers are the host municipalities. 
Contractual co-operation is common in the areas of waste management, water 
supply, rescue services, building inspection, consumer and debt counselling, and 
education. Some contracts are statutory, such as co-operation agreements on 
rescue services, and contracts for building and maintaining regional emergency 
dispatch centres.  
Public utilities and companies  
There are about 150 municipally owned public utilities and 1300 public limited 
companies whose main owner is a municipality. Limited companies, co-operative 
societies and foundations offer a possibility to combine public and private capital 
to implement suitable projects and service systems. For instance, local authorities 
                                              
 
6 The 1993 grant reform had a profound impact on risk sharing of costs in the health care sector. Before 
the 1993 grant reform, joint authorities first subtracted the grant revenue from the costs and billed 
municipalities only the average net cost. With matching grants, this actually meant a kind of a risk sharing 
arrangement in health financing. Today, the municipalities pay the full cost less the non-matching grants 
that are not influenced by real costs of the municipality. 
Public Services at the Local Level – The Finnish Way 
 
 
 
167 
have established joint waste management companies and urban development and 
enterprise service companies as well as health care companies. 
If a local authority is a major shareholder in a company, or exercises dominant 
influence in an association or a foundation, they make up together a consolidated 
corporation. The regulations on municipal corporations determine the policies of 
the participating companies and communities and their obligation is to report to 
the local authority. Corporate thinking and steering is more embedded in big 
urban local governments (Kallio et al. 2005). 
A local authority is also allowed to purchase services from another local 
authority or the private sector. Competitive tendering for externally purchased 
services is obligatory according to the Public Procurement Act. According to 
recent statistics, during 2008 municipalities and joint authorities paid a total 
amount of 10.8 billion € for outside services, materials and rents, which was 32 
per cent of total current expenditure. 
4.3 Recent and ongoing local government reforms 
The structural reform project (PARAS)  
A local government restructuring project was launched in 2005 by central 
government. The main goal of the project was to create bigger municipalities or 
enhanced cooperation of municipalities. The project aims to achieve economies 
of scale and sound capacity in the municipalities to provide services. Bigger 
municipalities and intensified municipal cooperation are expected to help the 
municipalities to cope with growing demand for the municipal services due to the 
aging population (see Figure 4.4 below), that is expected to rapidly increase, 
especially the demand for health care and elderly care services. 
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Figure 4.4. Age structure of Finnish population according to population 
forecast 
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Source: Statistics Finland 
 
As a follow-up to the restructuring project, the Structural Reform Act was 
enacted in 2006. According to this Act, municipalities are obliged to prepare 
plans to reach the predetermined minimum population bases for different 
activities defined in the Act. In primary health care and associated social 
services, municipalities should reach a population base of at least 20,000, and in 
vocational basic education a population base of 50,000. In 2010, only a quarter of 
health centres had a population base of more than 20,000. Some flexibility is 
allowed based on archipelago environments, long distances and language and 
cultural rights. Municipalities have been free to decide whether they reach the 
minimum population bases with mergers or with enhanced cooperation. In cases 
where a partnership area is formed, a new joint municipal body must be 
established for the management of the relevant tasks. 
In addition, the biggest urban regions – i.e. the four local authorities in the 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area as well as 16 other cities in the other parts of Finland 
with their neighbouring municipalities (altogether 102 municipalities) – had to 
draw up cooperation plans by 31 August 2007. These plans have to deal with 
land use, housing and transportation, and use of services across municipal 
boundaries.  
As for municipal mergers, the central government goal was to promote mergers 
by grants for the mergers during 2008–2013. The grant was 1.8-fold if the merger 
become effective on January 1st either in 2008 or 2009 and 1.4-fold if the merger 
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is carried out at the start of 2010 or 2011. In connection with the reform, a minor 
amendment to the basic state grant system was also made in 2009.   
In connection with the structural reform, the Ministry of Finance has defined a 
method to identify municipalities that are in severe economic crisis. The method 
is based on six economic criteria7 that aim to measure the fiscal health of the 
municipalities. If, according to these criteria, the municipal fiscal health is 
constantly below the country average and during two consecutive years also 
below the limits specified by the central government, a negotiating procedure is 
triggered between the municipality and the Ministry of Finance. The aim of the 
negotiation process is to create an economic rescue plan for the municipality in 
question. The rescue plan is negotiated separately with each municipality, and it 
may include measures such as a step-by-step economic recovery plan to be 
followed in exchange of supplementary aid (discretionary grant) paid by the 
Ministry of Finance. As an alternative, if the recovery plan cannot be followed, 
the measures may also include a proposal to make a municipal merger with the 
neighbouring municipalities. Between 2004 and 2010, altogether 25 
municipalities have been involved in the recovery negotiations. There have been 
more municipalities than these that meet the selection criteria, but the negotiation 
process has not been started because of voluntary municipal mergers. In addition, 
from the 25 cases where the negotiating process has been used, five 
municipalities have merged to another municipality. For the rest of the 
municipalities, the rescue plan is followed or a merger planning is in process. 
The negotiating procedure is experimental and will last until 2013, but there are 
already plans to make this system permanent.  
So far, the Structural Reform Act has led to mergers reducing the number of 
municipalities to 326 (as of January 1st 2010) (see Table 1 below). For the rest of 
the municipalities, new service provision models based on inter-municipal 
cooperation have been presented. In health care and welfare services, there will 
be some 65 cooperative areas by the end of year 2013.  
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has criticised the implementation of 
cooperation in health care and social and welfare services based on equity 
concerns and possible problems in coordination of health and welfare structures. 
According to the Ministry, the cooperative areas in primary health care do not 
                                              
 
7 The six criteria used to describe the municipal fiscal health are:  
- the annual contribution margin is negative (discretionary grant is not taken into account),  
- the income tax rate is at least 0.5 percentage points higher than the weighted national average,  
- the per capita amount of long term loans is at least 50 percent higher than the national average,  
- the balance sheet shows accumulated deficit,  
- the degree of self-sufficiency is below 50 percent,  
- the debt-equity ratio is at least 50 percent. 
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always match the hospital district areas which could cause problems in operating 
the services. Also, some of the municipalities plan to produce part of the social 
and welfare services themselves and part through the cooperation which may 
result in complicated service structures. According to some experts, the 
cooperation arrangements and gained efficiency in service provision have so far 
been insufficient, especially regarding the municipal cooperation in the capital 
region (Stenvall et al., 2009).8  
Table 4.2. Mergers as outcomes of the PARAS-project 
 
Year 
Number of  
mergers 
Total number of  
municipalities* 
2005 10 416 
2006 1 415 
2007 14 400 
2008 1 399 
2009 33 332 
2010 4 326 
 
* Ecluding the 16 municipalities of the autonomous Åland islands9 
Source: VATT 
 
As for the effects of municipal mergers, the research evidence seems to be 
mixed. For example, Moisio and Uusitalo (2003) were unable to find clear 
evidence of reductions in total per capita expenditure in those Finnish 
                                              
 
8 In addition to the cooperation among the hospital districts of the capital region municipalities, the 
present capital region cooperative bodies have mainly focused on the Helsinki region's international 
competitiveness. Regional cooperation focuses particularly on land use, housing and transport issues as 
well as regional services. Decisions on the details of the cooperation are made under an annual action 
plan. At present, there are two main bodies of capital city area cooperation. First, the Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area Advisory Board consists of leading elected officials in the cities of Helsinki, Vantaa, 
Espoo and Kauniainen. The activities of the Advisory Board are based on decisions made by the city 
councils of the cities involved. Items on the agenda are prepared at mayors' meetings, and a joint work 
plan is adopted every year. Another cooperative body for the whole Helsinki region is the Helsinki 
Region Cooperation Assembly that came into force on 1 October 2005. The Assembly consists of the 
leading elected officials of the fourteen municipalities in the Helsinki region. 
9 The autonomy of the Åland Islands is established on the basis of the autonomy granted to it by 
international treaties. In the framework of its autonomy, the Åland Islands has its own political and 
administrative organs responsible for decision-making. The Parliament of Åland exercises legislative 
power within the framework permitted by its autonomous position. Otherwise the laws enacted by 
Finland's Parliament apply. The Government of Åland is responsible for regional administration (source: 
State Treasury). 
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municipalities that had already merged. In addition, Loikkanen and Susiluoto 
(2005) studied municipalities (with populations above 2,000) as multiple service 
providers and found that the most cost efficient municipalities were relatively 
small. When population was included in regression models explaining cost 
efficiency, it got a negative sign. Alternative models indicated that municipalities 
with a population below 10,000 seemed to be less efficient than those in the 
range from 10,000 to about 40,000 inhabitants. In this range population did not 
explain efficiency differences practically at all. Finally, the biggest cities had 
relatively low cost efficiency in the provision of basic welfare services. On the 
other hand some other studies that have concentrated on specific municipal 
services suggest that the optimal size of the municipality for that service is 
somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000. Hence, if such services are chosen to 
determine municipality size there seem to be grounds for increasing the average 
size of the municipalities from the present 15,000 (Aaltonen et al 2006, Aaltonen 
et al 2009). However, the fact that the government policy is based on voluntary 
mergers with an obligatory 5 year period of transition may make it difficult to 
reach productivity improvements with municipal mergers. This is because during 
the transition period, no structural changes can be made without consensus 
agreements. It also seems that the municipalities who decide to merge are those 
who have had a history of joint cooperation (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2010). 
Hence, it is possible that the economies of scale have been utilised already prior 
to the merger. Furthermore, it is not clear that the municipalities that end up 
merging, would necessarily be the best combinations to achieve cost savings.  
The administrative experiment of Kainuu region  
An administrative experiment that created a regional level authority for 
cooperation and decision-making was launched in the Kainuu region10 in 2005. 
The experiment will last until 2012. The general aim of the experiment is to 
strengthen the municipal economic base in Kainuu area by operating on a larger 
scale and to enable equality of access to services throughout the region.  
The Kainuu regional level authority is in charge of planning, health care, social 
services (except daycare) and secondary schooling. In addition, the regional 
authority provides the main financial administration and IT services. Altogether, 
some 60 percent of local government tasks are provided at the regional level in 
the Kainuu area. 
Kainuu regional authority is governed by a council that is elected every fourth 
year by people entitled to vote in the region in direct local elections. The 
                                              
 
10 Kainuu region is located in remote North-Eastern Finland and comprises nine municipalities. The area 
is among the poorest in Finland. 
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financing of the Kainuu regional authority comes from the nine member 
municipalities. Each municipality in Kainuu region pays 60.1 percent of their 
agreed revenue (including tax revenues and grants) to the regional authority.  
The regional authority in Kainuu differs from the traditional joint authorities 
mainly with its elected council and the wide extent of cooperation. Another 
important difference is that the Kainuu regional authority gets a fixed sum from 
municipalities to finance its budget, whereas the other joint authorities in Finland 
are mostly financed by municipal member fees that are based on actual service 
usage and full cost pricing of the services. A Ministry of Finance (2010a) 
working group has recently considered different alternatives to finance Kainuu 
regional authority and proposed that the present financing system should be 
maintained, if the experiment will be continued. Hence, there are currently no 
plans to reshape the Kainuu regional authority to an intermediate level 
government unit in the same vein as for example the county level governments in 
Sweden with own taxation rights. 
According to a recent follow-up report, the Kainuu experiment has been able to 
cut the costs of service provision. In addition, the report claims that the municipal 
decision-making in Kainuu has been eased because of the experiment (Jäntti et 
al. 2010). Also the recent OECD Public Governance Review for Finland (OECD 
2010) discusses the Kainuu experiment. According to the OECD study, the 
Kainuu experiment has shown some positive results, especially by creating 
economies of scale and scope and by promoting new ways for service delivery. 
But as the experiment is still ongoing and because there are no sector specific 
efficiency studies of the Kainuu experiment, it is yet too early to draw definite 
conclusions about the effects of the experiment. A potential problem with the 
Kainuu experiment is the accountability – exactly the same challenge that 
concerns the other joint authorities – because voters and taxpayers do not have 
the same decision-making power at municipal and regional level in Kainuu. 
Therefore, one way to deepen the Kainuu administrative experiment after 2012 
could be to establish a true regional local self-government unit with elected 
council and own taxation rights. But as the Ministry of Finance (2010a) report 
has shown, there are some major legal and administrative obstacles on the way, 
because municipal self government and taxation rights are secured in the 
Constitution.11 The second alternative could be that the experiment would end in 
2012 to a municipal merger of the nine municipalities. In any case, at this point it 
is probably not possible to dissolve the experiment completely because the 
                                              
 
11 In addition, there have also been fears that the right to tax at regional level would increase the tax 
burden when municipal tax is added on the top of municipal income tax. This could perhaps resisted with 
(temporary) limit on total local government tax.  
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experiment has shown some positive results and because it would be very costly 
to go back to the original situation with nine separate municipalities. This latter 
point concerns especially the healthcare services. In sum, the Kainuu 
administrative experiment has shown that regional authority can be a serious 
alternative to municipal mergers, at least in the most remote and poorest areas of 
Finland.  
Proposals to reform the health care 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare is at the moment preparing proposals to 
renew the system of public health care services so that the patients would have 
more rights to choose service producers across municipal borders. The aim is that 
local governments should establish functionally larger health care districts that 
take care of both special and primary health care services. At the moment it is 
unclear whether these plans will result in actual reforms. 
Plans to reform the metropolitan area administration in the capital city area  
The City of Helsinki, the capital city of Finland, and its neighbouring 
municipality, the City of Vantaa, are investigating jointly the viability of a 
municipal merger. In addition, the feasibility of a new intermediate level of 
government in the Helsinki region is under study. These studies will outline the 
pros and cons of the proposed merger and the intermediate government level in 
the capital city area. The study's final report will aim to help the council members 
of the two cities to decide whether the formation of one large city would bring 
more benefits than drawbacks. The merger could be a reality by 2011 if council 
members agree to pursue the merger. The third big city in the area, City of 
Espoo, has not agreed to take part in these investigations. The merger of Helsinki 
and Vantaa would bring the capital’s population to over three quarters of a 
million.   
4.4 Finnish local government compared internationally 
The purpose of this section is to perform a selective international comparison of 
structures of local government, their tasks (outlay structures) and main sources of 
revenue. Here, after describing government structures, we mainly confine 
ourselves to unitary countries within the group of EU15. This makes it possible 
to present the case of Finland relative to other rather similar countries.  
The information in this section is based on IMF Government finance statistics 
(outlays and revenues). Description of government structures is based on CEMR 
(Council of European Municipalities and Regions) information. A fundamental 
difficulty is that most of it concerns all sub-national tiers of government, not only 
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municipalities and even in most unitary countries (except Finland), there is more 
than one tier below central government. 
The structure of government differs across countries in many respects. First, 
some countries are federations and have states or the like as the next tier under 
central government.  Federal countries tend to be big in population, but in Europe 
they also include Austria and also since 1993, Belgium. Then there are unitary 
countries, which have either only one or several lower tiers of government. By 
tier, we mean here levels with their own democratic decision making units, tasks 
and with taxing powers. Table 4.3 summarizes the tiers of sub-national 
government in a number of European countries in 2005, and separately for 
unitary and federal countries. The number of government units at each tier is also 
given. 
The number of municipalities varies dramatically from one country to another. 
Of the big unitary countries, France, Italy and Spain have a lot of them whereas 
the UK has very few. Among the included Nordic countries Finland was in 2005 
the only one with a two tier system where only the municipalities represent sub-
national government. Here, Finnish municipal joint authorities are not counted as 
a separate level. Also, nineteen regions (maakunta) are not listed as an 
intermediate tier. Their tasks include regional land use planning, which in 
principle is of great importance for the settlement structures and indirectly also 
for public service networks. In practice, the regional councils have had little 
power relative to municipalities, which have according to law land use (zoning) 
monopoly in their area. They also represent regions under the direction of central 
government and deal with EU projects. Thus, regional councils represent in 
practice just a form of municipal cooperation (joint municipal authority). The 
regional council members are not directly elected citizens, but are nominated by 
the member municipalities. In addition to limited tasks, the critical reason for not 
regarding regions and their councils as a tier of government is that they lack own 
revenue sources. Finnish regional governments have no powers of taxation. 
Unlike the Finnish case, Sweden and Norway have intermediate tiers (counties) 
with elected councils with their own tasks and revenue sources. This situation 
demonstrates that the degree of decentralisation to municipalities in Finland is 
extensive. They provide (and mostly produce) many health care, education and 
infrastructure services which are tasks of intermediate or even higher levels of 
government in the other Nordic countries.   
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Table 4.3. Sub-national government structure in some unitary European 
countries in 2005 
Country 
Regional or state 
governments 
Intermediate regional 
government Local government 
Unitary countries       
Denmark      5 counties       98 kommuner 
Finland          416 kuntaa 
France 26 regions 100 departements 36.683 communes 
Ireland     29 counties        85 munipalicities 
Italy 20 regions 103 provinces    8.102 comuni 
Greece    50 prefectures    1.034 munipalicities 
Luxemburg           116 communes 
Netherlands    12 provinces       443 gemeenten 
Norway    19 fylkeskommuner       430 kommuner 
Portugal   2 auton.regions         308 municipalities 
Spain 17 regions  50 provinces    8.111 municipalities 
Sweden    20 counties       290 kommuner 
UK   3 regions  35 counties       437 districts 
        
¹ The governments included should have both elected bodies and own revenue sources. 
 
Main source: CEMR 
 
The tasks and related expenditure structures of sub-national government (Figure 
4.5) reveal some noteworthy differences among unitary countries. In the UK and 
Ireland, for instance health is not a task at sub-national level, and its role is small 
in France and the Netherlands also. In Finland and Denmark the opposite is true. 
In Denmark, unlike elsewhere, outlays at sub-national level include presumably 
items included in social protection (related to pensions) which are absent in other 
countries. This explains partly why the sub-national sector (Figure 4.5) is also 
big in Denmark.  
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To get an idea of the basic structure of local finance, the revenue side of local 
government is divided into tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grants (Figure 4.6). 
There is quite a lot of variability in the revenue structures. The share of taxes at 
local level range roughly from 10 to 70 per cent. The range for grants is from 10 
to 70 per cent, and the typically smaller share on non-tax revenue ranges from 
less than 10 per cent to about 35 per cent. 
Figure 4.6. Structure of local government revenues in 2006 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
100 %
Ic
el
an
d
Sw
ed
en
Au
st
ria
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
N
ew
 Z
e
a
la
nd
Sl
ov
ak
Sp
ai
n
D
en
m
ar
k
Tu
rk
ey
Ja
pa
n
Fi
n
la
nd Ita
ly
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
N
or
w
ay
G
er
m
an
y
Ca
na
da
Au
st
ra
lia
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ko
re
a
H
un
ga
ry
Be
lg
iu
m
Po
la
nd
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Ire
la
nd
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
G
re
ec
e
O
EC
D2
8
Taxes other than social contributions Social contributions Grants + Other revenues
 
Source: OECD 
 
The above international comparison indicates that Finland is an exceptionally 
decentralised country. Several tasks, which are handled elsewhere at higher 
levels of government (or tiers) than municipalities, are taken care of by the local 
governments and their joint organisations. Besides local infrastructure and local 
public goods, the merit goods of education, health and social services, are also 
provided by Finnish municipalities. The latter tasks have been devolved to 
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municipality level by decisions of the National Parliament, but their finance is 
shared. In addition to block grants, municipalities levy income taxes on 
individuals’ incomes and receive shares of corporate tax revenues. Property 
taxation, introduced in 1993 has had a minor role.  
Many of the countries considered deviate from Musgrave’s (1959) principles of 
fiscal federalism in some respects. Finland is a rather extreme case even among 
them in solving the assignment problem of tasks and revenue sources to the 
lowest tier (municipalities). As for tasks, local public goods have a minor role 
compared to merit goods which are redistributive. As a result of this, Finnish 
municipality reforms concentrate predominantly on solving problems of health 
care and desired municipality size, something that has no role or only a minor 
role elsewhere at local level. The revenue structure also deviates from 
Musgravian principles which for instance UN-Habitat (2009) advocates to be 
applied globally. The small role of property taxation in Finland is one example of 
this. Reliance on corporate income (profits) taxation is another example, which is 
counter to the principle of centralised stabilization. According to this principle, 
revenue sources at local level should be more stable than at central level. As for 
the important role of local income tax, this is necessary given the large amount of 
tasks and the principle that municipalities cover part of the related costs from 
their own revenue sources.  
4.5 Discussion 
Finnish local public sector appears to be a unique case in the country 
comparisons. This is not just because of the country’s large public sector or the 
high degree of decentralisation. The fact that in Finland there is a single tier of 
local government – the municipalities – is also only a part of the explanation.  
The thing that especially characterises Finnish local government is the extensive 
and sometimes complicated structure of cooperation between the municipalities. 
In order to cope with scarce resources, wide responsibilities, small population 
size and challenging operating environment, cooperation between municipalities 
has been essential. As a result, the smallest municipalities have been involved in 
a number of separate voluntary and partly obligatory cooperative coalitions. 
Some small municipalities have even been described as being purchasing 
organisations rather than municipalities in a traditional sense. This is just a minor 
exaggeration.  
In Finland, the joint municipal authorities and other inter-municipal cooperation 
have effectively replaced the “missing” government tier at the local level. As 
such they correspond to special purpose entities which are used for certain 
purposes (like schools, waste management etc) in many countries, but in Finland 
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they do not have directly elected decision making bodies and an own finance 
system. In fact this solution, together with central government aid, has ensured 
that the smallest municipalities in Finland have been able to operate at all.  
Judged by the country comparisons performed by OECD and others, it seems that 
Finnish local public sector is performing fairly well. This is the case at least 
when comparing the outcomes and per capita expenditures. With this 
information, one may ask: why should we be worried about the future of Finnish 
local government?  
But the truly big question in Finland at the moment is: even if the system has 
worked in the past, will it work in the future, too? Indeed, the future for the 
Finnish local government does not look very bright. With a rapidly aging 
population, growing numbers of retiring municipal employees, and diminishing 
tax bases, it may be very difficult to carry on with the old ways.   
Having anticipated this, the government has taken steps to tackle the situation. 
With increased financial incentives for voluntary municipal mergers, regulations 
to enhance cooperation, requirements for productivity programme regarding the 
20 biggest municipalities and the initiatives to improve the cooperation of the 
main Metropolitan areas, the government hopes to be able to strengthen local 
government. But it will take years before the effects of these policy actions 
become evident.  
In addition to the measures already decided, there have been proposals for further 
policy measures. These include transferring the health care provision from the 
municipal sector to “health care districts” or even centralising the health care 
provision to be administered using a single “health care fund”. These proposals 
however have not yet been very detailed in practice, i.e. how to organise the 
decision-making bodies in these institutions, and how to ensure that the local 
needs and circumstances will be taken into consideration. As for the policy 
concerning the municipal structure, some have argued for compulsory mergers to 
speed up the structural change. 
Over the years, there has been some discussion about new intermediate levels of 
government with its own tax base and elected councils, but so far these proposals 
have not gained much political support. At the moment, the Kainuu region 
experiment is the only example of an intermediate level solution in Finland. The 
proponents of intermediate level government in Finland have argued that the 
regional level of government allows better coordination and helps to address the 
externalities associated, for example, with land use planning and transportation. 
These tasks are conventionally regarded as key ones for local and regional 
governments, since land use patterns (densities) affect the productivity of the 
private sector (World Bank 2009) and also the networks for public service 
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provision. The nature of these networks consisting of several service units can  
have more impact on efficiency than the mere size of municipalities.  
Currently, the control of land use, housing and transportation are not tasks 
performed by regional councils in Finland. Regional councils mainly make plans 
and cannot decide on important matters such as land use. Namely, municipalities 
have legal zoning monopoly in their area and do not need to accept plans 
proposed by regional councils. According to some experts, there is thus a 
genuine need to have a regional body with more power in these issues. They 
argue that one reason for the scattered population structure and low density and 
sprawled urban fabric in Finland is the lack of binding land use plans that cover 
the whole region and not just single municipalities. The present situation permits 
an owner of a property to build almost anywhere as municipalities with zoning 
monopoly, usually allow such developments to take place. A new intermediate 
level with its own tasks related to land use, transportation etc. and its own 
revenue sources is an alternative, but then regional councils in the current form 
are hardly needed. There is also a democracy point of view to this, as an 
intermediate level of government with elected councils could enhance local 
democracy and add transparency to decision-making. Intermediate government 
level could also be a stronger player in negotiations with central government.  
The critics of an intermediate government tier argue, instead, that introducing a 
new intermediate level of government could result in waste of resources and 
duplication in the provision of the services. In a situation where the public sector 
should improve productivity and reduce administrative expenditures, the 
intermediate level of government does not seem like a good idea if it leads to 
increased expenditures. It has also been argued that as Finnish municipalities are 
already utilising the economies of scale with intensive cooperation, and as the 
grant system addresses much of the spillover effects, there do not seem to be 
many economic arguments left for the new intermediate levels of government. It 
has also been pointed out that the experiences of the intermediate levels of 
government from the other Nordic countries do not seem very promising from 
the efficiency side. Norway has recently transferred the hospitals from the 
intermediate level to central government and Denmark has reduced the number 
of intermediate governments and their tasks. 
The present system of voluntary cooperation between municipalities is defended 
with the argument that it retains the local autonomy and accountability. A locally 
decided combination of own production, joint provision and contracting out may 
give the municipalities the possibility to address economies of scale or service 
spillovers on a service by service basis. This can help the municipalities to find 
the most flexible way to organise their services, which may be good for cost 
efficiency. According to this opinion, the present model needs only slight 
modification, for example by amalgamating some of the weakest municipalities 
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to create stronger independent municipalities. With more equal partners for 
cooperation, the inter-municipal cooperation could concentrate on services that 
truly need larger scale of operation.  
As single tier of local government seems to be strongly rooted in the Finnish 
thinking, no radical change on this seems likely. Hence, the present government 
policy which is based on gradual increase of average municipal size and 
enhanced cooperation is likely to continue. Having said this, it is still possible 
that in special cases such as the capital city area, new administrative models will 
be considered.  
But even if no ground-breaking change would be seen in the municipal 
administration, a small revolution may lie ahead in the utilisation of market 
mechanisms. While the separation of provider and producer roles in the 
municipalities has been the traditional attempt to utilise market mechanisms, 
some municipalities have recently outsourced part or all of their health care to 
private health care companies. In addition, new proposals to increase the freedom 
of consumer choice have been advanced. A new law of vouchers was enacted in 
2009 with the aim to enhance the use of vouchers in social and health care 
services. So far, vouchers have been used on a small scale in services like nurse 
visits to home or other home care help. But at the moment the applications of 
voucher systems are rapidly increasing in many municipalities. It seems that so 
far the experiences of vouchers have been positive. Also, recent research results 
show that optimally designed vouchers can generate savings in Finnish health 
care, although vouchers are not suitable for all services and all cases.  
Finnish local government is in a stage of transition. At the moment it is not clear 
whether the already decided reforms on local government will be sufficient. It 
seems that the question of balance between municipal tasks and financing is still 
unsolved. In order to be able to do this, the central government policy towards 
local government sector needs to be better coordinated. The burden of tasks of 
the municipalities should no longer be increased. During the past decades, the 
central government ministries have delegated various tasks to municipalities. 
Perhaps now the political discussion about which tasks should be provided 
locally and which tasks should be centralised or privatised, should start again. 
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Adapting to a Changing World:  
Reflections on the Reform of  
Local Governance for the Next Decade  
Anwar Shah 
 
  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, globalization and the information revolution have brought 
about profound changes in the governance structures within and across nations. 
Globalization has lifted millions of people out of poverty, and the information 
revolution has brought about a degree of citizen empowerment and activism in 
state affairs that is unparalleled in past history. They have also acted as catalysts 
for “reshuffling” government functions within and beyond nation states. 
Globalization also meant liberating markets and bringing market discipline to 
governments. Recent global financial crisis has significantly shattered common 
faith in workings of the free markets. Providing bailouts to markets have also 
endangered the fiscal health of government around the globe while creating a 
crisis in public confidence in national politics and leadership. This chapter 
reflects upon special challenges in adapting multi-order governance to make 
them incentive compatible with growth with equity and fiscal sustainability, 
urgency of which is brought home by these mega changes.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses roles and 
responsibilities of local governments for the new economic order and examines 
the relevance of current practices to the emerging new paradigm in local 
governance. Section 5.3 is concerned with structure and organization of local 
governments. Section 5.4 is concerned with financing regime for local 
governance and grant financing options for local governments are discussed in 
section 5.5. Section 5.6 is concerned with budgetary institutions for local fiscal 
discipline. Section 5.7 provides a framework for measuring and monitoring 
government performance. A final section provides some conclusions.  
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5.2 The Role of Local Governments in Multi-order Governance  
Motivations for rethinking the role of local governments 
Globalization and information revolution has brought about a paradigm shift in 
international competitiveness of nations. Economic prosperity of a nation is now 
more closely linked to the knowledge, skills and information base of its citizens 
rather than the country’s resource endowments. It is increasingly recognized now 
that local governments, especially cities, are at the core of the future prosperity of 
a nation in view of their better positioning to forge a competitive advantage to 
spur economic growth by fostering a new knowledge based economy. With 
capital mobility and deregulation, local governments as providers of 
infrastructure related services, are more appropriate channels for attracting 
domestic and foreign investment. Cities are increasingly becoming important 
players in international economic alliances. Global financial crisis has 
diminished people’s trust both in the markets and role of central governments in 
regulating such markets. With a cloud of fiscal distress looming over the world 
horizon from bailouts of financial markets, local governments may also hold the 
key to fiscal heath and sustainable public finances as costly centrally determined 
and delivered services are replaced by locally demanded and competitively 
delivered services at the local level. Closer to home, people are increasingly more 
likely to link their identities with local jurisdictions and are demanding higher 
quality local services to improve economic and social outcomes. But local 
governments with few exceptions (e.g. China, Denmark and Finland) are 
hamstrung to play a leadership role in local economic development in view of the 
constraints imposed by higher orders of government. To reshape the role of local 
governments to conform to the new world economic order, one has to review 
both the theory and the past legacy in practice.  
Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments: Analytical Underpinnings 
There are five perspectives on models of government and the roles and 
responsibilities of local government: (a) traditional fiscal federalism, (b) new 
public management (NPM), (c) public choice, (d) new institutional economics 
(NIE), and (e) network forms of local governance. The federalism and the NPM 
perspectives are concerned primarily with market failures and how to deliver 
public goods efficiently and equitably. The public choice and NIE perspectives 
are concerned with government failures. The network forms of governance 
perspective is concerned with institutional arrangements to overcome both 
market and government failures. 
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Local government as a handmaiden of a higher government order: Traditional 
fiscal federalism perspectives.  
The fiscal federalism approach is focused on internalizing benefits and costs of 
service provision to the same jurisdiction and treats local government as a 
subordinate tier in a multi-tiered system and outlines principles for defining the 
roles and responsibilities of various orders of government (see Boadway and 
Shah 2009 for such a framework for the design of fiscal constitutions). Hence, 
one sees that in most federations, as in Canada and the United States, local 
governments are creatures of state (intermediate order) governments (dual 
federalism). In a few isolated instances, as in Brazil, they are equal partners with 
higher-level governments (cooperative federalism), and in an exceptional case, 
Switzerland, they are the main source of sovereignty and have greater 
constitutional significance than the federal government. Thus, depending on the 
constitutional and legal status of local governments, intermediate order 
governments in federal countries assume varying degrees of oversight of the 
provision of local public services. In general, this perspective constrains the role 
of local governments as their expansive role comes at the expense of the powers 
of the intermediate order of government. As globalization and information 
revolution leads to diminished economic relevance of the intermediate order of 
governments, these conflicts are accentuated and intermediate order governments 
have a tendency to play a more intrusive role at the local level to stay politically 
relevant. The fiscal federalism perspectives serve as a response to market failures 
and heterogeneous preferences with little recognition of government failures or 
the role of entities beyond government.  
Local government as an independent facilitator of creating public value: New 
public management perspectives.  
Two interrelated criteria have emerged from the NPM literature in recent years 
determining, first, what local governments should do and, second, how they 
should do it better. It argues that the role of public managers in local 
governments is to tap free resources of the community (goodwill, good 
Samaritan values) and push the frontiers of improved social outcomes beyond 
what may be possible with meager local revenues (Moore, 1996). Thus, public 
managers create value by mobilizing and facilitating a network of providers 
beyond local government. This environment, focused on creating public value, 
encourages innovation and experimentation, bounded by the risk tolerance of the 
median voter in each community. The main current of the NPM literature is 
concerned not with what to do but with how to do it better. It argues for an 
incentive environment in which managers are given flexibility in the use of 
resources but held accountable for results. Top-down controls are thus replaced 
by a bottom-up focus on results.  
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Local government as an institution to advance self-interest: The public choice 
approach.  
The public choice literature endorses the self-interest doctrine of government and 
argues that various stakeholders involved in policy formulation and 
implementation are expected to use opportunities and resources to advance their 
self-interest. This view has important implications for the design of local 
government institutions. For local governments to serve the interests of people, 
they must have complete local autonomy in taxing and spending constrained only 
by direct democracy provisions and they must be subject to competition within 
and beyond government. In the absence of these prerequisites, local governments 
will be inefficient and unresponsive to citizen preferences (Boyne 1998, Bailey 
1999).  
The government as a runaway train: Neo-institutional economics (NIE) concerns 
with the institutions of public governance. 
The NIE provides a framework for analyzing fiscal systems and local 
empowerment and for comparing mechanisms for local governance. This 
framework is helpful in designing multiple orders of government and in 
clarifying local government responsibilities in a broader framework of local 
governance (see Shah and Shah, 2006). According to the NIE framework, 
various orders of governments (as agents) are created to serve the interests of the 
citizens as principals. The jurisdictional design should ensure that these agents 
serve the public interest while minimizing transaction costs for the principals.  
The existing institutional framework does not permit such optimization, because 
the principals have bounded rationality; that is, they make the best choices on the 
basis of the information at hand but are ill informed about government 
operations. Enlarging the sphere of their knowledge entails high transaction 
costs, which citizens are not willing to incur. Those costs include participation 
and monitoring costs, legislative costs, executive decision-making costs, agency 
costs or costs incurred to induce compliance by agents with the compact, and 
uncertainty costs associated with unstable political regimes (Horn 1997; Shah 
2007). Agents (officials of various orders of governments) are better informed 
about government operations than principals are, but they have an incentive to 
withhold information and to indulge in opportunistic behaviors or “self-interest 
seeking with guile” (Williamson 1985, 7). Thus, the principals have only 
incomplete contracts with their agents. Such an environment fosters commitment 
problems because the agents may not follow the compact. The situation is further 
complicated by three factors – weak or extant countervailing institutions, path 
dependency, and the interdependency of various actions. Countervailing 
institutions such as the judiciary, police, parliament, and citizen activist groups 
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are usually weak and unable to restrain rent-seeking by politicians and 
bureaucrats. Historical and cultural factors and mental models by which people 
see little benefits to and high costs of activism prevent corrective action. Further, 
empowering local councils to take action on behalf of citizens often leads to loss 
of agency between voters and councils, because council members may interfere 
in executive decision making or may get co-opted in such operations while 
shirking their legislative responsibilities. The NIE framework stresses the need to 
use various elements of transaction costs in designing jurisdictions for various 
services and in evaluating choices between competing governance mechanisms. 
Local government as a facilitator of network forms of local governance.  
Given the high transaction costs and perceived infeasibility of market and 
hierarchical mechanisms of governance for partnerships of multiple 
organizations, a network mechanism of governance has been advanced as a 
possible mode of governance for such partnerships – the kind to be managed by 
local governments. The network form of governance relies on trust, loyalty, and 
reciprocity between partners with no formal institutional safeguards. Networks 
formed on the basis of shared interests (interest-based networks) can provide a 
stable form of governance if membership is limited to partners that can make 
significant resource contributions and if there is a balance of powers among 
members. Members of such networks interact frequently and see cooperation in 
one area as contingent on cooperation in other areas. Repeated interaction among 
members builds trust. Hope-based networks are built on the shared sentiments 
and emotions of members. Members have shared beliefs in the worth and 
philosophy of the network goals and have the passion and commitment to 
achieve those goals. The stability of such networks is highly dependent on the 
commitment and style of their leadership (Dollery and Wallis 2001) and the 
catalytic and mediating role played by local governments.  
A synthesis: Reshaping the Role of Local Governments for the 21st Century 
We have reviewed ideas emerging from the literature on political science, 
economics, public administration, law, federalism, and the NIE with a view to 
developing an integrated analytical framework for the comparative analysis of 
local government and local governance institutions. The dominant concern in this 
literature is that the incentives and accountability framework faced by various 
orders of government is not conducive to a focus on service delivery consistent 
with citizen preferences. As a result, corruption, waste, and inefficiencies 
permeate public governance. Top-down hierarchical controls are ineffective; 
there is little accountability because citizens are not empowered to hold 
governments accountable.  
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Multi-order governance practices around the world are focused on structures and 
processes, with little regard for outputs and outcomes. These practices support 
top-down structures with preeminent federal legislation (that is, federal 
legislation overrides any sub-national legislation). The central government is at 
the apex, exercising direct control and micromanaging the system. Hierarchical 
controls exercised by various layers of government have an internal rule-based 
focus with little concern for their mandates. Government competencies are 
determined on the basis of technical and administrative capacity, with almost no 
regard for client orientation, bottom-up accountability, and lowering of 
transaction costs for citizens. Various orders of government indulge in 
uncooperative zero-sum games for control. This tug of war leads to large swings 
in the balance of powers. Shared rule is a source of much confusion and conflict, 
especially in federal systems. Local governments are typically creatures of states 
or provinces and given straitjacket mandates. They are given only limited home 
rule in their competencies. In short, local governments in this system of 
“federalism for the governments, by the governments, and of the governments” 
get crushed under a regime of intrusive controls by higher levels of governments. 
Citizens also have limited voice and exit options.  
The governance implications of such a system are quite obvious. Various orders 
of government suffer from agency problems associated with incomplete contracts 
and undefined property rights, as the assignment of taxing, spending, and 
regulatory powers remains to be clarified – especially in areas of shared rule. 
Intergovernmental bargaining leads to high transaction costs for citizens. 
Universalism and pork-barrel politics result in a tragedy of commons, as various 
orders of government compete to claim a higher share of common pool 
resources. Under this system of governance, citizens are treated as agents rather 
than as principals.  
On how to reverse this trend and make governments responsive and accountable 
to citizens, the dominant themes emphasized in the literature are the subsidiarity 
principle, the principle of fiscal equivalency, the creation of public value, results-
based accountability, and the minimization of transaction costs for citizens, as 
discussed earlier. These themes are useful but should be integrated into a broader 
framework of citizen-centered governance, to create an incentive environment in 
the public sector that is compatible with a public sector focus on service delivery 
and bottom-up accountability and also incentive- compatible with globalization. 
Such integration is expected to deal with the commitment problem in various 
levels of government by empowering citizens and by limiting their agents’ ability 
to indulge in opportunistic behavior. Table 5.1 provides general principles for 
rethinking the role of local government based upon a synthesis of the conceptual 
and empirical literature.  
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Table 5.1.  The Role of a Local Government under the New Vision  
of Local Governance 
 
Old view: 20th century New view: 21st century 
Is based on residuality and local 
governments as wards of the state 
Is based on subsidiarity and home rule 
Is based on principle of ultra vires Is based on community governance 
Is focused on government Is focused on citizen-centered local 
governance 
Is agent of the central government Is the primary agent for the citizens and 
leader and gatekeeper for shared rule 
Is responsive and accountable to higher-level 
governments 
Is responsive and accountable to local 
voters; assumes leadership role in improving 
local governance  
Is direct provider of local services Is purchaser of local services 
Is focused on in-house provision Is facilitator of network mechanisms of local 
governance, coordinator of government 
providers and entities beyond government, 
mediator of conflicts, and developer of social 
capital 
Is focused on secrecy Is focused on letting the sunshine in; 
practices transparent governance  
Has input controls Recognizes that results matter 
Is internally dependent Is externally focused and competitive; is 
ardent practitioner of alternative service 
delivery framework 
Is closed and slow Is open, quick, and flexible 
Has intolerance for risk Is innovative; is risk taker within limits 
Depends on central directives Is autonomous in taxing, spending, 
regulatory, and administrative decisions 
Is rules driven  Has managerial flexibility and accountability 
for results 
Is bureaucratic and technocratic Is participatory; works to strengthen citizen 
voice and exit options through direct 
democracy provisions, citizens’ charters, and 
performance budgeting 
Is coercive  Is focused on earning trust, creating space 
for civic dialogue, serving the citizens, and 
improving social outcomes 
Is fiscally irresponsible Is fiscally prudent; works better and costs 
less 
Is exclusive with elite capture Is inclusive and participatory 
Overcomes market failures Overcomes market and government failures 
Is boxed in a centralized system  Is connected in a globalized and localized 
world 
 
Source: Shah and Shah (2006, 2007) 
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The framework emphasizes reforms that strengthen the role of citizens as the 
principals and create incentives for government agents to comply with their 
mandates. The commitment problem may be mitigated by creating citizen-
centered local governance – by having direct democracy provisions, introducing 
governing for results in government operations, and reforming the structure of 
governance, thus shifting decision making closer to the people. Direct democracy 
provisions require referenda on major issues and large projects and require that 
citizens have the right to veto any legislation or government program. A 
“governing for results” framework requires government accountability to citizens 
for service delivery performance. Hence, citizens have a charter defining their 
basic rights as well as their rights of access to specific standards of public 
services. Output-based intergovernmental transfers (discussed in section 5.4) 
strengthen compliance with such standards and strengthen accountability and 
citizen empowerment. 
Implications for division of powers within nations: Role reversals for central and 
local governments 
The framework described above has important implications for reforming the 
structure of government. Top-down mandates on local governance will need to 
be replaced by bottom-up compacts. Furthermore, the role of local government 
must be expanded to serve as a catalyst for the formulation, development, and 
operation of a network of both government providers and entities beyond 
government. Local government’s traditionally acknowledged technical capacity 
becomes less relevant in this framework. More important are its institutional 
strengths as a purchaser of services and as a facilitator of alliances, partnerships, 
associations, clubs, and networks for developing social capital and improving 
social outcomes. Two distinct options are possible in this regard, and both imply 
a pivotal role for local governments in the intergovernmental system. The options 
are (a) local government as the primary agent, subcontracting to local providers, 
regional (state), and federal or central government authorities and engaging 
networks and entities beyond government, and (b) local, regional (state), and 
national governments as independent agents.  
Option A: Local governments as primary agents of citizens. In this role, a local 
government serves as (a) a purchaser of local services, (b) a facilitator of 
networks of government providers and entities beyond government, and (c) a 
gatekeeper and overseer of state (intermediate order) and national governments 
for the shared rule or responsibilities delegated to them. This role represents a 
fundamental shift in the division of powers from higher to local governments. It 
has important constitutional implications. Residual functions reside with local 
governments. Regional governments would not be directly elected and would 
simply be constituted from local government representatives to perform inter-
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municipal services as is presently the case in Finland. The national government is 
assigned redistributive, security, foreign relations, and interstate (inter-regional) 
functions such as harmonization and consensus on a common framework. The 
Swiss system bears some affinity to this model and Finland incorporates 
elements of this framework.  
Option B: Various orders of government as independent agents. An alternative 
framework for establishing the supremacy of the principals is to clarify the 
responsibilities and functions of various orders as independent agents. This 
framework limits shared rule. Finance follows function strictly, and fiscal 
arrangements are periodically reviewed for fine-tuning. Local governments enjoy 
home rule, with complete tax and expenditure autonomy. The Brazilian fiscal 
constitution incorporates some features of this model, albeit with significant 
deviations.  
Feasibility of options. Option A is well grounded in the history of modern 
governments and is most suited for countries with no history of internal or 
external conflict in recent times. It is already practiced to some degree in 
Switzerland, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. War, conquest, and security 
concerns have led to a reversal of the roles of various orders of governments and 
to a reduction in local government functions in more recent history. 
Globalization and the information revolution have already brought pressures for 
much larger and stronger roles for local governments. Although a majority of 
governments have done some tinkering with their fiscal systems, the radical 
change recommended here is not in the cards anywhere. This is because the 
unlikelihood of overcoming path dependency – a tall order for existing 
institutions and vested interests – makes such reform infeasible. Under such 
circumstances, option B may be more workable, but here the clarity of 
responsibilities may not be politically feasible. In general, there is unlikely to be 
political will to undertake such bold reforms. Piecemeal adaptation of this model 
will nevertheless be forced on most countries by the effects of globalization and 
by citizen empowerment, facilitated by the information revolution.  
The Practice of Local Governance and Lessons for Reform 
The legal status of local government varies across industrial countries, with local 
government deriving authority from national constitutions in Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden; from state constitutions in Australia, 
Switzerland, and the United States; and from national legislation in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand and from provincial legislation in Canada. It is 
interesting that there is no clear pattern in the autonomy and range of local 
services provided by local governments deriving their status from national and 
state constitutions. However, local governments that are created through 
legislation are significantly weaker.  
Anwar Shah 
 
 
 
 
194 
The relative importance of local governments in industrial countries is compared 
using two indicators: share of consolidated public sector expenditures and local 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. On both indicators, Nordic countries are 
the leaders; the United Kingdom and United States are in the lower ranges; and 
Canada, France, and Germany are in the lowest range. Local government in 
Denmark stands out, claiming about 50 percent of total expenditures, which 
account for about 30 percent of GDP. Among the industrial countries, Australia 
is an outlier with local expenditures accounting for less than 3 percent of GDP.  
 Figure 5.1.  Relative Importance of Local Governments as measured by 
expenditure share and employment share of general government 
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Source: Ivanyna and Shah, forthcoming. 
 
Relative importance of local government is quite small and local government role 
in local economic development is quite weak in Australia (“roads and rubbish” 
only), India (largely ornamental), France and United Kingdom. In these countries 
local governments were seen in the past more as instruments of political 
participation rather than autonomous institutions for self-government and service 
provision. This view has been reshaped to give greater autonomy to local 
governments in municipal services in recent years in UK and France. Local 
governments are relatively more important and play a moderate role in local 
economic development in Japan, Germany, Canada, USA and Brazil. In these 
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countries, local governments have an exclusive role in municipal services but 
limited role in social services. The role of local government is expansive in 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland), Switzerland and 
China. In Nordic countries, local governments act as the primary agent of citizens 
and provide a broad role in support of a client-oriented welfare state. For 
example, in Finland, local governments assume a predominant role in social 
services (Moisio, Loikkanen, Oulasvirta, 2010). In Switzerland cantons (higher 
order of local governments) enjoy autonomy not only in fiscal matters but also in 
such areas as immigration, citizenship, language and foreign economic relations. 
China affords its local governments one of the strongest role in local economic 
development. Local governments below provincial level employ 89% of the 
public workforce and command 51% of public expenditures. A unique feature of 
local government in China is that local autonomy varies directly with success in 
local performance as measured by local economic development, service delivery 
and citizen satisfaction. Nordic countries, Switzerland and China appear to have 
local government role more consistent with the demands of new world economic 
order.  
Some Lessons 
Historical evolution and the current practice of local governance is instructive in 
drawing lessons for reform of local governance. There is great diversity in 
practice in local governance in industrial countries, but there are also some 
common strands. The diversity is in the institutional arrangements, which have 
evolved incrementally over a long period. This evolution has resulted in diverse 
roles for local governments and diverse relations with central governments across 
countries. In Nordic countries, local government serves as the primary agent of 
the people, whereas in Australia, that role is entrusted to state governments, and 
local government has a minimal role in local affairs.  
There is no uniform model for local government size, structure, tiers, and 
functions across OECD countries. There are nevertheless a number of interesting 
common features. First, most countries recognize that finance must follow 
function to ensure that local governments are able to meet their responsibilities 
efficiently and equitably. Second, home rule is considered critical to meeting 
local expectations and being responsive to local residents. Therefore, local 
governments must have significant taxing, spending, and regulatory autonomy, 
and they must have the ability to hire, fire, and set terms of reference for 
employees without having to defer to higher levels of governments. Only then 
can local governments innovate in management by introducing performance-
based accountability and innovate in service delivery by forging alternative 
service delivery arrangements through competitive provision, contracting, and 
outsourcing wherever deemed appropriate as done in Finland (see Moisio, 
Loikkanen and Oulasvirta, 2010). They can also facilitate a broader network of 
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local governance and harness the energies of the whole community to foster 
better social outcomes. Third and most important, accountability to local 
residents has been the factor most critical to the success of local governance in 
industrial countries. This accountability is strengthened through democratic 
choice, participation, transparency, performance budgeting, citizens’ charters of 
rights, and various legal and financing provisions that support wider voice, 
choice, and exit options to residents. 
In conclusion, a synthesis of the conceptual literature suggests that the modern 
role of a local government is to deal with market failures as well as government 
failures. This role requires a local government to operate as a purchaser of local 
services, a facilitator of networks of government providers and entities beyond 
government, and a gatekeeper and overseer of state and national governments in 
areas of shared rule. Local government also needs to play a mediator’s role 
among various entities and networks to foster greater synergy and harness the 
untapped energies of the broader community for improving the quality of life of 
residents. Globalization and the information revolution are reinforcing those 
conceptual perspectives on a catalytic role for local governments. This view is 
also grounded in the history of industrial nations especially Nordic countries and 
ancient civilizations in China and India. Local government was the primary form 
of government until wars and conquest led to the transfer of local government 
responsibilities to central and regional governments. This trend continued 
unabated until globalization and the information revolution highlighted the 
weaknesses of centralized rule for improving the quality of life and social 
outcomes. The new vision of local governance (table 5.1) presented here argues 
for a leadership role by local governments in a multi-centered, multi-order, or 
multi-level system. This view is critical to creating and sustaining citizen-
centered governance, in which citizens are the ultimate sovereigns and various 
orders of governments serve as agents in the supply of public governance. This 
view is also relevant for carving and sustaining a competitive edge in 
international economic relations as demonstrated by the recent experience of 
China. Empowering local governments and strengthening their role in local 
economic development ushered China in an era of sustained economic growth 
and lifting billions out of the poverty trap. 
5.3 Structure and Size of Local Government 
The fiscal federalism and public choice literature provides broad guidance on the 
structure of local government and assignment of responsibilities to local, 
metropolitan and regional governments. A synthesis of this literature suggests 
that the assignment of public services to local governments or to metropolitan or 
regional governments can be based on considerations such as economies of scale, 
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economies of scope (appropriate bundling of local public services to improve 
efficiency through information and coordination economies and enhanced 
accountability through voter participation and cost recovery) and cost-benefit 
spillovers, proximity to beneficiaries, consumer preferences, and budgetary 
choices about the composition of spending. The particular level of government to 
which a service is assigned determines the public or private or competitive 
production of the service in accordance with considerations of efficiency and 
equity. Large metropolitan areas with populations in excess of 1 million could be 
considered for subdivision into a first tier of municipal governments of smaller 
size responsible for neighborhood-type services and a second tier of 
metropolitan-wide government providing area-wide services. The first-tier 
governments could be directly elected, and elected mayors of these governments 
could form the metropolitan council at the second tier. Two-tier structures for 
metropolitan governance have been practiced in Melbourne, Australia; 
Vancouver, Canada; Allegheny county, Pennsylvania, United States; and 
Stockholm, Sweden.  
In industrial countries, special-purpose agencies or bodies deliver a wide range of 
metropolitan and regional public services, including education, health, planning, 
recreation, and environmental protection. Such bodies can include library boards; 
transit and police commissions; and utilities providing water, gas, and electricity. 
These agencies deal with public services whose delivery areas transcend political 
jurisdictions and are better financed by loans, user charges, and earmarked 
benefit taxes, such as a supplementary mill rate on a property tax base to finance 
a local school board. If kept to a minimum, such agencies can exploit economies 
of scale in the delivery of services where political boundaries are not consistent 
with service areas. A proliferation of these agencies can undermine 
accountability and budgetary flexibility at local levels. Accountability and 
responsiveness to voters are weakened if members of special-purpose bodies are 
appointed rather than elected. Budgetary flexibility is diminished if a majority of 
local expenditures fall outside the control of local councils.  
Private sector participation can also take a variety of forms, including contracting 
through competitive biddings, franchise operations (local government acting as a 
regulatory agency), grants (usually for recreational and cultural activities), 
vouchers (redeemable by local government with private providers), volunteers 
(mostly in fire stations and hospitals), community self-help activities (for crime 
prevention), and private nonprofit organizations (for social services). Thus, a mix 
of delivery systems is appropriate for local public services.  
A Brief Overview of Practices 
There are wide variations in the number of municipal governments, with as few 
as 74 in New Zealand and as many as 35,906 in the United States. Similarly, the 
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median size of a municipal government jurisdiction in 1998 was smallest in 
Iceland (1,160 people) and largest in the United Kingdom (about 160,000). In a 
large majority of industrial countries, the average municipal government 
jurisdiction covers fewer than 20,000 people (see Boadway and Shah, 2009). 
This small size is seen to limit efficiency gains from economies of scale and 
scope and there has been a wave of consolidating smaller municipalities to create 
a larger size municipality in the European Union during the last decade. Finland 
in 1998, instituted a special grant program to promote such mergers. In the 
academic literature, there is yet no consensus on the optimal size of a general 
purpose local jurisdiction as the optimal size varies by type of services. 
McMillan (2008) argues that a population size of 10–20,000 may be appropriate. 
Whereas Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2006) in Finland’s case find that a relatively 
smaller size (about 5–10,000) may be most efficient for welfare services. On the 
other hand, Aaltonen et al (2006) find that optimal local size jurisdiction falls in 
the range of 20–40,000. Aaltonen et al findings may be more relevant for most 
industrial countries (see also Moisio et al, 2010).  
There is no uniform model in local spending responsibilities, except that 
property-oriented services are provided at the local level in almost all countries. 
In infrastructure, Australian local governments command 27 percent of total 
expenditures, compared with 62 percent in the United Kingdom and 47 percent 
and 41 percent in the EU and the OECD. People-oriented services show more 
variation. In education, there is no role for local government in Australia, but it 
takes up more than 60 percent of expenditure share at local levels in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. In the OECD, it averages about 46 
percent. In health, local governments have no role in Australia and the United 
Kingdom but a predominant role in Denmark (about 92 percent); EU and OECD 
average expenditure shares are 28 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Most 
industrial countries have significant higher-level intervention in social services 
and unfunded mandates to local governments in environmental protection. 
Overall, local governments in Nordic countries perform the maximal range of 
local services, encompassing a wide range of people- and property-oriented 
services. Local governments in southern Europe and in North America fall in a 
median range and are more focused on property-oriented services. Australian 
local governments are engaged in the most minimal property-oriented services 
(primarily “roads and rubbish”).  
5.4 Financing Local Governments 
Fiscal federalism literatures highlights four general principles requiring 
consideration in assigning taxing powers to various governments. First, the 
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economic efficiency criterion dictates that taxes on mobile factors and tradable 
goods that have a bearing on the efficiency of the internal common market 
should be assigned to the center. Subnational assignment of taxes on mobile 
factors may facilitate the use of socially wasteful “beggar thy neighbor” policies 
to attract resources to own areas by regional and local governments. In a 
globalized world, even central assignment of taxes on mobile capital may not be 
very effective in the presence of tax havens and the difficulty of tracing and 
attributing incomes from virtual transactions to various physical spaces. Second, 
national equity considerations warrant that progressive redistributive taxes 
should be assigned to the center, which limits the possibility of regional and local 
governments following perverse redistribution policies using both taxes and 
transfers to attract high-income people and repel low-income ones. Doing so, 
however, leaves open the possibility of supplementary, flat-rate, local charges on 
residence-based national income taxes. Third, the administrative feasibility 
criterion (lowering compliance and administration costs) suggests that taxes 
should be assigned to the jurisdiction with the best ability to monitor relevant 
assessments. This criterion minimizes administrative costs as well as the 
potential for tax evasion. For example, property, land, and betterment taxes are 
good candidates for local assignment because local governments are in a better 
position to assess the market values of such assets. Fourth, the fiscal need or 
revenue adequacy criterion suggests that to ensure accountability, revenue means 
(the ability to raise revenues from own sources) should be matched as closely as 
possible with expenditure needs. The literature also argues that long-lived assets 
should primarily be financed by raising debt, so as to ensure equitable burden 
sharing across generations (Inman 2006). Furthermore, such large and lumpy 
investments typically cannot be financed by current revenues and reserves alone 
(see box 5.1).  
These four principles suggest that user charges are suitable for use by all orders 
of government, but the case for decentralizing taxing powers is not as compelling 
as that for decentralizing public service delivery. This is because lower-level 
taxes can introduce inefficiencies in the allocation of resources across the 
federation and cause inequities among people in different jurisdictions. In 
addition, collection and compliance costs can increase significantly. These 
problems are more severe for some taxes than others, so the selection of which 
taxes to decentralize must be made with care, balancing the need to achieve fiscal 
and political accountability at the lower levels of government against the 
disadvantages of having a fragmented tax system. The tradeoff between 
increased accountability and increased economic costs from decentralizing taxing 
responsibilities can be mitigated by fiscal arrangements that permit joint 
occupation and harmonization of taxes as done in Canada and Finland to 
overcome fragmentation and by fiscal equalization transfers that will reduce the 
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fiscal inefficiencies and inequities that arise from different fiscal capacities 
across regional and local governments. 
Box 5.1.  Key Considerations and Tools for Local Government Finances 
 
 
Source: Inman (2006) and Shah and Shah (2006), Boadway and Shah (2009). 
 
Key Considerations 
The overall objective of local governments is to maximize social outcomes for residents and 
provide an enabling environment for private sector development through efficient provision 
of public services. This requires that local financing should take into account the following 
considerations: 
• Local government should limit self-financing of redistributive services. 
• Business should be taxed only for services to businesses and not for redistributive 
purposes. 
• Current period services should be financed out of current year operating revenues 
and future period services should be financed by future period taxes, user 
charges/fees, and borrowing.   
• Residential services should be financed by taxes and fees on residents. 
• Business services should be financed on site/land value taxes and user charges. 
Profit, output, sales, and moveable asset taxes may drive business out of the 
jurisdiction.  
 
Tools for Local Finance 
• Local taxes for services with public goods characteristics – streets, roads, street 
lighting 
• User charges for services with private goods characteristics – water, sewerage, solid 
waste 
• Conditional, non-matching, output-based grants from national/state-order 
governments for merit goods: education and health 
• Conditional matching grants for spillovers in some services 
• Unconditional grants for fiscal gap and equalization purposes 
• Capital grants for infrastructure if fiscal capacity is low 
• Capital market finance for infrastructure if fiscal capacity is high 
• Development charges for financing growth with higher charges for developing land 
on local government boundaries 
• Public-private partnerships for infrastructure finance but keeping public ownership 
and control of strategic assets 
• Tax increment financing districts to deal with urban blight. For this purpose, the area 
should be designated for redevelopment and annual property tax revenues frozen at 
pre-vitalization levels. For a specified period, say 15-35 years, all tax revenues 
above base are used for redevelopment. Capacity improvements are undertaken 
through municipal borrowing/bonds against expected tax increments.  
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The Practice: Local Revenues and Revenue Autonomy 
Income taxes, property taxes, and fees are major revenue sources for local 
governments. In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, more than 80 percent of tax 
revenues are derived from taxes on personal and corporate incomes. In contrast, 
in Australia, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, property taxes contribute more than 80 percent 
of local tax revenues. It should be noted, however, that the role of local 
governments is quite constrained in countries where property tax finance 
dominates due to limited productive potential of such taxes. Therefore OECD’s 
call for a larger role of property tax finance in Finland may not be practicable 
(see Moisio et al, 2010). Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain rely 
on a mix of local tax sources, with Spain drawing about 40 percent of tax 
revenues from sales taxes. For the EU as a whole, income taxes dominate, 
followed by property taxes, sales taxes, and fees. On average in industrial 
countries, 50 percent of local revenues come from taxes, 20 percent from user 
charges, and 30 percent from transfers from higher levels (see McMillan 2008).  
Intergovernmental finance is relatively less important in Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden, whereas in most OECD countries 
the share of grant-financed local expenditures is quite large. This large share of 
grants indicates that in many OECD countries, local governments typically 
perform agency functions for higher-level governments and have only a limited 
range of locally determined responsibilities. General-purpose, formula-based 
grants using fiscal capacity and need factors dominate in most OECD countries, 
with the exception of New Zealand, and the United States. In those three 
countries, specific-purpose transfers assume greater importance in local finances. 
In Finland, expenditure needs determined on the basis of sector specific 
indicators are compensated by a general block grant with no conditions on the 
use of funds (see Moisio et al, 2010). 
In most countries, airports, parking, water, sewerage, and garbage collection are 
predominantly financed by fees, whereas social services are primarily financed 
from general tax revenues and grants. Infrastructure finance relies on a mix of 
sources that include own-source revenues and reserves, charges, fiscal transfers, 
borrowing, and public-private partnership arrangements. In most countries, 
significant help is available from higher-level governments in facilitating access 
to the credit market for local governments 
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5.5 Reform of Central-local fiscal transfers to strengthen local 
autonomy while enhancing incentives for accountability 
In financing local governments, industrial countries place a significant emphasis 
on general purpose equalization transfers. These transfers are typically financed 
by the central government with a few exceptions. As an example of such an 
exception, in Finland, while the expenditure need component of the fiscal 
equalization is financed by the central government, the fiscal equalization 
component of the equalization program is based on Robin-Hood or solidarity 
type of transfers where richer local jurisdictions contribute to the pool and the 
poorer jurisdictions receive funds from this pool (see Moisio, Loikkanen and 
Oulasvirta, 2010). These latter type of equalization transfers represent the ideal 
form of such transfers as contributions of richer jurisdictions are recognized and 
overall pool is subject to discipline based upon the consensus of donors and 
recipients. Such an internal discipline is lacking in wholly centrally financed 
transfers as the latter transfers depend on the whims of the central government. 
This creates incentives for local politicians to lobby the central government for 
ever higher levels of such transfers and also undermines local government 
accountability to local residents with implicit incentives for lower tax effort. 
These lobbying efforts have resulted in highly complex allocation criteria as 
prevalent in central-local equalization transfers in Australia and Netherlands 
making the whole system not only opaque but also possibly unjust. Expenditure 
need equalization adds a significant layer of complexity and controversy in these 
transfers. Ideally, one may aim for a simpler solidarity type approach to fiscal 
capacity equalization to a standard arrived by political consensus among all 
donors and recipients as done in Finland. Expenditure needs equalization could 
be achieved through output-based specific purpose transfers. 
Specific purpose (conditional) transfers in most industrial countries (with notable 
exception of Nordic countries) are typically not well structured. These are ad hoc 
transfers for specific functions with requirements for verification of grant 
financed expenditures. They undermine local autonomy and distort local 
priorities if, as usually is the case, there are conditions on spending and 
fungibility of funds is not feasible as would be the case for spending that receives 
low priority in local allocation choices. Nordic countries, especially Denmark 
and Finland, have improved upon the traditional design of such conditional 
grants at least in fairness of allocation criteria by using a “standard cost” 
approach. This approach is desirable but it still misses the most important 
ingredient – incentives for results based accountability. Shah (2006, 2009) has 
argued that output based transfers (or performance oriented grants) that link grant 
finance with local service delivery performance while allowing local government 
to spend the transfer monies as they please, would preserve local autonomy while 
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strengthening bottom up accountability. A few illustrative examples of such 
transfers are presented below. 
Output based operating transfers for setting national minimum standards for 
merit goods (education, health, social welfare and infrastructure). 
(a) Output based school grants to encourage competition and innovation in 
education. Output based grants create incentives regime to promote the 
results based accountability culture. Consider the case where the national 
government aims to improve access to education by the needy and poor as 
well as enhance quality of such education. A commonly practiced 
approach is to provide grants to government schools through conditional 
grants. These grants specify the type of expenditures eligible for grant 
financing, for example, books, computers, teachers’ aides etc and also 
financial reporting and audit requirements. Such input conditionality 
undermines budgetary autonomy and flexibility without providing any 
assurance regarding the achievement of results. Such input conditionality, 
in practice, is difficult to enforce as there may be significant opportunities 
for fungibility of funds. Experience has also demonstrated that there is no 
one-one link between increase in public spending and improvement in 
service delivery performance. To bring about accountability for results, 
consider an alternate, output based design of such grants. Under the 
alternate approach, national government allocates funds to local 
authorities based upon school age population. The local authorities in turn 
pass these funds to both government and non-government providers based 
upon school enrollments. Conditions for receipt of these grant funds for 
non-government providers are that they must admit students on merit and 
provide tuition subsidy to students whose parents do not have sufficient 
means to afford such fees. Conditions for the continuation of funds for all 
providers will be to improve or at the minimum maintain baseline 
achievement scores on standardized tests, improve graduation rates and 
reduce dropout rates. Lack of compliance with these conditions will invite 
public censure and in the extreme case a threat of discontinuation of funds 
with perpetual non-compliance. In the meanwhile reputation risks 
associated with poor performance may lead to reduced enrollments and 
associated reduction in grant funds through parental choices. There are no 
conditions on the use of funds and schools have full autonomy in the use 
of grant funds and retain unused funds. Such grant financing would create 
an incentive environment for both government and non-government 
schools to compete and excel to retain students and establish reputation 
for quality education as in the final analysis it is the parental choice that 
would determine available grant financing to each school. Such an 
environment is particularly important for government schools where 
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typically staff have life-long appointments and financing is assured 
regardless of school performance. Budgetary flexibility and retention of 
savings would encourage innovation to deliver quality education. Thus 
output based grants preserve autonomy, encourage competition and 
innovation while bringing strict accountability for results to residents. This 
accountability regime is self enforcing through consumer (parental choice 
in the current example) choice. Such a school financing regime is 
especially helpful for countries where several local jurisdictions are 
plagued with poor quality of teaching and worse teacher absenteeism or 
lack of access to education in rural areas. The incentive regime provided 
by results based financing will create market mechanism to help overcome 
these deficiencies over time.    
(b) Output based grants for local health financing. A similar example of such 
a grant in health care would allocate funds to local authorities based upon 
weighted population by age class with higher weights for senior citizens 
(65 years and over) and children (under 5 years). The distribution by local 
authorities to providers would be based upon patient use. Minimum 
standards of service and access to health care will be specified for the 
eligibility to receive such transfers.  
(c) Output based grants for social welfare. Such grants would provide 
matching assistance to local authorities based upon the relevant service 
population e.g. elderly without care, single mothers, orphans etc. 
Matching rate would vary with the fiscal capacity of the local jurisdiction 
with lower matching rate for richer jurisdictions.  
(d) Output based transfers for road maintenance. Such a grant would be 
based on classification of roads by types and traffic use and provide per 
kilometer grants differentiated by the type of road classification. 
Minimum standards of up-keep service for such roads will be specified 
and future grant releases will depend upon local authorities certifying 
those standards are being met and providing information on road 
conditions and use.   
Lessons from the Practice of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
Review of international practices yields a set of practices to avoid and a set of 
practices to emulate. A number of important lessons also emerge (table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2.  Principles and better practices in grant design 
 
Grant objective Grant design 
Examples of better 
practices 
Examples of practices 
to avoid 
Bridge fiscal gap Reassignment of 
responsibilities, tax 
abatement, tax-base 
sharing 
Tax abatement and tax-
base sharing (Canada, 
Finland, Thailand) 
Deficit grants, wage 
grants (China), tax by tax 
sharing (China, India) 
Reduce local/ 
regional fiscal 
disparities 
General nonmatching 
fiscal capacity 
equalization transfers 
Fiscal equalization with 
explicit standard that 
determines total pool as 
well as allocation 
(Canada, Denmark, 
Finland and Germany)  
General revenue sharing 
with multiple factors 
(Brazil and India); fiscal 
equalization with a fixed 
pool (Australia, China) 
Compensate for 
benefit spillovers 
Open-ended matching 
transfers with matching 
rate consistent with spill-
out of benefits 
Grant for teaching 
hospitals (South Africa) 
Closed-ended matching 
grants 
Set national 
minimum 
standards 
Conditional nonmatching 
output-based block 
transfers with conditions 
on standards of service 
and access 
 
 
 
 
 
Road maintenance and 
primary education grants 
(Indonesia before 2000) 
Education transfers 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia). 
Health transfers (Brazil, 
Canada), school finance, 
health and social 
transfers in Finland, 
“standard cost” allocation 
criteria in Finland 
Conditional transfers with 
conditions on spending 
alone (most countries), 
pork barrel transfers 
(USA), 
ad hoc grants 
 
 
 
Conditional capital grants 
with matching rate that 
varies inversely with local 
fiscal capacity. 
Capital grant for school 
construction (Indonesia 
before 2000), highway 
construction matching 
grants to states (United 
States) 
Capital grants with no 
matching and no future 
upkeep requirements 
Influence local 
priorities in 
areas of high 
national but low 
local priority 
 
Open-ended matching 
transfers (preferably with 
matching rate varying 
inversely with fiscal 
capacity) 
Matching transfers for 
social assistance 
(Canada before 2004, 
Finland) 
Ad hoc grants 
Provide 
stabilization and 
overcome 
infrastructure 
deficiencies 
Capital grants, provided 
maintenance possible.  
Capital grants with 
matching rates that vary 
inversely with local fiscal 
capacity 
Stabilization grants with 
no future upkeep 
requirements 
 
Source: Adapted from Boadway and Shah, 2009 
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Negative Lessons: Types of Transfers to Avoid 
Policymakers should avoid designing the following types of intergovernmental 
grants: 
• Grants with vaguely specified objectives.  
• General revenue–sharing programs with multiple factors that work at 
cross purposes, and undermine accountability and do not advance fiscal 
efficiency or fiscal equity objectives. Tax decentralization or tax-base 
sharing offer better alternatives to a general revenue– sharing program, as 
they enhance accountability while preserving subnational autonomy.  
• Grants to finance subnational deficits, which create incentives for running 
higher deficits in future. 
• Unconditional grants that include incentives for fiscal effort. Improving 
service delivery while lowering tax costs should be public sector 
objectives.  
• Input- (or process-) based or ad hoc conditional grant programs, which 
undermine local autonomy, flexibility, fiscal efficiency, and fiscal equity 
objectives.  
• Capital grants without assurance of funds for future upkeep, which have 
the potential to create white elephants.  
• Negotiated or discretionary grants in a federal system, which may create 
dissention and disunity. 
• One size fits all grants to local governments, which create huge inequities. 
• Grants that involve abrupt changes in the total pool and its allocation.  
Positive Lessons: Principles to Adopt 
• Policymakers should strive to respect the following principles in designing 
and implementing intergovernmental transfers: 
• Keep it simple. In the design of fiscal transfers, rough justice may be 
better than full justice, if it achieves wider acceptability and sustainability. 
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• Focus on a single objective in a grant program and make the design 
consistent with that objective. Setting multiple objectives in a single grant 
program runs the risk of failing to achieve any of them.  
• Introduce ceilings linked with macro indicators and floors, to ensure 
stability and predictability in grant funds. 
• Introduce sunset clauses. It is desirable to have the grant program 
reviewed periodically – say, every five years – and renewed (if 
appropriate). In the intervening years, no changes to the program should 
be made, in order to provide certainty in budgetary programming for all 
governments.  
• Equalize per capita fiscal capacity to a specified standard in order to 
achieve fiscal equalization. Such a standard would determine the total 
pool and allocations among recipient units. Calculations required for fiscal 
capacity equalization using a representative tax system for major tax bases 
are doable for most countries. In contrast, expenditure need equalization 
requires difficult and complex analysis, inviting much controversy and 
debate; as desirable as it is, it may not therefore be worth doing. In view 
of this practical difficulty, it would be best to deal with fiscal need 
equalization through output-based sectoral grants that also enhance 
results-based accountability. A national consensus on the standard of 
equalization is critically important for the sustainability of any 
equalization program. The equalization program should not be looked at 
in isolation from the broader fiscal system, especially conditional 
transfers. The equalization program would be strengthened by the addition 
of a sunset clause and provision for formal review and renewal. For local 
fiscal equalization, one size does not fit all.  
• In specific-purpose grant programs, impose conditionality on outputs or 
standards of access and quality of services rather than on inputs and 
processes. This allows grantors to achieve their objectives without 
undermining local choices on how best to deliver such services. Most 
countries need to establish national minimum standards of basic services 
across the nation in order to strengthen the internal common market and 
economic union.  
• Recognize population size class, area served, and the urban/rural nature of 
services in making grants to local governments. Establish separate formula 
allocations for each type of municipal or local government. 
• Establish hold harmless or grandfathering provisions that ensure that all 
recipient governments receive at least what they received as general-
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purpose transfers in the pre-reform period. Over time, as the economy 
grows, such a provision would not delay the phase-in of the full package 
of reforms.  
• Make sure that all stakeholders are heard and that an appropriate political 
compact on equalization principles and the standard of equalization is 
struck. Politics should be internalized in these institutional arrangements. 
Arms-length institutions, such as independent grant commissions, are not 
helpful, as they do not allow for political input and therefore tend to opt 
for complex and nontransparent solutions.  
• Moving from a public sector governance culture of dividing the spoils to 
an environment that enables responsive, responsible, equitable and 
accountable governance is critical. Doing so requires exploring all feasible 
tax decentralization options, instituting output-based operating and capital 
fiscal transfers, establishing a formal fiscal equalization program with an 
explicit standard of equalization, and ensuring responsible access to 
borrowing.  
5.6 Budgetary Institutions for Local Fiscal Discipline 
Having greater local autonomy also poses some risks for national 
macroeconomic management and a large number of countries have in recent 
decades grappled with a framework for fiscal discipline at the local level. These 
efforts attempt to mitigate the so-called tragedy of commons associated with 
common pool resources allocated and distributed by the central government. A 
stylized view of these approaches is presented below. 
1. Citizen-voter based discipline – direct democracy provisions. This is the 
approach adopted by Switzerland, where new taxes and expenditures and 
borrowing by cantons and communes is restricted to capital projects that 
can be financed on a pay as you go basis and requires a popular 
referendum for approval. A variation of this approach is also imposed on 
local governments by three states in the USA and four provinces in 
Canada. People based discipline works best in societies that have 
conservative fiscal values as in Switzerland. 
2. Market-based discipline. Market based discipline is exercised through 
rating agencies which rate local governments as well as their marketable 
financing instruments such as municipal bonds. Finland and Canada rely 
heavily on this channel to discipline their local governments. Market 
based discipline works best when rating agencies act with professionalism 
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and integrity and avoid conflict of interest and when there is no possibility 
(implicit or explicit) of a central government bailout. Recent US 
experience has shown that such conditions may not be hold in real life.  
3. Discipline through intergovernmental coordination. If all orders of 
government are involved in jointly formulating and implementing fiscal 
policy, then moral suasion and peer pressure can be brought to reign in on 
members that do not comply. Several countries follow this approach. In 
Australia, National Loan Council monitors fiscal health of all members 
and serves as a coordinating agency for public borrowing. Austria, 
Belgium, Canada and Spain have set up intergovernmental forums to 
coordinate response to fiscal policy issues.   
4. Soft controls. These are the principles, codes of conduct or process and 
reporting requirements to ensure greater transparency and accountability 
in budgeting. Most industrial countries (e.g. Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany and Norway) have established fiscal reporting and external 
auditing requirements. Most also follow golden rule for borrowing. UK 
has established principles and processes of sound fiscal management at the 
local level and has also established an independent audit commission for 
local governments.  
5. Hard controls. Following the European Union Growth and Stability pact, 
a large number of countries have enacted budget balance requirements 
(see Table 5.3) numerical fiscal rules imposing limits on wages, 
expenditure and debt (see table 5.4). Non-compliance with these rules 
invites specific legal sanctions in Brazil (strictly imposed) and the 
European Union (mostly ignored in practice) 
Fiscal Responsibility Legislation. The purpose of such legislation is to provide a 
comprehensive framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability. Such 
legislation may embody one or more of the elements of budgetary discipline 
discussed above. New Zealand, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Argentina 
have used this framework with some success in bringing about local fiscal 
discipline.  
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Table5. 4. Subnational borrowing controls in selected countries 
 
Market Rules-Based Control Administrative Control     Prohibition
 Discipline limit on debt limit on debt service specific purpose Prior Approval domestic abroad
Industrial Countries
Austria x x
Belgium x
Canada x x (local) x (local)
Denmark x x (local)
Finland x
France x (local)
Germany x x
Greece x (local)
Ireland x (local)
Italy x x x x
Japan x
Norway x (local) x
Portugal x (local)
Spain x x x
Sweden x
Switzerland x
United Kingdom x (local) x (local)
United States x
Developing Countries
Argentina x x
Bahamas x x
Bolivia x x x x
Brazil x x x
Chile x x
Colombia x x x
Costa Rica x x
Ecuador x x x x
El Salvador x x
Ethiopia x x
Guatemala x x
Guyana x x
Honduras x x
India x x x
Jamaica x
Korea x x
Mexico x x (local)
Panama x x
Paraguay x x
Peru x x x x
Suriname x x
Thailand x x
Trinidad and Tobago x x
Turkey x (local)
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Table 5.4. (continued) 
Market Rules-Based Control Administrative Control     Prohibition
 Discipline limit on debt limit on debt service specific purpose Prior Approval domestic abroad
Transition Countries
Albania x x
Armenia x x
Azerbaijan x x
Belarus x
Bosnia x x
Bulgaria x
China x
Croatia x x
Czech Republic x
Estonia x x x
Georgia x x
Hungary x x (local)
Kazakhstan x x x x
Kyrgyz Republic x x
Latvia x x
Lithuania x x
Poland x x
Romania x
Russia x x x x
Slovakia x
Slovenia x x
Tajikistan x x
Ukraine x x
Uzbekistan x x  
Source: Crivelli and Shah (2009) 
 
 
5.7 A Framework for Monitoring and Evaluating Local Government 
Performance 
Traditional literature has focused on subsidiarity principle to ensure that public 
sector decision moves closer to people. It assumes that once decision making 
moves closer to people, voting by ballots and voting with feet will ensure 
accountable local governance. However such mechanisms may work imperfectly 
and central government monitoring of the financial and general operations of 
local authorities may be needed. In the event, local authorities are fully self-
financed, accountability mechanisms are expected to work well and therefore 
need for external oversight may be limited. When local authorities are 
predominantly financed by higher level transfers, a strong rationale emerges for a 
framework for oversight of local authorities to balance autonomy and 
accountability concerns. For citizens at large such a framework is needed to 
ensure that local authorities face an incentive environment that is compatible 
with focus on service delivery and bottom-up accountability and limiting the 
agents’ ability to indulge in opportunistic behaviors. Shah and Shah (2006) have 
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advanced the following three principles to decide on specific criteria for 
evaluating local government performance.  
Responsive and fair governance. This principle aims for governments to do the 
right things – that is, to deliver services consistent with citizen preferences and to 
safeguard the interests of the poor, needy and disadvantaged groups.  
Responsible governance. The government should also do it right – that is, 
manage its fiscal resources prudently. It should earn the trust of residents by 
working better and costing less and by managing fiscal and social risks for the 
community. It should strive to improve the quality and quantity of and access to 
public services. To do so, it should benchmark its performance with the best-
performing local government. Table 5.5 provides examples of indicators that can 
be used for such benchmarking in police protection and transportation services. 
Table 5.5.  Performance Benchmarks 
 
 Police Transportation 
Cost Per capita expenditure Per capita expenditure 
Workload Average number of police calls Lane miles to be constructed and maintained 
Efficiency Average cost per incident Annual maintenance cost per lane mile 
Quality Percent of cases cleared Percent of lane miles in good repair 
Quality of life Incidence of violent crimes Ease of commute and pothole free of roads, 
traffic accidents and travel time delays due to 
congestion 
 
Accountable governance. A local government should be accountable to its 
electorate. It should adhere to appropriate safeguards to ensure that it serves the 
public interest with integrity. Legal and institutional reforms may be facilitate 
local governments’ ability to deal with accountability between elections – 
reforms such as a citizen’s charter and a provision for recall of public officials. 
Table 5.6 provides specific criteria for evaluating individual local government 
performance and ranking of these governments. The specified criteria embodies 
process, institutions and outcome measures. Overall the framework ensures that 
local governments have freedoms with accountability.  
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Table 5.6. A Framework for Monitoring and Evaluating Local Governance 
 
Responsive and fair governance Responsible governance Accountable governance 
• Has subsidiarity and 
home rule 
• Has direct democracy 
provisions 
• Has budget priorities 
consistent with citizens’ 
preferences 
• Specifies and meets 
standards for access to 
local services 
• Improves social 
outcomes 
• Offers security of life 
and property 
• Offers shelter and food 
for all 
• Has clean air, safe 
water, and sanitation 
• Has a noise-free and 
preserved environment 
• Offers ease of 
commute and pothole-
free roads 
• Has primary school at a 
walking distance 
• Has acceptable fire and 
ambulance response 
times 
• Has libraries and 
Internet access 
• Has park and 
recreation programs 
and facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Follows due process: 
• The principle of ultra vires 
or general competence or 
community governance 
• The procedure bylaw 
• Local master plans and 
budgets 
• Zoning bylaws and 
regulations 
• Funded mandates 
Is fiscally prudent: 
• Operating budget in 
balance 
• Golden rule for borrowing 
• New capital projects that 
specify upkeep costs and 
how debt is to be repaid 
• Conservative fiscal rules to 
ensure sustainable debt 
levels 
• Major capital projects that 
are subject to referenda 
• Maintenance of positive net 
worth  
• Commercially audited 
financial statements 
Earns trust: 
• Professionalism and 
integrity of staff 
• Safeguards against 
malfeasance 
• Streamlined processes and 
e-governance 
• Complaints and feedback 
acted on 
• Honest and fair tax 
administration 
• Strict compliance with 
service standards 
• Citizen-friendly output 
budgets and service 
delivery performance 
reports 
• Participatory budgeting and 
planning 
 
Lets the sunshine in:  
• Local government bylaw on 
citizens’ right to know 
• Budgetary proposals and 
annual performance reports 
posted on the Internet 
• All decisions, including the 
costs of concessions, 
posted on the Internet 
• Value for money 
performance audits by 
independent think tanks 
• Open information and public 
assessment 
Works to strengthen citizen 
voice and exit: 
• Citizens’ charter 
• Service standards 
• Requirements for citizens’ 
voice and choice 
• Sunshine rights 
• Sunset clauses on 
government programs 
• Equity- and output-based 
intergovernmental finance 
• Citizen-oriented 
performance (output) 
budgeting 
• Service delivery outputs 
and costs 
• Citizens’ report card on 
service delivery 
performance 
• Budget, contracts, and 
performance reports 
defended at open town hall 
meetings 
• All documents subjected to 
citizen-friendly requirements 
• Open processes for 
contract bids 
• Mandatory referenda on 
large projects 
• Steps taken so that at least 
50 percent of eligible voters 
vote 
(continues on the next page) 
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(Continues) Works better and costs less: 
• All tasks subjected to 
alternative service delivery 
test—that is, competitive 
provision involving 
government providers and 
entities beyond government  
• Financing that creates 
incentives for competition 
and innovation 
• Comparative evaluation of 
service providers 
• Public sector as a 
purchaser through 
performance contracts but 
not necessarily a provider of 
services 
• Managerial flexibility, but 
accountability for results 
• No lifelong or rotating 
appointments 
• Task specialization  
• Budgetary allocation and 
output-based performance 
contracts  
• Activity-based costing  
• Charges for capital use 
• Accrual accounting  
• Benchmarking with the best 
• General administration 
costs subjected to public 
scrutiny 
• Boundaries that balance 
benefits and costs of scale 
and scope economies, 
externalities, and decision 
making 
• Boundaries consistent with 
fiscal sustainability  
 
• Citizens’ boards to provide 
scorecard and feedback on 
service delivery 
performance 
• Provisions for popular 
initiatives and recall of 
public officials 
• Bylaw on taxpayer rights 
 
Source: Shah and Shah (2006, 2007) 
 
International Practices 
The above framework has not been applied in its entirety anywhere in the world. 
But a number of the elements presented here are practiced in industrial countries 
and selected developing countries. Most industrial countries require due process 
provisions and sound public financial management principles are adhered to. In 
addition, monitoring of fiscal stress has received enhanced attention. 
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Monitoring fiscal stress – selected examples 
State of Michigan, USA – 10-point Scale Fiscal Stress Indicator. The State of 
Michigan monitors local government fiscal health using the point ten point scale: 
Population Growth (2 years); Real Taxable Value Growth (2 years); Large 
decrease in real taxable value; General Fund Expenditures as a percent of taxable 
value; General Fund Operating Deficit; Prior General Fund Operating Deficits; 
General Fund balances as a percentage of General Fund revenues; Current year 
deficit in a major fund; Previous year deficit in a major fund; and General long 
term debt as a percentage of real taxable value. 
State of Ohio, USA – Fiscal Watch program. Ohio monitors fiscal health of its 
local government and those in precarious fiscal health are placed under state 
watch following two classifications: (a) Fiscal Watch list: A local government is 
placed under this list if deficit exceeds 8.3% of revenues. All local governments 
placed under this list are obligated to follow workouts suggested by the state 
auditor; and (b) Fiscal Emergency list: A local government under extreme fiscal 
distress is placed on this list. To qualify, a local government must be with more 
than 30 day default on debt obligations and/or payment of salaries or overdue 
amounts exceed one-sixth of previous year revenues. A local government on this 
list is placed under a state appointed control board that manages its finances until 
the local government is brought to fiscal health.  
Colombia Traffic Light System for Local Debt. Colombia has adopted fiscal rules 
to distinguish local governments in good fiscal health from those requiring 
central government attentions. It uses a traffic light system as follows: (a) Green 
light – local governments with healthy finances. These are local governments 
whose interest payments to savings ratio is less than 40% and ratio of debt to 
current income is less than 80%; (b) Yellow Light – local governments with 
moderate concerns about their fiscal health. Local governments that have ratio of 
interest payments to savings in the range of 40–60% qualify for this list. Central 
government provides advisory assistance to these local governments; and (c) Red 
Light – local governments in financial distress. A local government is placed on 
this list if its ratio of interest payments to savings exceeds 60% and its debt to 
current income exceeds 80%. All local governments on this list are placed under 
local government oversight.  
The Practice of Fiscal Rules For An Early Warning System of Fiscal Stress. A 
number of countries have introduced numerical fiscal rules as early warning 
signs. For example, Russia requires that ratio of debt to revenues be less than 
30% for oblasts and 15% for rayons. Limiting debt service to revenues is 
mandated at less than 25% in Italy and Spain, less than 20% in Japan and 15% in 
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Russia. Several other countries e.g. Brazil places limits on borrowing as a percent 
of revenues.  
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has reflected on the unfinished agenda for local government reform 
for the next decade. Broad contours of the reform include freeing local 
governments from shackles of centralized control so as to enable them to assume 
a leadership role in improving economic and social outcomes for local residents. 
This leadership role requires local governments to assume a catalyst’s role in 
directing and coordinating governmental (including central government) and 
non-governmental agencies and networks to local economic development. Local 
governments would be in a position to play this role if their responsibilities are 
determined by home rule and community governance principles and they have 
adequate access to revenues from own sources or they can piggyback on central 
tax bases. In addition to strengthen their accountability to local residents not only 
finance should follow function but intergovernmental finance should be 
structured such as to strengthen local autonomy while enhancing results based 
accountability. There is also need for reform of the budgetary institutions so that 
all orders of government are bound by a common framework of fiscal 
responsibility, integrity, fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability. There should 
also be a framework to ensure that local government performance is measured 
and monitored for compliance with the principles of responsive and fair, 
responsible and accountable governance. 
Our survey of the literature suggests that local governance in most industrial 
countries does not fully correspond to the governance principles enunciated here 
or even to the needs of economic success in the information age. There are only 
few exceptions and these are found mostly in Nordic countries especially in 
Finland. Other industrial countries would be well advised to follow the Finland 
lead in adapting local governance to the needs of the 21st century.  
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Chapter 6 
The Finnish Model – Which way forward? 
Antti Moisio (Ed.) 
 
  
  
 
Each author was asked to briefly comment on the Finnish situation. In order to be 
able to do this, the authors were sent a recent report that describes Finnish local 
government (Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta 2010). These comments are 
presented in this chapter. 
6.1 Comments on the Finnish Model: Camila Vammalle and Claire 
Charbit1 
Finland is one of OECD’s most decentralized countries (sub-central governments 
represent 40% of public spending and 30% of public revenues, well above the 
OECD average of 26% and 16% respectively), and the Finnish municipalities are 
responsible for providing essential public services, such as primary and 
specialized health care, social services, education services, etc. But today’s socio-
economic forces are challenging the capacity of Finland’s central and sub-central 
governments to deliver quality public services effectively and efficiently. This is 
due to two main demographic factors. First is territorial migration, where 
municipalities in the Northern and Eastern regions are losing population as 
younger people move to urban centers, and the aged who remain are requiring 
more specialized services. The second is an ageing population, which puts a 
strain on service delivery. Since the migrating population tends to be youth or 
younger generations, the human capital pool available to provide services in the 
regions is shrinking. Together, these two phenomena result in a double problem, 
since: a) there will be fewer public sector workers to deliver services and pay 
taxes, and b) as municipal workers retire, they will be demanding the services 
they once provided, thereby adding to already increasing demand and forecasted 
                                              
 
1 The authors would like to thank Maria Varinia Michalun for her inputs and comments on these pages. 
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expenditure. Of course, this is compounded by the impact of the recent financial 
and economic crisis, as it puts an additional strain on municipal finances. 
Faced with similar challenges, several OECD countries are seeking to increase 
the size of their administrative units, and/or create or reinforce a regional level of 
government, which would handle responsibilities where a critical mass is needed 
to increase effectiveness, such as health care or regional policy.2 For example, in 
2007, Denmark carried out a Local Government reform aiming at improving the 
quality of public goods provided by sub-national governments while ensuring 
their sustainable provision. This reform consisted in increasing municipalities’ 
size (municipalities were obliged to merge to achieve a minimum population 
requirement), and reinforcing the regional level, replacing the 16 existing 
counties by 5 regions which assumed responsibilities such as health care and 
regional development. In some countries such as the Eastern European ones, the 
emergence of a regional level has also been encouraged by the allocation system 
of the EU Structural Funds, which is based on NUTS 2 regions. This triggered 
the creation of regions in countries such as the Czech Republic (1993 
Constitution) or Poland (which created 16 regions in 1999). Some countries have 
allowed a differentiation in sub-national administrative structures, as it may be 
seen as more appropriate than a single “one-size-fits-all” structure. In Sweden for 
example, there has been a gradual, bottom-up regionalization process, where the 
central government did not impose a single model on the counties. This resulted 
in a rather heterogeneous administrative map, with three types of regions: a first 
type with directly elected regional councils, a second type with counties forming 
regional co-ordination bodies which are indirectly elected, and a third type where 
there are no regional bodies and where the central government intervenes through 
deconcentrated agencies. This experience highlights several pros and cons of 
asymmetric decentralization: on the one hand, it allowed a smooth 
decentralization process on a learning-by-doing basis, with the possibility to 
learn from the results, and positive experiences leading to “reform spillovers”. In 
addition, it allows tailoring different solutions for regions with different needs 
and capacities. On the other hand, there is a risk of creating a complex and 
heterogeneous system in which accountability mechanisms are unclear and the 
credibility of the regional level is limited.3 
As other OECD countries, Finland is searching for a way to secure the 
sustainability of its local governments and of the decentralized provision of basic 
public services by exploring territorial organization reforms. In 2007, Finland 
                                              
 
2 See: OECD (2010), Regional Policy in OECD Countries, Preliminary document prepared for the 
Territorial Development Policy Committee, GOV/TDPC(2010)1, OECD, Paris. 
3 For more information on the Swedish case, please refer to: OECD (2010), OECD Territorial Reviews: 
Sweden, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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started implementing the PARAS reform, which aims at creating economies of 
scale by encouraging voluntary municipal mergers and municipal cooperation 
areas for public service delivery. Given the high degree of municipal autonomy 
in Finland, and the country’s tradition of consensus it was not possible to use 
threats or sanctions to bind municipalities in implementing the reform (as was the 
case in Denmark, where municipalities were given one year to get into a 
voluntary merger, and if they did not comply, the central government could 
impose the merger). Municipalities therefore could choose between merging or 
joining larger cooperation areas, but financial incentives were used to encourage 
municipalities to select the merging option. Payments were provided for merging 
municipalities in function of three factors: the timing of the merger (the earlier, 
the greater the amount received), the number of municipalities involved (the 
greater the number, the larger the amount), and the population (higher rewards 
were given to municipalities which reached 20,000 inhabitants, and the amounts 
were greater the smaller the initial population of the merging municipalities). 
Still, despite these one-off payments, it is not obvious that municipalities really 
have incentives to merge. Indeed, the process of merging is costly, so it may 
absorb at least part of this financial benefit. Besides, given the equalization 
structure, small municipalities which face higher costs for providing public 
services are compensated through higher grants received from the central 
government, and can thus provide the same level and quality of public services as 
larger municipalities. The incentives embedded in the equalization mechanism 
should therefore be modified so that smaller municipalities have an incentive to 
improve their cost efficiency, for example by merging or joining a cooperation 
area. The PARAS reform would also benefit from setting clear targets for the 
mergers (population of the new municipality, total number of municipalities to be 
reached, clear deadline to carry out the mergers, etc.), and clear guidelines for the 
cooperation areas (which services should be transferred, to which institution, 
etc.). 
Finland is also evaluating the relevance of reinforcing a regional level of 
government.4 In spite of an apparently homogenous administrative structure 
(there are deconcentrated state bodies, regional councils, and hospital districts for 
example throughout the country), in practice, Finland has allowed a rather 
asymmetrical decentralization. In some regions, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa (Northern 
Ostrobothnia) for example, the administrative structure functions in the 
traditional fashion (standard division of tasks between municipalities and 
Regional Councils). In others, such as Central Finland where urban centers are 
strong and/or numerous (as in Jyvaskyla), these tend to overshadow the Regional 
Council, and are better positioned to lead some policies such as regional 
                                              
 
4 OECD (2010), OECD Public Governance Review of Finland: Working together to sustain success. 
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development (which is normally under the Regional Council’s responsibility). 
The Aland Islands enjoy provincial autonomy. In the remote region of Kainuu, 
which faces specific challenges due to population scarcity and long distances, a 
regional self government experiment is ongoing (2003–2012), which gives the 
Regional Council a stronger role in multiple areas of administration (including 
financial management and service delivery). Finally, in greater Helsinki, a 
metropolitan structure would be most appropriate, and there are already plenty of 
co-operation and partnerships in place for the provision of key public services 
such as transportation, land use, housing, etc.  
It would now be crucial to carry out an evaluation of these different 
experimentations and of the PARAS reform, in order to take an informed 
decision of what should be done next: extending the regional model as in 
Kainuu? Recognizing the asymmetric decentralization? Strengthening the 
municipal merger policy? Indeed, whatever the choice that will be made, it 
should be based on proper information and evaluation of existing practices. Then, 
implementing these choices will require reforms, and thus, relying on the 
relevant instruments which can facilitate these. A recent study of by the OECD5 
has underlined the specific challenges of public administration reforms and 
possible instruments which can facilitate them. Among these instruments, 
bundling several reforms together (such as territorial reform, allocation of roles 
and responsibilities and financing reforms) has helped several countries push 
public administration reforms through, as stakeholders may lose from some 
elements of the reform while benefiting from others, therefore being either 
indifferent or even supportive of the reform as a whole. In this regard, Finland 
may consider in the future, bundling the unfinished grants reform and the 
continuation of its local governments reforms together. This could for example 
allow reforming the equalization formula to give greater incentives to 
municipalities to seek efficiency gains, for example by merging and/or 
reinforcing cooperation agreements.  
6.2 Comments on the Finnish Model: Jens-Blom Hansen 
Based on the description of the Finnish situation given by Moisio et al. (2010) 
the Danish experience may be useful in four areas. 
                                              
 
5 Charbit, C., and Vammalle, C. (2010), “Modernising Government”, in Making Reform Happen: Lessons 
for the Future, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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Municipal amalgamations: A challenge for expenditure control 
In 2007 the number of municipalities was reduced from 271 to 98 in Denmark. 
This was achieved by semi-voluntary amalgamations on a massive scale over just 
1–2 years. 234 municipalities amalgamated into 65 new units. Only 33 were left 
intact. In Finland amalgamations are also on the political agenda, although much 
more time is allowed for the process. The Danish experience suggests that 
controlling municipal expenditure is difficult in this process. 
This is due to three factors. First, amalgamating municipalities means closing 
down existing systems. This creates an incentive to “spend before closing time”. 
No municipality seems to find it attractive to close down with unspent funds. 
Furthermore, many seem to find it relevant to protect local citizens from 
expected “unjust” measures from the future large municipality which may want 
to close down local institutions. One way to raise the political costs of doing so is 
to bring local institutions into tip-top shape before closing time. In Denmark, this 
incentive structure was anticipated by the central government which installed a 
number of restrictions to prevent overspending by the old municipalities (cf. 
above): Regulation of local capital and current spending levels, tax restrictions, 
and compulsory saving schemes. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
overspending did take place (Blom-Hansen 2010). 
Second, immediately after amalgamations have taken place, the new 
municipalities have to find a uniform service level on the basis of the previous 
municipalities’ different service levels. In Denmark this averaging exercise was 
difficult. Local citizens were told that amalgamations were a good idea because 
the quality of local service would increase and so on. But citizens living in areas 
where the old municipalities had over-average service levels had to accept 
decreasing service levels unless municipal expenditure was to increase. On the 
one hand this is simple mathematics. On the other, it is politically very difficult. 
The political incentive was to aim for the highest common denominator. This 
incentive structure has not been investigated in detail, but it is probably one of 
the reasons why municipal expenditure increased dramatically after 2007. 
Third, in Denmark one of the main arguments for amalgamations was that this 
would give rise to scale effects. Large municipalities were believed to be more 
efficient than small ones, especially in the administrative area (see e.g. 
Strukturkommissionen 2004: Ch. 11). This message was probably wrong. In the 
administrative area, large municipalities were not more efficient than small ones 
once differences in decentralization of administrative services to local institutions 
were controlled for (Blom-Hansen & Larsen 2005). In the various service areas a 
correlation between expenditure and municipality size could be demonstrated in 
the old structure, but this was probably spurious. Scale effects could be found at 
the level of institutions (e.g. schools, kindergartens), but there was no systematic 
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relationship between the size of municipalities and the size of their institutions. 
What did matter for the size of local institutions was the degree of the individual 
municipality’s urbanization (Blom-Hansen 2004a: 2004b). But urbanization 
would, of course, not change as a result of amalgamations. 
So far, there is no evidence that the amalgamated municipalities in Denmark are 
more efficient than the old ones or more efficient than the municipalities which 
did not amalgamate. On the contrary, a study of the 2008 accounts showed rising 
administrative costs in the amalgamated municipalities (Krevi 2009). This should 
not be taken as evidence that no efficiency gains can be made from the reform. 
Amalgamations force municipalities to reconsider their organization, service 
standards, administrative routines, number and size of schools, kindergartens, old 
age homes, and so on. There are many potential learning effects here. But this is 
a reform effect, not a scale effect. 
The Danish experience, in short, is that in economic terms municipal 
amalgamations carry considerable risks and no easy gains. 
Municipal equalization schemes: Transparency or justice? 
Finland and Denmark both have advanced systems for intermunicipal 
equalization that take into account differences in both expenditure needs and tax 
base. In both countries, equalization is on the political agenda, and reforms are 
often considered and sometimes implemented. The Danish experience suggests 
that this is an area of constant reform pressure and a futile search for a balance 
between fairness and transparency. 
In contrast to the traditional system in Finland, Denmark has for a long time had 
a system that only involves the Ministry of Interior, not the sectoral ministries. In 
this sense, the preconditions for making a more coherent system should be 
present. But the record shows that the system is constantly debated. The 
following issues have been the most controversial ones in Denmark. First, 
measuring expenditure needs is not easy. In Denmark the greatest challenge has 
been to find good empirical indicators of social costs and to decide their 
importance relative to demographic costs. For the present (year 2010), social 
needs weigh 30.75 while demographic costs weigh 69.25 (Ministry of the Interior 
2009b). This question is probably the thorniest issue in Denmark today. A 
number of municipalities feel that the system is so unfair that they have raised an 
“equalization rebellion”. They have been so successful that an overhaul of the 
system has been promised for 2012. 
Second, the question of which tax sources exactly to include in the tax base has 
been debated. Apart from income and property taxes, the municipalities also levy 
some minor taxes. But they are unevenly distributed among the municipalities. 
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So far, the general system only includes income and property taxes, but a special 
system for equalizing corporate income tax revenue has recently been installed. 
Third, the level of equalization is regularly debated. For the present, the general 
system equalizes 58 per cent of the differences in tax bases and expenditure 
needs, but there are special systems for municipalities in the Copenhagen region 
and very poor municipalities. Fourth, the relationship between matching grants 
and equalization is also constantly debated. Matching grants are seen to lead to 
suboptimal local decisions, but abolishing them requires more fine-grained 
equalization because the types of expenditure they help finance are not evenly 
distributed among the municipalities. 
In addition to these technical questions, there are constant complaints that the 
equalization system is too complex and suffer from transparency and legitimacy 
problems. The challenge is that reducing complexity easily reduces the degree of 
fairness in the system, a dilemma well-known from other policy areas, e.g. tax 
policies. 
In sum, the Danish experience suggests that equalization is a policy area where 
the status quo is constantly challenged. Due to its character as a zero-sum game 
between the municipalities it pits municipalities against each other and makes it 
an area difficult to handle for their associations. Furthermore, due to its technical 
complexity complaints of lack of transparency are likely to abound. 
Macroeconomic policy: Central control vs. local autonomy 
In all the Nordic countries local and regional governments are the implementing 
agencies of the welfare state. This means that municipalities and regions are 
responsible for a large share of public expenditure and income. This makes 
financial policy and macroeconomic control a challenge in all countries. Either 
this must be done on the basis of the relatively small central government budget, 
or some mechanism of involving the local and regional government sector must 
be found. 
Denmark is probably the Nordic country where local and regional governments 
are subjected to macroeconomic control in the most systematic fashion. This is 
done through the system of annual economic negotiations between the central 
government and the association of local and regional authorities that is described 
earlier in the paper. 
The Danish experience with this system is not easily summarized, but holds some 
lessons of potential value for Finland. The most general one is that finding the 
balance between central control and local autonomy is difficult. In principle the 
Danish system is elegant: A general revenue and expenditure guideline is set for 
the local and regional government sector which secures sound macroeconomic 
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performance. At the same time local autonomy is respected because individual 
municipalities and regions may deviate from this guideline as long as it is kept at 
the collective level.  
In practice, however, it is difficult. The most difficult problem is probably the 
rigidity which the system causes. Taxation is not adapted to local conditions 
because no mayor dares lower taxes since this would make the municipality more 
vulnerable to future constraints. In 2010 not a single municipality implemented 
tax cuts. This rigidity means that a pressure builds up in the system because 
municipalities experiencing an upwards expenditure pressure due to, say, the 
demographic development or the local employment condition are forced to cut 
down on welfare or seek assistance from the central government. As a partial 
acknowledgement of this problem the government set aside a “tax pool” of 500 
mill. DKK for 2010. Municipalities which wanted to increase taxation could then 
seek permission with the Interior Ministry to increase their local income taxation. 
Central government taxes would then be reduced with the same amount so that 
overall taxation remained unchanged. In the end, 42 municipalities – that is, 
almost half of the 98 municipalities – sought a permission and, in total, they 
wanted to increase taxation by 2 bill. DKK, four times more than was possible. 
This example is indicative of the dilemma of involving local governments in 
macroeconomic control: What is left of the independent local taxation right in 
Denmark nowadays is a possibility for democratically elected mayors to apply 
for tax permission with a central government official. 
This may be a deplorable situation from the perspective of local self-government. 
But under all circumstances it shows that involving local governments in 
macroeconomic control carries risks of creating counterproductive incentives. 
The rigidities in the Danish system mean that individual local authorities cannot 
adjust their own revenues. Faced with expenditure pressures they can either cut 
down local welfare or ask the central government for help. If the central 
government does not carefully follow a credible policy of not acting as a 
guarantor of last resort, it may be subjected to a pressure to bail out individual 
municipalities. So far, this situation has been avoided in Denmark because the 
central government has a precedent of responsible behavior when a municipality 
experiences a crisis. If a municipality cannot honor its obligations, it must seek 
exemption from the rule on overdraft facilities from the Interior Ministry. By 
tradition, to grant this exemption the ministry requires the municipality to present 
an economic recovery plan involving both tax increases and expenditure 
reductions (Juul 2006: 87–88). But this system is under pressure since local tax 
increases are no longer acceptable to the central government. 
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Is a regional level a good idea? 
A big difference between the local government systems in Denmark and Finland 
is the status of the regional level. In Denmark, regions are – at least formally – 
independent political bodies directly elected by the regional citizens. In Finland, 
the regional level consists of municipal cooperations, so-called joint authorities. 
Although some attempts have been made in Finland to strengthen the regional 
level (e.g. the Kainuu-region), Finland is exceptional, since both Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden have regional governments. So based on the Danish 
experience, would it be a good idea to create regional governments in Finland? 
As has been described in this chapter, Danish regions (before 2007: counties) 
have not had an easy life. The main problem seems to be that Danish citizens feel 
no particular allegiance to their region. When asked about their attachment to 
different geographical entities they systematically rank their region below their 
town, municipality and country (Kjær 2003). This lack of popular support makes 
it difficult for the regions to create a strong legitimacy base. This again means 
that their existence is mainly based on administrative efficiency. Since the local 
government reform in 1970 the main raison d’être of the regions/counties has 
been the administration of the hospital sector. When the 14 counties were created 
in 1970 their size was calculated as the population base required for running a 
modern hospital service. This was also the main criterion when the 14 counties 
were reformed into five regions in 2007 (Regeringen 2004). This again means 
that the regions are vulnerable if alternative institutional arrangements for the 
hospitals can be devised. But so far no-one has been able to do this. Although the 
Norwegian central government’s take-over of the hospital sector was noted with 
interest in Denmark, no-one seems to nurture the idea of a hospital sector run by 
the central government in Denmark. The Finnish model – municipal cooperations 
– is also politically impractical in Denmark. There is a historical tradition of 
skepticism towards this model. There seems to be a consensus that it is too 
vulnerable to non-transparency and political irresponsibility. Both in 1970 and 
2007 municipal amalgamations were carried through not least in order to abolish 
intermunicipal cooperative arrangements (Kommunallovskommissionen 1966: 
167–171; Strukturkommissionen 2004: 450–461) 
Based on this experience it would seem ill-advised to recommend any large-scale 
regionalization efforts in Finland, unless a stronger regional allegiance by the 
local citizenry can be demonstrated than in Denmark. 
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6.3 Comments on the Finnish Model: Matz Dahlberg 
I have four comments on the Finnish system. The comments are related to the 
joint authorities, the amalgamation of municipalities, the grant system and the 
decentralization of services. 
Joint authorities  
A rather specific feature of the Finnish system is the organization of certain 
services within joint authorities. In the wake of the structural reform project 
(PARAS), launched in 2005, and the Structural Reform Act, enacted in 2006, this 
seems to be a growing phenomenon. A joint authority is a cooperation between 
two or more municipalities on the supply of some service (e.g. hospitals, basic 
health care, care of the disabled and vocational education). There are no elections 
to the joint authorities; their decision makers are chosen by the member 
municipalities. There are several potential problems with designs similar to those 
in the joint authorities: First, it is hard to know the voters’ preferences for the 
services provided by joint authorities (the voters cannot reveal their preferences 
for these services through the ballot box since the elections are held at the 
municipal level). Second, since there is no election to these local bodies, it is not 
clear who the decision-maker is (difficult to know how the voters’ preferences in 
different municipalities are aggregated within the joint authorities). Third, local 
accountability decreases since it becomes harder for the voters to know which 
decision-makers to hold responsible for the decisions made at the joint authority 
level (the decision-makers come from different municipalities and the decision-
makers are perhaps not even the elected politicians). Fourth, the joint authorities 
might create common pool problems (the services provided at the joint authority 
level can be asymmetrically used by inhabitants in different municipalities, 
depending on preferences and socio-economic and demographic structure, but the 
costs are divided between several municipalities). One possible solution to these 
problems is to impose an additional local body, like the Swedish counties, that is 
horizontally lined together with the municipalities under the central government, 
which are responsible for services that need a large population base and whose 
decision-makers are elected in general elections. 
Related to the issue of joint authorities is the recent argument that has been raised 
in Finland that land use planning should be moved from the municipal level to an 
intermediate level. If the intermediate level is not governed by a political body 
that has been elected in general elections, this may generate the same type of 
problems as discussed above for joint authorities. Apart from the political 
argument, it is hard to say what the optimal jurisdictional size should be for land 
use planning. There is always the trade-off between benefits from larger 
jurisdictional units (like economies of scale and the possibility to internalize 
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externalities) and costs from them (e.g., more difficult to have good knowledge 
about local preferences and local conditions and decreased local accountability). 
Amalgamation of municipalities  
There is a recent trend towards larger municipalities in Finland, a policy that is 
still high up on the political agenda. This is clear from the structural reform 
project, PARAS, and the Structural Reform Act, but also from the fact that the 
central government rewards municipalities that merge sometimes between the 
year 2008 and the year 2013 with extra grants (the grant was 1.8-fold if the 
merge took place in 2008 or 2009, and 1.4-fold if it took place in 2010 or 2011). 
There is however potential problems associated with amalgamation of 
municipalities into larger units. Given the number and size of the municipalities 
in Finland, it is unclear from existing research whether further amalgamation of 
municipalities leads to significant economic improvements. Research do however 
indicate that local democracy worsen with the size of the municipality; the larger 
the municipality is, the lower is the political participation at the local level, the 
lower is the voters’ view on the legitimacy of democracy and the larger is the 
differences between voters’ and politicians’ preferences. Research conducted on 
amalgamation of municipalities in Sweden also indicates that the common pool 
problem is to be taken seriously. Municipalities anticipating an amalgamation 
indulge in strategic debt behavior before the amalgam is constructed. This means 
that the central government in Finland through its extra grants to merging 
municipalities might reward inefficient, debt-financed, spending behavior. At the 
very least, the government financially punishes those municipalities that had 
merged before the year 2008. If the central government has decided that there is a 
need for fewer and larger municipalities, a possible solution is that the central 
government announces which amalgamations that is to take place and a protocol 
that is to be followed until the amalgamation has taken place. 
Grant system  
The grant system in Finland does not seem that transparent. This is a problem 
and calls for a grant reform. In addition, a large share of the grants allocated to 
the municipalities is based on municipal characteristics. This is problematic both 
on the ground that the municipalities can quite likely affect some of the variables 
through their policies, and thereby the allocation of grants, and on the ground that 
it is hard to know which weights to put on the municipal characteristics when 
deciding about the allocation rule. An important part of a grant reform could be 
to increase the share of general (block) grants. This would have several 
advantages. First, an increase in the share of general grants would make the 
system more transparent. Second, general grants do not affect the relative prices 
between different services, implying that the municipalities’ priorities will mirror 
the costs of the municipal services. Third, general grants do not put any 
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restrictions on municipal decision-making, which ear-marked and matching 
grants do. Fewer restrictions on municipal decision-making make local 
accountability easier. Fourth, general grants are more in accordance with the idea 
of local self-government than ear-marked and matching grants.  
Decentralization of services  
There is a large amount of tasks that are decentralized to the municipalities in 
Finland. A reasonable question to ask is which services are suitable to 
decentralize? Are all welfare services appropriate? It is not obvious that it is a 
good idea, for example, to decentralize primary schools and welfare. Research 
shows that decentralization of social welfare (welfare assistance) might lead to 
welfare competition among the municipalities, which in turn might lead, from a 
societal point of view, to a sub-optimal level in the welfare generosity (a “race to 
the bottom”). Research on decentralization of schools in Sweden indicate that 
decentralization might lead to an, from the society’s point of view, undesirable 
large variation over students in school resources.  
6.4 Comments on the Finnish model: Lars-Erik Borge 
The Finnish model of local government has the same main characteristics as the 
other Nordic models. The local government level is the main provider of welfare 
services within education, health, and social services. Total revenues amount to a 
substantial part of GDP and a proportional income tax is the cornerstone in the 
financing. A block grant system has been in place since 1993, with the purpose 
of equalizing service provision throughout the country. On the other hand, the 
Finnish model differs from the other Nordic models in two important and related 
aspects. It has no middle tier and relies on extensive cooperation among 
municipalities. 
In this comment on the Finnish model I will concentrate on (i) municipal 
structure and municipal cooperation, (ii) the middle tier, and (iii) tax financing 
and tax equalization. 
Municipal structure and municipal cooperation 
In terms of municipal structure Finland is facing the same challenge as Norway. 
Many municipalities are considered to be too small to achieve efficiency and 
quality in service provision. In addition, both countries have relied on voluntary 
mergers instead of a national reform. Turning to the outcomes, Finland has 
clearly been more successful than Norway in terms of reducing the number of 
municipalities. Since 2005 the number of municipalities is reduced by 90 in 
Finland, compared to only 5 in Norway. 
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Why has Finland succeeded, while Norway has not? Both countries have applied 
economic incentives to stimulate mergers, but I think the Finnish design has been 
more effective by limiting the merger grant to the period 2008-2013 and by 
making the grant more generous for mergers early in the period. In addition a 
merger grant may in general be less effective in Norway where most small 
municipalities have above average fiscal capacity – the carrot becomes less 
tempting when they already are well off. 
In the Norwegian context I have expressed skepticism towards the principle of 
voluntarity, arguing that it is unlikely to result in a coherent reform in all parts of 
the country. In some parts of the country small municipalities will merge, in 
others they will not. Then there is no national solution with respect to the 
organization of welfare services. However, in Finland the lack of a coherent 
reform is less of a problem given the tradition of extensive municipal 
cooperation. Areas where small municipalities do not merge must simply rely on 
cooperation. 
However, I must admit that the extensive reliance on municipal cooperation in 
Finland is a bit of a puzzle to a Norwegian observer. Extensive cooperation 
makes the system less transparent and may create unclear responsibilities and 
little accountability. That joint municipal authorities run hospitals is particularly 
puzzling. Specialized medical care is a large, growing, and increasingly 
complicated activity where most countries are struggling with organization and 
financing to control costs. Municipal cooperation is seldom an alternative that is 
considered. Still the Finnish system seems to produce pretty good results. Is that 
because or despite municipal cooperation? 
The middle tier 
All Nordic countries are discussing reforms of the middle tier. Finland and 
Norway seem to be the two countries that are discussing the most drastic 
changes. In Finland there is a discussion to establish a middle tier, and in Norway 
a move to a two-tier system is on the agenda. For both countries the experience 
of the other are obviously of relevance. 
I think the main message from the Norwegian experience is that it difficult to 
build up sufficient political legitimacy for a new middle tier. The establishment 
of the county level as a separate political level in 1976 was expected to 
strengthen local democracy, but the counties were never able to live up to these 
expectations. The citizens are far more attached to municipal and national 
politicians than to county politicians. And after the central government took over 
the responsibility for the hospitals, the county level became even weaker and 
more marginalized. For Finland I will argue against establishment of a middle 
tier of the present Norwegian type, i.e. county governments with own tax base, 
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directly elected councils and with responsibility for regional planning, 
transportation, and other minor issues. Responsibility for hospitals must be a 
precondition for establishment of a middle tier with own tax base and directly 
elected councils. 
The main message from the Finnish experience is that decentralized provision of 
welfare services and no middle tier require extensive municipal cooperation, in 
particular when there are many small municipalities. When a move to two-tier 
system is considered in Norway, it is important to think through how municipal 
cooperation will work. 
Equalization grants 
The Finnish equalization system consists of costs equalization and revenue 
equalization. There are three cost equalization grants related to health and 
welfare services, education, and general grant (capturing rural and urban cost 
factors). For health and welfare services and education a formula defines a 
calculatory cost per capita for each municipality. The per capita grant received 
equals the calculatory cost in excess of 65 percent of the country average. The 
cost equalization scheme could be revised in two ways. First, since the cost 
equalization grants are block grants (non-earmarked), it may be confusing to 
have sector specific cost equalization grants. The formulas should be merged into 
a single formula producing a single cost equalization grants. Second, the cost 
equalization could be made self-financing by letting contributions from 
municipalities with below average calculatory costs finance the transfers to 
municipalities with above average calculatory costs. The amount of money in the 
present cost equalization grants could be transferred into a flat per capita grant. 
The legitimacy of the cost equalization should be improved by publishing the 
analyses that have generated the formulas. 
The revenue (or tax) equalization scheme guarantees all municipalities nearly 92 
percent of average per capita (calculatory) tax revenue. This implies that 
municipalities with tax base below 92 percent of the average have weak 
incentives to develop the local tax base. A successful development policy has 
little impact on municipal revenues since higher tax revenues are counteracted by 
a reduction in the revenue equalization grant. To improve incentives the 
compensation rate should be below 100 percent also for the municipalities with 
tax base below 92 percent of the average. 
6.5 Comments on the Finnish model: Anwar Shah 
Globalization and the information age calls for empowered local governments 
that can work as catalysts for national economic growth and international 
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competitiveness while advancing local economic development. The information 
age has also resulted in diminished economic relevance of intermediate order 
governments while they still retain strong political clout. China adopted such a 
model and local governments there played a critical role in China’s success story 
in rapid economic growth. Local governments in most industrial countries are 
constrained to play such a role due to their narrowly defined range of 
responsibilities with even more limited own financing possibilities. There are 
only few exceptions and these are found mostly in Nordic countries especially in 
Finland. Finland should receive plaudits for several important features of its local 
governance. Finland gives some recognition to the role of local governments as 
the primary agent of people and almost all of local service responsibilities are 
entrusted to them. Local governments in Finland have seized upon this 
opportunity by innovating in diverse financing and delivery arrangements for 
local public services. Consistent with the analytical view, Finland has also 
recognized that intermediate order governments have little economic relevance 
unless they are constituted as consultative or cooperative bodies of local 
governments to deal with inter-municipal services and affairs as done in Finland. 
Finland also needs to be congratulated for separating the executive and 
legislative functions at the local government in the interest for better economic 
governance through appointments of professional municipal managers. Other 
industrialized countries can learn from this experience especially given the fiscal 
sustainability concerns arising from recent fiscal and financial crisis. Finland also 
affords its local government significant access to central revenue bases through 
piggybacking. Finland’s system of inter-local revenue equalization is also 
commendable for the use of “Robin-Hood” approach for the fiscal equalization 
component. The structure of central-local transfers for education, health and 
social welfare is also laudable for their transparency, simplicity and objectivity. 
The missing element in design is results based accountability without 
undermining local autonomy through the use of output-based fiscal transfers for 
merit goods that set national minimum standards in education, health, social 
welfare and infrastructure. Finland, however, must avoid the temptations of 
falling in the academic trap of looking for precise justice through complex grant 
formulae for expenditure needs (costs) equalization as done in Australia, 
Netherlands and several other countries. For local fiscal discipline, Finland 
primarily relies on market discipline. This works only so long as rating agencies 
are not conflicted with personal interest and local politics is constrained by 
strong fiscal conservatisms by citizen-voters. For transparency and 
accountability, Finland requires external auditing and in budgeting has taken 
some steps to introducing performance budgeting. It could do more by linking 
this budgeting with planning and evaluation and human resource management as 
well as using it for benchmarking performance in local service delivery. In 
conclusion, Finland is already in-step with the needs of modern local governance. 
It simply needs to sustain the current path by fine tuning the existing system of 
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local governance. Other industrialized countries in Southern Europe and North 
America and also Australia are in need of major reform of local governance and 
could learn from Finland’s experience.  
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